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Venture capital can not only realize its own capital appreciation, but
also promote the development of startups and boost the development
of high-tech industries; therefore, it has obvious positive externalities.
With the development of venture capital in China, the impact of venture
capital on the operating performance of startups gradually attracts
widespread attention.
This paper investigates the impact of venture capital on the operating
performance of startups and conducts an in-depth discussion on the
problem formulation, empirical relationship, cause and effect analysis,
and countermeasure suggestions. The main research contents include:
The first part is the introduction, which analyzes the research
background, purpose and significance, research methodology,
technical routes, etc., reviews the relevant theories of research objects,
the impact of venture capital on operating performance of startups, and
relevant literature at home and abroad, and compares and analyzes the
development processes of venture capital at home and abroad, in order
to lead to the research problems of this paper.
The second part is the empirical analysis, which uses the public data of
Chinese GEM listed companies to conduct an empirical analysis of the
impact of venture capital on the operating performance of startups and
draw relevant conclusions, pointing out that adverse selection is the
main reason for the formation of these impact relationships and
conducting an in-depth discussion.
The third part is the cause and effect analysis, which mainly elaborates
the causes of the market-based selection of risk appetite, information
asymmetry, and principal-agent mechanism for adverse selection, and
analyzes the adverse selection effects of the
SMU Classification: Restricted
possibility of increasing venture capital for startups, lemon market, and
valuation bubble by making use of adverse selection.
The fourth part is the countermeasure analysis, which puts forward
countermeasures and recommendations for venture capital, startups,
and other participants in the capital market based on the mutual impact
between venture capital and operating performance of startups in order
to deepen the application value of this paper.
The empirical analysis of this paper demonstrates that the venture
capital is negatively correlated with the operating performance of
startups due to the adverse selection. This conclusion has positive
practical guidance value for the venture capital, startups and other
participants in the capital market to strengthen their strategic
responses.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Venture capital can not only realize its own capital appreciation, but
also promote the development of startups, boost the development of
high-tech industries, accelerate the technological innovation of certain
countries and regions, and make up for the insufficient funds for
innovative SMEs. It has obvious positive externalities and plays a very
active role in prospering economy and society. With the development of
venture capital in China, the interconnection and mutual impact
between venture capital and the operating performance of startups
gradually attract widespread attention and are worth of deep
exploration and research.
1.1 Research backgrounds, reasons, purposes and
significance
Venture capital (VC), also known as “venture investment”, private
equity investment, etc., refers to the investment mode that conducts
equity investment in startups, with a view to obtain capital appreciation
mainly through equity transfer after the invested startups become
matured or relatively mature. Venture capital is an equity-type direct
investment with its own distinctive characteristics, and has achieved
great success in developed economies such as Europe and the United
States and developed areas in China.
1.1.1 Research backgrounds and reasons
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China’s economic and social development can be described as a
magnificent history. Reform and opening-up have profoundly changed
the social relations of China, which has greatly promoted the production
of material wealth compared with the past. And the national economy
has maintained a rapid growth for many years. At present, China has
entered a new stage of development, facing a transformation from an
economic growth model of resource consumption, earning foreign
exchange through exports investment driving, and extensive
development to resource conservation, consumption growth, innovation
driving and intensive development. The environment for economic
development is increasingly complex. Driven by the evolution of
industrial structure, Chinese economy is presenting a trend of switching
from old growth drivers to new ones, and forming an innovation drive
from quantitative change to qualitative change. The proportion of new
growth drivers in the national economy is accelerating, and the scale
can make equal to some of the old growth drivers. The increase in the
economic contribution of growth drivers stems from a more obvious
acceleration trend presented by the scale.
The emergence of a new economy and new growth drivers is
inseparable from the venture capital. “Widespread Entrepreneurship
and Innovation” has strengthened the concentration effect of capital,
projects and talents. According to data from more than 700 Chinese
GEM listed companies, more than 50% of these companies were
favored by venture capital before IPO. At the same time, venture capital
has its own distinctive characteristics:
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Firstly, the investment objects are mainly high-tech startups. Compared
with traditional enterprises, high-tech enterprises are at the forefront of
technological innovation, which may bring revolutionary changes to
human production and life. Therefore, they have higher growth potential.
Although the traditional commercial banks seeking lower and fixed
investment returns are unwilling to get involved, high-tech enterprises
have become favored investment objects for venture capital pursuing
high profits and having probability of failure. In the United States, more
than 70% of venture capital is invested has been put high-tech fields,
which has greatly promoted the industrialization of high-tech①.
Secondly, high risks and high returns exist side by side. In the process
of technological innovation and incubation growth, high-tech
enterprises need to go through the stages of R&D, experiment, serving
and sales. Each of these stages is highly uncertain and likely to fail.
Therefore, venture capital has high risks. At the same time, once a
high-tech startup succeeds, it can enable venture capital to obtain high
returns of several times, dozens of times, or even hundreds of times
due to its knowledge-intensive, technology-intensive and
innovation-intensive products or services. With the high gains obtained
from successful projects to offset the losses of failed projects, venture
capital can obtain a higher average return.
Thirdly, provide value-added services for startups. Venture capital not
only builds a bridge between capital and high-tech, but also provides
① PEdaily.cn.What is Startup Investment?. https://pe.pedaily.cn/chuangye.shtml
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important funding sources for the cultivation and growth of many
promising high-tech startups that are difficult to finance from banks and
other channels. It also actively participates in major management
activities of invested companies after investment, provides value-added
services that cannot be achieved by startups’ own resources, assists
the invested companies in brand image promotion, continuous
financing, governance improvement, risk control, IPO counseling, etc.,
to facilitate the invested companies to grow bigger and stronger quickly.
Fourth, the investment period is long and the liquidity is relatively small.
Venture capital often considers to exit after going through the R&D,
production, marketing, sales and other processes of startup projects.
Therefore, the investment period is longer, ranging from 3-5 years to
7-10 years. This is different from the repayment of principal and interest,
exit on time or transfer of creditor’s rights of credit capital.
Fifth, the periodicity and cyclicity of investment. Venture capital
emphasizes the potential growth and high profitability of the invested
companies. When the invested companies rapidly develop to a certain
stage, the equity value of venture capital doubles, and the equity is sold
to achieve high capital returns at this time. Hereafter, venture capital
can seek new risk projects with the principal and proceeds, pursue new
returns, and form a cycle of capital movement. It is exactly because of
this special mechanism of venture capital that small and medium-sized
innovative enterprises continue to emerge, develop and expand.
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As venture capital invested in startups has the characteristics of
profit-seeking, periodicity, and failure-tolerance, the mutual impact
between venture capital and operating performance of startups is
worthy of deep exploration, which in turn leads to issues such as why
and how to impact and can be applied to enhance the operation level of
venture capital, strengthen the integration of startups and venture
capital, and promote the healthy and sustainable development of
China’s capital market.
This paper takes the GEM listed companies as the research object to
carry out the research on the mutual impact of venture capital and
operating performance of startups. The main reasons are as follows:
Firstly, venture capital and startups are important components of
China’s new economy and new growth drivers. The relationship
between venture capital and operating performance of startup is a
trending topic. The research of this paper will help boost the
development of China’s new economy represented by high-tech
industry. The author has long been concerned about China’s new
economy, new growth drivers, and the future and destiny of China’s
economic and social development. Conducting research on the
relationship between venture capital and operating performance of
startups will help deepen the understanding of the future development
of China’s new economy.
Specifically, the ever-changing industrial form, labor costs that increase
over time, increasingly scarce natural resources, severe environmental
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pollution, and dynamic global economic new pattern have all had a
major impact on China’s economic development. How to realize
high-quality economic growth of China is an extremely important and
arduous task. The economic development path of developed countries
affords us useful experience that when economic development reaches
an advanced stage, they establish a development mode driven by
technological innovation. Venture capital plays an indispensable role in
technological innovation, so it is also positive for technological
innovation. Carrying out research on the impact of venture capital on
the operating performance of startups will bring about the
understanding on the development path of startups with technological
innovation as their mission.
Secondly, the IPO is a symbolic time node for the development of
startups. Venture capital has a very obvious impact on the operating
performance of startups before the IPO. The venture capital may,
before the IPO, take all measures to improve the operating
performance of startups in order to help the startups sprint to go public,
so the operating performance of startups should fully realize its
potential. After the IPO, as the goals of venture capital and startup are
no longer the same, the role of venture capital may be divergent. One
option is to let things take their course. Because after a startup goes
public, it needs to accept more regulatory requirements, and the role of
venture capital is weakened and inadequate to help the operating
performance, so that the operating performance of startups will decline;
another option is to continue to contribute to the operating performance
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of startups, in order to achieve a high premium exit of venture capital.
Therefore, using IPO as a time node to explore the mutual impact
between venture capital and operating performance of startups is
conducive to deepen the understanding of the subject of this paper.
At the same time, the valuation bubble of venture capital projects
currently is a hot topic. Wework, a shared office space project invested
by Softbank, flopped before the IPO, and even failed to go public due to
the resistance from the capital market. As an investor widely involved in
venture capital and the secondary market investment, the author is
particularly concerned about the impact of venture capital on the
operating performance of startups before IPO, which is also a reason
for conducting the research of this paper.
Venture capital makes complicated impact on the operating
performance of startups, and its mechanism is worthy of further
research and discussion. The mechanism has been researched and
investigated from the perspective of classic theories, such as adverse
selection hypothesis, monitoring hypothesis, certification hypothesis,
and market power hypothesis. It is shown from the current related
studies, there has not yet been a consensus on the impact of venture
capital on the operating performance of startups. This paper mainly
conducts a profound discussion from the perspective of qualitative and
empirical analysis in order to draw some meaningful conclusions. For
the author, analyzing the reasons is very significant for the career
development with investment as the main job.
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Fourthly, this paper is themed “the mutual impact between venture
capital and operating performance of startups”, with venture capital and
startups as two main subjects. At the same time, as the data sources
and research objects are mainly from the Chinese GEM listed
companies, the third-party participants in the GEM market should also
be considered. Such participants mainly include securities underwriters,
exchanges and other regulatory authorities, and investors in the
primary and secondary markets. In this way, the analysis of the
relationship between venture capital and operating performance of
startups will not only enlighten venture capital and startups, but also
enlighten other participants in the GEM market and the proposal of
relevant strategic recommendations will contribute to promoting the
healthy and sustainable development of China’s capital market, which
is also a wish of the author to carry out the research in this paper.
1.1.2 Research purposes
There is a complex relationship between venture capital and operating
performance of startups, which is affected by a combination of various
factors. This paper focuses on the mutual impact of venture capital and
operating performance of startups, with the main research purposes as
the follows:
The first purpose is to make theoretical interpretation and literature
review. The academic community has established the theories of
adverse selection hypothesis, grandstanding hypothesis, monitoring
hypothesis, certification hypothesis, and market power hypothesis to
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address the mutual impact of venture capital and operating
performance of startups. The predecessors have also conducted
profound related researches, and there are a large number of research
literatures. In this paper, trace analysis and review are performed on
relevant theories and literature. From the theoretical level, the impact
relationship and association mechanism between venture capital and
operating performance of startups are discussed.
The second purpose is to put forward research hypotheses from the
perspective of “the impact of venture capital on the operating
performance of startups”. Based on the statistical IPO data of Chinese
GEM listed companies, a mathematical model of the impact of venture
capital on the operating performance of startups is constructed,
relevant hypothesis verification and conclusion analysis are carried out
accordingly, and the impact of venture capital on the operating
performance of startups is explored from an empirical level.
The third purpose is to analyze the causes and effects of adverse
selection in the venture capital process. Venture capital has a negative
correlation with the operating performance of startups due to adverse
selection in the venture capital process. Then, the causes and effects of
adverse selection are analyzed to enhance the understanding of the
venture capital market characteristics, such as the possibility of
increasing venture capital for startups, lemon market, valuation bubble,
moral risks, and threshold issues.
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The fourth purpose is to put forward relevant strategic
recommendations for venture capital, startups, and other participants in
the GEM market based on the results of empirical analysis in order to
promote the healthy and sustainable development of China’s capital
market, deepen the theoretical reference and practical guidance of this
paper.
1.1.3 Research significance
This paper takes Chinese GEM as the data source and empirical
analysis object to carry out the research on the relationship between
venture capital and operating performance of startups. The research
significance lies in the following aspects.
First of all, empirical method is adopted to clarify the impact of venture
capital on the operating performance of startups, which helps to
strengthen the understanding of the impact of venture capital on the
operating performance of startups. The operating performance of
startups is mainly reflected in profitability, operating ability and solvency.
The presence or absence of venture capital will have a certain impact
on the operating performance of startups. The empirical analysis and
overall description of such impact relationship will help strengthen
people’s understanding of the role of venture capital. Further, using IPO
as a time node to investigate the impact of venture capital on the
operating performance of startups can describe the role of venture
capital for startups for different purposes in a more profound manner,
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which provides a valuable reference for the development of venture
capital and the introduction of venture capital into startups.
Secondly, qualitative analysis is applied to explore the causes for the
impact of venture capital on the operating performance of startups,
which helps to understand the impact mechanism of venture capital on
startups, and strengthens the verifications on relevant theories such as
adverse selection hypothesis, monitoring hypothesis, certification
hypothesis and market power hypothesis. And observation is
conducted on some characteristics of startups’ choice of venture capital,
in order to draw some ideas that can help promote the development of
venture capital and startups, and then to guide to solve the realistic
problems.
In terms of theoretical research, the researches on the impact of
venture capital on the operating performance of startups carried out by
western scholars basically take the mainstream hypotheses of adverse
selection, monitoring, certification and market power of venture capital
as the theoretical basis. The adverse selection hypothesis is mainly to
demonstrate from the perspective of information asymmetry that
companies with promising development prospects will avoid venture
capital, while those with worse performance and poor growth choose
venture capital financing to share future risks. The monitoring
hypothesis elaborates that by exerting the “screening effect” and
“monitoring effect”, venture capital plays a supervisory role to startups
and provides value-added services to improve the efficiency of
enterprises. The certification hypothesis asserts that as it is difficult for
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external investors to obtain all information of the companies, lower
prices will be offered to their securities, while venture capital with a
good reputation is a third-party verification agency that can provide
verification information for companies by financial capital and reputation
capital, which has an impact on the security pricing of the listing of a
company. In the market power hypothesis, venture capital is attractive.
By attracting high-quality market partners, including underwriters,
institutional investors and securities analysts, to participate in the IPO
of target company and improve the valuation of the IPO and secondary
market to obtain considerable returns.
However, due to the late start of research on venture capital in China
and basing on the different hypotheses, scholars still have
disagreements. One of the most apparent examples is that domestic
scholars sometimes silently accept the certification hypothesis and the
grandstanding hypothesis of venture capital and sometimes make the
conclusion that these hypotheses are not suitable for the Chinese
market. It is certain that the laws of venture capital in the West have
play a very important role in deepening our understanding on venture
capital, but the gap between the West and China in the analysis of
economic problems must not be blurred. Theoretical verification and
analysis of empirical relationships can help understand the application
of relevant theories in China’s venture capital market and guide the
development of venture capital and startups.
Thirdly, it is of great significance to propose strategies for venture
capital, startups, and other capital market participants to promote the
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sustainable and healthy development of China’s capital market, on
basis of the impact of venture capital on the operating performance of
startups. Venture capital and startups are important players in China’s
capital market. In addition, the capital market also consists of other
institutions, regulatory authorities and various investors. Based on the
impact of venture capital on the operating performance of startups, as
well as the mechanism of the impact and cause, some strategic
recommendations for venture capital, startups and other participants in
the capital market can be formed to promote the development of
China’s capital market, boost the transformation and upgrading of
industrial structure and the flourishing of innovation and startup
activities, which has a far-reaching significance for the future
development of China’s new economy and new growth drivers.
1.2 Research content and methodology
1.2.1 Main research content:
The paper discusses the impact of venture capital on the operating
performance of startups in order to obtain a clearer and more accurate
judgment of China’s venture capital market. Then, the strategies for
venture capital, startups, and other capital market participants are
proposed. The content structure of the paper is mainly divided into 7
chapters.
Chapter 1 is the introduction. This chapter is the beginning of paper,
mainly explaining the research backgrounds, reasons, purposes and
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significance, research content, research methodology, technical routes
and possible novelties of the paper, which plays a guidance role.
Chapter 2 is about fundamental theories and literature review. It mainly
includes concepts related to venture capital and startups, relevant
theories on the mutual impact of venture capital and operating
performance of startups, and Chinese and foreign literature reviews
and evaluations.
Chapter 3 is about the development process of venture capital and
research problems in this study. It mainly includes the development
history of Chinese and foreign venture capital, as well as the
introduction to the research problems, relevant research framework and
research design.
Chapter 4 is an empirical analysis of the impact of venture capital on
the operating performance of startups. It mainly includes the
characterization dimension of the operating performance of startups,
regression analysis of the impact of venture capital on operating
performance of startups, hypothesis verification and conclusion
discussion of the impact of venture capital on operating performance of
startups.
Chapter 5 analyzes the causes and effects of adverse selection in the
venture capital process. Venture capital has a negative correlation with
the operating performance of startups due to adverse selection in the
venture capital process. This chapter mainly analyzes the causes and
effects of adverse selection: The causes include the market-based
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selection of risk appetite, information asymmetry, and principal-agent
mechanism for adverse selection, and adverse selection effects mainly
elaborate the possibility of increasing venture capital for startups by
making use of adverse selection, lemon market, and valuation bubble,
moral risks and threshold issues.
Chapter 6 puts forward countermeasures and analysis of the mutual
impact between venture capital and operating performance of startups.
It is mainly based on the empirical analysis of the impact of venture
capital on the operating performance of startups, and combine the
causes and effects of adverse selection to propose countermeasure
suggestions for venture capital, startups and other participants in the
capital market, and deepen the research value of the paper.
Chapter 7 is about research conclusions and prospects. Based on the
research in Chapters 1 to 6, the main work and conclusions of the
paper are reviewed, and the problems and directions which require
further study are pointed out for the paper.
1.2.2 Main research methodology
Economics is a science that guides economic practice and solves
practical problems. Literature research, descriptive statistics and
econometric analysis, qualitative and comparative analysis are all
commonly used in the researches of economics. These methods will be
comprehensively applied to carry out research in the paper.
(1) Literature research and summary analysis methods
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Literature research is a method of sorting out and reviewing the
literature, outcomes and theories of previous studies, and forming a
scientific understanding of facts through literature research. Summary
analysis is a method of inducing and analyzing specific situations in
practice to make them systematic and theoretic. In the paper, literature
research is mainly used in the literature review, and summary analysis
is mainly used in background analysis and countermeasure analysis.
(2) Descriptive statistical method
Descriptive statistics is a method of data statistics, arrangement,
induction and analysis, which can discover the internal laws of numbers
in economic matters. Descriptive statistics is the key to empirically
analyze the interactive relationship between economic matters, and it
helps comprehensively examine the mutual impact between venture
capital and operating performance of startups, so as to display the
mathematical relationship between venture capital and operating
performance of startups from multiple sides and dimensions.
(3) Metrological analysis method
Mathematical models and quantitative analysis are applied to conduct
hypothesis verification on the impact of venture capital on the operating
performance of startups in the paper, which mainly involves multiple
regression analysis with dummy variables, in order to reveal the
empirical impact relationship between venture capital and operating
performance of startups.
(4) Qualitative analysis and comparative analysis methods
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Qualitative analysis method to infer the nature and development trend
of things based on the subjective judgment and analysis ability of
researchers. Comparative analysis method is to compare objective
things so as to realize the essence and law of things and make a
correct evaluation. In the paper, qualitative analysis is mainly used in
analyzing the causes and effects of adverse selection of the impact of
venture capital on the operating performance of startups, and
comparative analysis is mainly used in proposing related
countermeasure suggestions.
1.3 Technical route and novelties
1.3.1 Technical route
According to the research content and research methodology of the
paper, the technical route can be illustrated as follows (Figure 1-1):
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In the process of research on the relationship between venture capital
and operating performance of startups, possible novelties mainly lie in
following two aspects:
The first possible novelty lies in the innovation of research content. The
paper studies the impact of venture capital on the operating
performance of startups, and also deeply discusses the causes and
effects of adverse selection in the venture capital process. According to
literature research, at present, many studies have addressed “the
impact of venture capital on the operating performance of startups”
while few studies have explored “the causes and effects of adverse
selection”. In this study, the above two are combined, which shows
some innovations in the research content.
The second possible novelty lies in the innovation of research value. In
relevant research at home and abroad, there are many research
literatures that believe that venture capital has a positive impact on the
operating performance of startups, and certainly there are research
literatures that hold the opposite view. The paper does not hold any
predetermined position in the research process, with all depending on
data. It is concluded that venture capital is negatively correlated with
the operating performance of startups mainly due to the adverse
selection, and the countermeasure suggestions that have practical
guiding significance for venture capital, startups, and other capital
market participants may form a certain innovation of research value.
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Chapter 2 Fundamental Theories and Literature Review
Venture capital and startups follow each other and have close ties. The
impact between venture capital and operating performance of startups
has long been widely concerned by academic community in China and
abroad, and there are many theories formed, a lot of related research
literatures and different academic views. This chapter mainly explains
the related theories, related research literature and research results of
venture capital, startups, and the impact of venture capital on operating
performance of startups through literature review.
2.1 Venture capital and startups
2.1.1 About venture capital
From the concept perspective of venture capital, the venture capital in
broad sense generally refers to all investments with high risks and high
potential returns; the venture capital in narrow sense refers to the
investment in production and operation of technology-intensive
products based on high-tech. From the perspective of investment
behavior, venture capital refers to an investment process that invests
capital in the research and development field of high-tech and its
products having the risk of failure to obtain high capital returns.
At present, venture capital is becoming an important part of China’s
multi-level financial system, which is essential to the technological
innovation and the development of high-tech industries.
(1) The meaning of venture capital
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Venture capital is mainly equity capital provided to unlisted startups. A
complete venture capital process includes four steps: fundraising,
investment, management, and exit.
The fundraising step refers to the fundraising by fund managers from
qualified investors such as institutions and individuals, mainly involving
preparations, core legal documents, roadshows and fund establishment.
In this process, investors are facing both high expected return and a
loss of principal, so it is a “venture capital”. The investment step refers
to that the venture fund managers (venture investors) invest the raised
funds into the startups to obtain the equity of the startups, in order to
realize capital appreciation after the rapid growth of the startups,
involving project search, project evaluation, due diligence and
investment plan design, etc.; due to the characteristics of fast growth
and high income, high-tech industry has become the target of most
venture funds. This process reflects the characteristics of the
introduction of venture capital by the entrepreneurs to start businesses,
so it is a kind of “venture capital”. The management step refers to that
after venture capital is invested in startups in exchange for shares,
venture fund managers provide value-added services to help startups
improve financial, strategic, marketing and other management levels,
and strengthen investment risk control in order to prompt startups to
grow bigger and stronger. The exit step refers to that the venture capital
exits the startups after a certain period of time to realize value-added
investment; instead of controlling the operating rights of the enterprise,
the purpose of venture capital is to transfer out the equity after the rapid
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growth of the invested enterprise to obtain high returns. The exit
methods of venture capital include IPO exit, mergers and acquisitions,
equity repurchase, and liquidation exit.
The venture capital process can be deemed as a process of capital
movement. In this process, investors obtain capital appreciation income,
risk fund managers obtain management income and share the capital
appreciation income of investors, and startup entrepreneurs quickly get
bigger and stronger, thus bringing about economic and social benefits
such as high-tech industry growth, technological progress, employment,
and taxation. Therefore, venture capital has created a new economic
development model, stimulated the vitality of economic development,
and has great benefits for economic and social development, which is a
booster for the economic and social development of a country and
region.
(2) The role of venture capital
It can not only realize its own capital appreciation, but also promote the
development of startups, boost the development of high-tech industries,
accelerate the technological innovation of certain countries and regions,
and make up for the insufficient funds for innovative SMEs. It has
obvious positive externalities and plays a very active role in prospering
economy and society.
Firstly, promote the development of startups. Venture capital not only
provides capital input to high-tech and high-risk startups, but also
provides a variety of value-added services after investment to help
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startups achieve rapid growth. While achieving its own investment and
value-added goals, it objectively promotes the development of startups.
At the same time, venture capital exits after the growth of a single
startup, and seeks new startup projects in the market, continues to
invest to promote the development of new startups, which forms a
circular movement of capital and becomes a capital partner that always
goes with startup activities.
Secondly, foster the prosperity of high-tech industries. From successful
R&D to real industrialization, high-tech needs to go through many
processes including product testing, production and marketing, and
may face the risk of failure at any process. The intervention of venture
capital provides capital and value-added services, accelerates the
transformation of high-tech achievements, and has become a catalyst
for the industrialization of high-tech achievements. In addition, the
concentration of venture capital also attracts a large number of
entrepreneurs to form a multi-level industrial cluster led by large
high-tech enterprises and supplemented by many small and
medium-sized enterprises. The world-renowned high-tech industrial
clusters such as Silicon Valley in the United States, Bangalore in India,
and Hsinchu Science Park in Taiwan cannot develop without the strong
support of venture capital.
Thirdly, accelerate technological innovation. Venture capital is
committed to investing in high-tech companies at start-up stage. For
long-term development, enterprises must continually carry out
technological innovation. However, capital investment in enterprises at
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start-up stage rarely have income, traditional banks and other financial
companies are reluctant to invest for risk reasons. The provision of
loans and the introduction of venture capital have promoted the
development of technological innovation. The technological innovation
process is confronted with huge technical risks and market risks, and it
is difficult for entrepreneurs themselves to resist the risks. Venture
capital is mainly invested in the form of equity. After becoming a
shareholder of the enterprise, it shares the risks with the enterprise.
Even if the technological innovation of enterprise fails or the operation
is poor, the repayment of principal is not required. Instead of simply
investing in the technological innovation of an enterprise, venture
capital will invest in multiple technological innovation projects at
different stages of development at the same time. Although diversified
investment does not always succeed, it reduces the risk of high-tech
innovation to a certain extent and promotes the technological progress
of the entire society.
Fourthly, break the “difficult financing” dilemma of innovative SMEs.
The core value of innovative SMEs lies in innovation, so there are full of
uncertainty in few fixed assets and future earnings. Credit capital that
pursues stable returns and dislikes risk will seldom intervene, while
venture capital that pursues excess profits and prefers risk just makes
up for this blind spot in the financial market. If the traditional banking
industry despises the poor and curries favor with the rich and likes
making things even better, venture capital is undoubtedly the opposite.
It is not afraid of risks and prefers to provide timely help. Therefore, the
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deluge of venture capital can gradually eliminate the difficulty and costly
financing for innovative SMEs.
Because venture capital has the significant external role mentioned
above, many countries and regions regard promoting startup
investment as an effective means for expanding new economy,
promoting technological innovation and improving regional
competitiveness, and encourages, guides, and facilitates the
development of venture capital.
2.1.2 About startups
Entrepreneurship is a process of discovering and capturing
opportunities to create novel products, services or realize the potential
value. The startups refer to innovative and pioneering enterprises which
simultaneously contain high growth and high risks in the start-up stage.
Entrepreneurship is closely related to creativity and innovation, and
startups consist of an important part of innovation activities.
(1) Creativity, innovation and startup
Creativity refers to novel and creative ideas different from ordinary
solutions, which is obtained mainly through brainstorming and reverse
thinking. Innovation is the act of improving or creating new things,
methods, elements, paths, environments, with certain beneficial effects
obtained. Generally speaking, innovative activities are accompanied by
a large number of creative ideas.
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Startup refers to the process by which entrepreneurs optimize and
integrate the resources they own or the resources that can be owned by
them through the efforts to create greater economic or social value.
Startup is inseparable from creativity and innovation. Creativity mainly
generates ideas first, innovation is the act of putting ideas into practice,
and startup is the process of commercializing innovative acts.
Venture capital focuses on the entire process of startups and can
participate in the creation stage, which is generally called a seed fund.
The initial innovation stage can be called an angel round. After it has a
commercial structure, it is collectively called venture capital. After
growing to relatively mature, it is called private equity investment, which
is further divided into A round, B round, C round, C+ round, D round,
etc. Generally speaking, it corresponds to the life cycle of an enterprise,
but limited to the time before IPO. After a startup enters a mature period
(usually marked by IPO), it is generally no longer called a startup, and
its financing activities are not considered as absorbing venture capital.
(2) Startups and their characteristics
It is generally believed that enterprises that have certain innovation
activities and are in the stage of entrepreneurship are called startups.
Entrepreneurs create market entities by recognition of entrepreneurial
opportunities to form the startups. The recognition process of
entrepreneurial opportunities includes creation, discovery and
identification. Identification mainly occurs in traditional economic field,
creation mainly in new economic field, and discovery mainly in the
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transition from the traditional economy to the new economic field.
Entrepreneurs and startups should have a certain entrepreneurial spirit.
The characteristics of startups mainly consist of the following.
Firstly, have a certain entrepreneurial spirit and innovative ability.
Entrepreneurship refers to the comprehensive ability of the organization,
establishment, operation and management of market subjects. It is an
important and special intangible production factor. Entrepreneurial spirit
becomes the key to determine whether the organization will succeed or
fail in the market competition. Entrepreneurship generally manifests
itself in many aspects such as innovation. It can be said that innovation
is the soul of entrepreneurship, and the startups must be accompanied
by certain innovation activities and have certain innovative capabilities.
In addition, entrepreneurship also includes adventure, cooperation,
dedication, learning, perseverance and integrity, which are also critical
to the success of a startup.
Secondly, survival is the primary task of startups. The primary task of a
startup is to survive in the market and make consumers recognize and
accept its products. Only in this way can an enterprise continue to
create value for customers and continue to grow and develop.
Therefore, in the startup stage, “survival” should always be the first
priority, and everything should be operated around survival. All
practices that endanger survival must be avoided.
Thirdly, the startups must be customer-oriented. Customer orientation
is one of the essential characteristics of startups. From the perspective
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of the realization approach of startup, it is usually realized based on a
deep understanding of customer needs and the unique value created
for customers. Without this, the existence value of enterprise will be all
gone and startup will be bound to fail.
Fourthly, the startups adhere to opportunity orientation. Without clinging
to the constraints of current resource conditions, the startups seek
opportunities by combining different resources to utilize and develop
opportunities and create value. Therefore, startups tend to respond
quickly upon discovering opportunities, rather than developing and
utilizing opportunities in a planned, organized and well-positioned
manner. In this case, the actions of enterprise are often driven by
opportunities.
Fifthly, free cash flow is created mainly by relying on its own funds.
Cash flow is like human blood which maintains human life in a smooth
circulation, and good cash flow is the basic condition for the enterprises
to survive. Therefore, startups must make every endeavor to increase
operating income and expenses, accelerate capital turnover, and
control the development pace. They mainly rely on their own funds to
create free cash flow, thereby providing a basic guarantee for the
survival of enterprises.
Sixthly, an efficient startup team can be easily formed. In the early days
of establishment, the organization of most startups is not perfect,
mainly aiming to “complete tasks”. It often shows a “highly ordered”
state, and is easy to form an efficient startup team. As everyone,
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especially the members of the startup team, knows his/her goals and
strives to work at full stretch. In the process, no one will fuss about the
gains or losses, the power, or clearly divide the responsibilities. There
are only roles and no difference in positions. The team features high
cohesion, high execution and high motivation.
Due to the above-mentioned characteristics of startups, they are
particularly suitable for the intervention of equity capital, especially
venture capital. The main reasons are: Firstly, a certain entrepreneurial
spirit and innovative ability, customer orientation, and opportunity
orientation are conducive to guaranteeing the rapid growth of
enterprises, so that venture capital may obtain high return on
investment; secondly, as the startups have insufficient assets for
mortgage and poor credit (not necessarily due to default, but due to the
weak credit, lack of credit history, etc.), mainly relying on their own
funds to create free cash flow, once financing is needed, the loan
capital is difficult to intervene, but venture capital does not require
mortgage, which is suitable for investment; thirdly, the startups often
have efficient teams, which is easy to form a vibrant and prosperous
corporate culture. Successes are achieved by excellent people,
investment is also about investing people and teams. A good team can
improve the safety margin of risk capital.
(3) Operating performance of startups
Operating performance is a relatively broad concept. From the
management perspective, operating performance is the result expected
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by the organization, which can be considered a combination of process
and result. According to the definition of foreign scholars, “performance
is the achievements and results of work, as such achievements and
results are closely related to the strategic goals, customer satisfaction
and financial returns of the enterprise”.(Zhang,2006) From the
economics perspective, operating performance can be described as the
relationship between economic input and output, which is the maximum
output of the enterprise under limited resources or the minimum input
under fixed output. Its specific representation refers to the completion of
relevant indicators of the enterprise.
In relevant literature, operating performance is generally measured
from the dimensions of profitability, solvency, operating ability, and
growth ability. In terms of the operating performance of startups, the
in-depth investigations are not conducted in some enterprises that are
struggling due to the extremely unstable growth ability of startups, the
large annual changes in relevant indicators including operating income
growth rate, total asset growth rate, operating profit growth rate, net
profit growth rate and net asset growth rate, and the great differences
between industries.
In this paper, in terms of profitability, the return on equity (ROE) and the
return on total assets (ROA) are selected to represent the profitability of
startups; in terms of solvency, the current ratio (CR) and the quick ratio
(QR) are selected; in terms of operating capabilities, the inventory
turnover (I_TURNOVER) and the total asset turnover (TAT) are
selected. The interpretations of relevant indicators are as follows.
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ROE = net profit/average balance of shareholders’ equity. This indicator
reflects the level of returns of shareholders’ equity and is used to
measure the efficiency of an enterprise to use its own capital. The
higher the indicator value, the higher the return on investment. This
indicator reflects the ability of equity capital to obtain net proceeds.
ROA = (total profit + interest expense)/average total assets. This
indicator analyzes the profitability of an enterprise based on investment
returns, and is the ratio between the investment returns and total
investment of an enterprise. The investment returns of an enterprise
refer to the sum of the profit before paying the interest and the income
tax, with the total investment as the average total assets of the current
period.
CR = current assets/current liabilities, which is used to measure the
ability of an enterprise to convert its current assets to cash for
repayment of liabilities before the short-term debt expires. The higher
the CR, the stronger the liquidity of an enterprise’s assets and the
stronger the repayment ability of short-term debt. However, a great ratio
indicates that the occupancy of current assets is large, which will affect
the operating capital turnover efficiency and profitability. Generally, a
reasonable minimum CR should be 2.
QR = quick assets/current liabilities. Quick assets are the balance of
the current assets minus inventory and prepaid expenses, mainly
including cash, short-term investment, bills receivable, accounts
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receivable and other items, and quick assets = current assets -
inventory.
I_TURNOVER = cost of sales/average inventory balance, which is a
comprehensive indicator to measure and evaluate the management
efficiency of various processes including the purchase of raw materials,
production, sales recovery, etc. The faster the inventory turnover (that
is, the greater the I_TURNOVER or the number of inventory turnover
and the shorter the inventory turnover days), the lower the inventory
occupancy level and the stronger the liquidity, the faster the conversion
of inventory into cash or accounts receivable, which will enhance the
short-term solvency and profitability of the enterprise.
TAT = total sales revenue/total average assets, which is an important
indicator to comprehensively evaluate the operating quality and
utilization efficiency of all assets of an enterprise, and reflects the
overall asset operating capability of the enterprise. Generally speaking,
the more the number of asset turnovers or the shorter the turnover days,
which indicates that its turnover speed is faster and the operating
capability is stronger.
2.2 Theoretical hypotheses for the impact of venture capital
on the operating performance of startups
Internationally, many theories or hypotheses about the mutual impact
between venture capital and operating performance of startups have
been formed during the long-term development venture capital, and
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large disputes exist. The relevant theories or hypotheses are explained
below.
2.2.1 Adverse selection hypothesis
The adverse selection hypothesis of venture capital is based on the
theory of adverse selection in information economics. Akerlof (1970)
was a pioneer in the school of information economics. His thesis The
Markets for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and The Market Mechanism
is an economics publication that has an important position in the
development history of Western economics. At that time, in the markets
for lemons in the US, sellers usually chose to hide the quality
information of the goods. Akerlof believed that it would produce adverse
selection, cause the defective products to expel the superior products in
the market, and eventually lead to the perish of the markets for lemon.
The law of adverse selection is universal, which is of positive
significance in economic science. Scholars in later ages therefore
recognized the existence of asymmetric information.(Wang & Liu,2002)
Based on the theory of adverse selection, Amit, Glosten, and Muller
believed that startups with better operating conditions in actual
production do not need to accept venture capital as financing through
other means may be more cost-effective and beneficial. They proposed
the “Adverse Selection Problem” in 1990. The principal-agent
relationship exists between venture capital and capital managers, and
information asymmetry is a common phenomenon in such relationship.
Based on this, the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard
similar to the lemon market mentioned above will generate between
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venture capital and startups. In order to better develop productivity,
Amit, Glosten, and Muller (1990) believed that the “intervention” of
venture capital is unfavorable, and enterprises with capabilities and
potential can obtain funds by debt financing or other forms. Under such
circumstances, the adverse selection problem may entangle the
venture capital industry in tragic situation where it may be conquered by
those startups with worse performance and worrying development,
causing the immature venture capital institutions to suffer disasters
together.
2.2.2 Grandstanding hypothesis
Since the 1980s, the discussion on venture capital has been
continuously deepened along with the establishment of venture capital
theory. Among them, Gompers and Lemer (1995) found through
research that more than 80% of venture capital institutions are limited
partnerships with limited duration of funds; financial pressures faced by
venture capitalists are much greater than we know, so they are usually
reluctant to hold shares in startups during their tenures.Subsequently,
Gompers (1996) injected new contents into his discovery. He noticed
some immature traits of young venture capitalists and proposed the
grandstanding hypothesis. This proposition vividly portrays the process
of young venture capitalists’ pushing immature startups to market as
soon as possible under the dual pressures of capital recovery and
capital appreciation after the 1990s. The hypothesis emphasizes the
impact of startup IPO on the reputation of venture capital, but this has
exacerbated the trend of higher IPO underpricing rates for venture
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capital-backed companies, which increases the incentives of high IPO
underpricing for startups. For the post-IPO business of startups, this
may result in continuous deterioration of performance. Excellent
enterprises would rather choose financing methods of other industries
or with fierce competition than choose venture capital. In the end, only
inferior enterprises will choose venture capital to share risks.(Zhou &
Song,2012) In conclusion, Gompers’ analysis is no different from that of
Amit, Glosten, and Muller. Because of this, the grandstanding
hypothesis is considered a special case of the adverse selection
hypothesis. If we extend the horizon of history and judge the
background of these two hypotheses, it can be found that the difference
between them is extremely significant. When venture capital screens
startups, due to asymmetric information, it is often considered to invest
in relatively inferior startups. This is the adverse selection hypothesis.
But when the funds of venture capital are implemented, the adverse
selection hypothesis is no longer suitable. Young venture capitalists
can easily be under the various financial pressures of investment, and
treats promoting immature enterprises to the capital market as soon as
possible as the principle of principal recovery and capital appreciation.
On this account, excellent startups defend that they don’t need venture
capital, and only inferior enterprises will attach importance to venture
capital. These “reversals” remind us that the researches made by




Barry, Muscarella, Peavey and Vetsuypens (1994) pioneered the
“Monitoring Hypothesis”.The theory was later supplemented by
Chemmanur and Loutskina (1999) and other scholars to continuously
develop and improve, they believed that venture capital can play a
monitoring effect on startups.(Wu,2017) At the same time, the scholars
have their own focuses and give different explanations. Barry et al.
used the coalition of high-reputation underwriters for reducing the IPO
underpricing rate to illustrate the improvement of venture capital’s
supervision on enterprises. At the same time, they considered the
position of venture capital in the board of directors as the basis for
venture capital to strengthen enterprise supervision. Chemmanur found
that it is normal for enterprises to repeatedly hesitate about and
measure the IPO timing, and venture capital institutions generally have
a special advantage in information about the listing timing of an
enterprise. This advantage tends to be the key to successful listing of
enterprises in domestic or overseas capital markets. For this reason,
startups choose to cooperate with venture capital which will provide
“value-added services” of IPO for them. Subsequently, scholars took a
giant stride in the theoretical research of the “monitoring hypothesis”.
From the chronological order, Chemmanur and Loutskina (2006) split
the “supervisory effect” into two parts, with one part as the “screening
effect” and the other as the “monitoring effect”.(Cheng,2013) Both are
essentially “supervisory effect” in the broad sense, and have same
directions of action. However, the “screening effect” is the instant
“supervisory effect” before venture capital, and the “monitoring effect” is
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the sluggish “supervisory effect” after venture capital. Their research
findings lead to such a problem: To what extent can this “supervisory
effect” of venture capital be applied to countries other than European
countries and America? Whether this “supervisory effect” of venture
capital depends on the screening function before venture capital, or on
the regulatory function after venture capital. In the researches for
seeking answers to these problems, scholars in later ages have also
tried to clarify the scope of application of the theory and their main
differences through empirical research and other methods.
2.2.4 Certification hypothesis
The traditional corporate finance theory has made a very profound
discussion from the perspective of information asymmetry on the
motivation to prevent the leakage of news that has an adverse impact
on the listing of companies. There is no doubt that external investors
are difficult to grasp all the information of listed companies. If some
critical bad information is hidden inside the companies, such
information can affect the security prices and even directly determine
the success or failure of IPO. The situation of information asymmetry
will hinder the decision-making of investors in the market, and the
valuation of newly listed companies in the capital market is generally
low. Listed companies are often powerless to such lower security prices.
With this as an entry point, Megginson and Weiss (1991) pioneered the
certification hypothesis to fully affirm the role of venture capital in
startup IPO. They pointed out that venture capital with a good
reputation plays a “certification role” between the capital market and
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listed companies, and the security prices that affect startup IPO are
more frequent. In this way, scholars have introduced the idea of
“certification” into venture capital theory, conducted tentative research
on the impact of startup IPO, and carefully considered the role of
venture capital in it. The certification hypothesis pays more attention to
the performance of IPO of venture capital-backed enterprises than the
grandstanding hypothesis and monitoring hypothesis do. This is a
major leap forward in the development of venture capital theory, which
further widens the boundaries of venture capital theory in explaining
actual economic problems.
2.2.5 Market power hypothesis
For any enterprise, negotiation, signing and cooperation with venture
capital can be a “systematic project”. Similarly, it is impossible to
consider only the impact of venture capital on the IPO underpricing rate
and ignore other aspects. Therefore, the problem of “certification
hypothesis” lies in that its research scope seems too narrow. For
example, if the capital market is not satisfied with the information about
listed companies released through venture capital, the certification role
may not occur. In particular, the situation in the capital market is
changing rapidly, and the valuation of listed companies must depend on
various factors in the capital market. Therefore, it requires us to fully
discuss the impact of venture capital on the startup IPO. Based on the
certification hypothesis, Chemmanur and Loulskina (2006) basically put
forward the market power hypothesis through further analysis and
research. This is another theoretical contribution of scholars following
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the “certification hypothesis” in the field of venture capital’s impact on
startup IPO. The main points of the theory include: Venture capital can
draw on its own experience and advantages to attract outstanding
securities underwriters and institutional investors to take part in the IPO
process of the companies it invests in, or invite securities analysts to do
some publicity on the IPO of listed companies. Listed companies can
benefit from the guidance provided by such high-quality participants.
Specifically, the gap of valuation in the dynamic game between listed
companies and the capital market will narrow. Certainly, this can also
bring greater benefits to venture capital. In terms of research method,
the “market power hypothesis” is a continuation of the “certification
hypothesis”. It chooses the “friend circle” of venture capital as the
starting point to study the effect of the “good friends” of venture capital
on startup IPO. Undoubtedly, the “market power hypothesis” shifts the
research on the impact of venture capital on startup IPO from reducing
the improper valuation caused by information asymmetry to the
valuation improvement brought by the demonstration of high-quality
participant, achieving new breakthrough in theoretical research.
2.2.6 Supervisory mechanism effect
After the mid-1970s, Jensen and Meckling (1976) put forward the idea
of venture capital that focuses on the supervision of enterprise
management by venture capital, reflecting that the academic
community began to pay more attention to the impact of venture capital
on internal governance of enterprise. Fama and Jensen (1983) also
believed that venture capital realizes the regulation by assigning
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directors to enterprises. Their idea portrays that value-added services
brought by venture capital have now been extended to the optimization
and internal supervision of enterprise management. And it is
highlighted by the regulatory mechanism of venture capital. Gompers
(1995), Cotter and Peck (2001), Renneboog and Simons (2005) all
believed venture capital is capable of improving the internal
governance of companies, and this positive impact mainly comes from
the effective supervision and management of the directors which
venture capital brings to the target companies. Katz (2009) and Givoly
(2010) point out that the effect of strengthening enterprise governance
through venture capital is very significant. This conclusion can be
corroborated by the fact that the monitoring mechanism of venture
capital reduces the earnings management behavior of target
companies. Other scholars who support the internal governance of
enterprise by venture capital think that, venture capital can play an
active role in impacting the enterprise governance structure by
optimizing the structure of the board of directors and increasing the
ratio of independent directors and professional directors.(Li,2014)
2.2.7 Incentive mechanism effect
In the enterprises where ownership and power of operation are
separated from each other, there is a big problem that it is difficult for
companies to implement the optimal high-salary incentive system
according to the efforts of the managers in the case of information
asymmetry. However, by linking the compensations of executives to the
operating performance of enterprises, Pareto improvement can be
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easily achieved. It is the core content of the incentive mechanism put
forward by Jensen et al. (1990). It achieves the consistency between
shareholders and managers in terms of goals. It can be seen that this
theory describes the incentive mechanism as a very important force to
improve enterprise governance. Thereby, the issue of incentive
mechanism for venture capital arises. Obviously, the introduction of
venture capital contributes to forming a good incentive mechanism,
which in turn may have a positive effect on startups.(Peng,2014)
2.3 Literature review on the mutual impact between venture
capital and operating performance of startups
In addition to the above theoretical hypothesis, there is a plenty of
researches on the impact of venture capital on operating performance
of startups in China and abroad, which forms an important support for
the research in this paper.
2.3.1 Review of relevant literature
(1) In general, the studies of Chinese scholars generally support the
adverse selection hypothesis of venture capital. For example, Zhang
Lingyu (2006) set up two control groups for companies supported by
venture capital and companies without the support of venture capital,
and used comparative analysis to investigate the underpricing levels
and underwriting rates of IPOs of startups. But the result is different
from the assumption. The underpricing and underwriting rate of
companies supported by venture capital are actually higher, which is
basically due to the poor quality of venture capital.Zhang Feng (2009)
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emphasized that the adverse selection effect of venture capital exists in
SMEs board market of China. 256 listed companies on the SMEs board
from June 25, 2004 to June 30, 2008 were selected as the research
object to establish a mean comparison and multiple regression analysis
model, and explain the mechanism by which venture capital affects the
IPO of startups. Li Yao and Zhang Ziwei (2011) focused on private
equity investment funds and angel investments, which also studies the
level of underpricing during IPO and selects samples of companies
listed on GEM before 2011. The study found that companies invested
by private equity funds had higher levels of underpricing during IPO,
and adverse selection was one of the important reasons for such
situation. We can see from this perspective that the hypothesis of
adverse selection of venture capital is suitable for Chinese companies.
Some scholars concentrate on the financial status of startups and study
whether the adverse selection hypothesis of venture capital exists from
the perspective of ROA, ROE and business profit rate. Song Fangxiu
and Li Chenchen (2014) selected GEM listed companies as the
research object. And the research found that: Compared with
companies without the support of venture capital, companies supported
by venture capital have worse financial performance before IPO. Poor
financial performance often means that companies have poor
capabilities, and normally it is difficult to attract attention from investors.
Therefore, this also supports the hypothesis of adverse selection of
venture capital.
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(2) According to the differences in the analysis conclusions of the
grandstanding hypothesis, Chinese scholars can be roughly divided
into the following two categories: Among the scholars with positive
attitude, Chen Gongmeng, Yu Xin and Kou Xianghe (2011) adopted
multiple linear regression method for investigating the “three places and
four boards” (Shenzhen SME Board, Hong Kong Main Board, New York
and NASDAQ) to compare the adjusted return in the first day of listed
companies with or without venture capital support, and found that the
grandstanding hypothesis of venture capital exists objectively,
especially among newly established venture capital institutions whose
supported companies obviously have a shorter listing cycle. At the
same time, combined with the factors of the listing location, the above
researches further found that the companies with venture capital
holdings listed on the Shenzhen SME Board and the Hong Kong Main
Board have a significantly higher discount rate during IPO than those
listed on the same board without venture capital support. However,
under the effect of the grandstanding hypothesis of venture capital, the
listing of company is indeed conducted earlier, which in turn will further
increase the discount rate of the company at the time of IPO.
Among other scholars with reservations, Song Fangxiu and Li
Chenchen (2014) conducted empirical research by employing the
cross-sectional multiple linear regression method based on ROA, ROE
and other financial indicators. Their research mentioned the adverse
selection of venture capital in the GEM market. Because the
performance of companies with the supported of venture capital before
44
listing is worse than that of companies without the support of venture
capital, and the discount rate of companies with the supported of
venture capital during IPO is actually higher. However, they believe that
the role of the reputation variable of venture capital is relatively neutral,
and it cannot explain that the reputation effect is significant. This
certainly does not imply that the grandstanding hypothesis fails or does
not exist objectively, and the corresponding tests can be carried out by
adjusting measurement methods, variable design and data selection.
(3) Western scholars almost unanimously give a positive answer to the
supervision role of venture capital. Bloom et al. (2009) investigated the
situations of more than 4,000 manufacturing companies in the United
States, Europe and Asia and found that the performances of companies
supported by venture capitals significantly superior to other companies,
and this positive effect on performance mainly comes from the
improvement of governance of the supported companies. Croce et al.
(2013) confirmed that there is a “time effect” on the positive impact of
venture capital in European high-tech companies. Only when high-tech
companies receive their first round of investment will venture capital
have a significantly positive effect. While the productivity of high-tech
companies invested by non-venture capital institutions does not show a
sudden and violent increase, but a significant growth advantage
appears after the first round of VC investment. This conclusion can be
used to support the “monitoring effect” of venture capital. The empirical
research of Chemmanur and Krishnan (2011) clearly indicates the
“screening effect” and “monitoring effect” of venture capital. The
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longitudinal research database of the US Census Bureau was used and
the endogenous switching regression model, regression discontinuity,
PSM and other research methods were adopted to carry out the
empirical testing for the TFP of target companies before, during, and
after venture capital support. In terms of the effect produced, venture
capital is related to the total factor productivity of target companies, and
the reputation of venture capital will also directly affect the magnitude of
such effect. More importantly, this effect is not restricted before, during
and after the event, and runs through the entire process of venture
capital. This phenomenon occurs in manufacturing companies
(especially between 1972 and 2000). In this way, the target companies
develop through the continuous assistance of venture capital, which
shows the “screening effect” and “monitoring effect” of venture capital.
In addition to empirical analysis of venture capital by foreign scholars,
for a period of time, Chinese scholars have also made some
preliminary attempts to verify the monitoring hypothesis of venture
capital. However, we conclude from the results that the monitoring
hypothesis is not directly reflected in these researches. For example,
Tan Yi (2009), Jin Ming and Wang Juan (2010) specialized in the
research of the companies listed on SME board of Shenzhen Stock
Exchange, and found that venture capital has not improved the
performance of the invested companies. Venture capital can even
hinder the operating performance, excess returns or improvement in
governance of the invested companies in some places. Deng Yaogang
(2010) set his sights on the Chinese GEM market. Among the 48 listed
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companies funded by venture capital, neither the amount of venture
capital, nor the holding time and the number of venture capital has
significant impact on the IPO P/E ratio for the companies. However, it
can be seen after careful study that the above empirical researches of
Chinese scholars are based on the investigation of the stock price
performance of the invested company at the time of (after) listing and
the operating performance after the listing, and have not reached to the
complete interactive relationship of venture capital and startups. They
viewed post-listing impact as a possible trend, deviating from what
Chemmanur and Loutskina (2006) called the “supervisory effect”
consisting of both before and after the listing. Therefore, although these
researches find the reverse “monitoring effect” of venture capital on
startups, their importance is very limited. Moreover, these researches
are not enough to explain whether this impact is due to the beforehand
inefficiency of the invested companies or the subsequent weak
supervision of venture capital. Attention should also be paid to how
more GEM listed companies understand venture capital, and whether
the “supervisory effect” in broad sense has occurred.
(4) In the empirical analysis on the role of certification, Megginson and
Weiss tested 640 companies listed in the United States between 1983
and 1987. The conclusion is divided into two following aspects: Firstly,
the companies with venture capital have lower underpricing rates and
stock underwriting rates than companies without venture capital at the
time of IPO; secondly, the average market share ratio of lead
underwriters of companies with venture capital is higher than that of
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companies without venture capital at the time of IPO. To sum up,
venture capital can effectively break the information asymmetry
between target companies and capital markets with its own good
reputation. The companies supported venture capital have such an
advantage at the time of the IPO that they can reduce the offering costs
and increase the average market share of the lead underwriters under
the certification of venture capital.
Judging from the empirical literature of a large number of Chinese
scholars on the role of venture capital certification, there are some
arguments. One party believes that venture capital plays the
certification role, while the other party holds a critical attitude and
believes that the certification role of venture capital is not significant.
Chen Jianli (2012) investigated many companies listed on the GEM
based on the relationship between venture capital and capital markets.
The biggest difference between this research and researches of other
scholars is that it focuses on the bubble of the capital market, and
believes that such bubble has a close relationship with the performance
of listed companies at the time of IPO. To this end, the author has
designed a unique evaluation index: PEG (PEG = P/E ratio / annual
profit growth rate of the company). After cross-sectional multiple
regression analysis, the author finds that venture capital does play a
role in certification at IPO to effectively suppress the bubble of listed
companies. Li Yuhua and Ge Xiangyu (2013) carried out empirical
testing around GEM listed companies, with time of the IPO limited from
October 2009 to July 2012. They observed that: By introducing and
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making use of venture capital, listed companies have reduced their
underpricing rates at the time of IPO. This means that venture capital
generates a “certification role”. Compared with the previous empirical
analysis by scholars, Chinese scholars pay special attention to the
analysis on the degree of earnings management of listed companies
before IPO, the first-day underpricing rate at IPO, and the annual
average earnings per share after IPO. Furthermore, they also give
answers in the empirical analysis of different types of venture capital
and their impact on those aspects mentioned above. For example,
Zhang Xueyong and Liao Li (2011) classified venture capital into three
different types: private sector background, foreign investment
background and mixed type according to the ownership status. By
using cross-sectional multiple linear regression measurement, it is
found that the IPO underpricing rate of companies invested by the
venture capital with foreign investment background and mixed type
background is low, and venture capital with private sector background
has no significant impact on the underpricing rate of companies during
IPOs. Zhang Xueyong, Liao Li, and Luo Yuanhang (2014) supported
the “certification hypothesis”, and especially venture capital with a
background of securities traders has played a certification role in the
IPO process of companies. They used the data of companies listed on
the Chinese A-share market after the restart of A-shares in 2009 to the
end of July 2012, clearly distinguished the venture capital of
background of securities traders from venture capital of other
backgrounds, and conducted targeted empirical tests. After a
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quantitative analysis, it was found that venture capital with a
background of securities traders have a significantly positive impact on
the underpricing rate of A-share listed companies during IPOs, while
general venture capital does not have this effect. Therefore, they
concluded that: A securities trader with a good reputation is the key to
reducing the information asymmetry between the listed company and
the capital market, which is closely linked to the certification effect of
venture capital.
At the same time, some other scholars pointed out the reasons for not
supporting the certification role of venture capital during IPOs. Zeng
Wenqiang, Li Hongcheng, and Wang Jiayi (2010) expanded the
research scope, investigating both the companies listed on the SME
board and the GEM listed companies. Their test could not find a
significant difference in the IPO underpricing rate between companies
with venture capital participation and companies without venture capital
background. This implies that the certification impact of risk investors
on IPOs of companies may not work or may be not obvious. Zheng
Qingwei and Hu Ridong (2010) investigated 44 listed companies
supported by venture capital in the SME board market. The empirical
research shows that for these companies, the “certification role” of
venture capital is still a secret cannot be solved at least in these
companies. In addition, some scholars used a comparative analysis
method to investigate Chinese funded companies listed on the
NASDAQ in the United States and the Hong Kong GEM market, and
companies listed on the China Mainland’s SME board, studying the
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certification role of venture capital for companies listed in different
capital markets. The final conclusion is that the researches on
companies listed on China’s SME board do not seem to confirm the
certification role of venture capital during IPOs.
(5) In the research of the market power hypothesis, Chemmanur and
Loulskina reviewed and studied the early scholars’ researches on the
impact of venture capital during IPOs, and was surprised to find the
contradiction of “certification hypothesis”. According to Megginson and
Weiss, the certification role of venture capital will reduce the
underpricing rate of companies during IPOs. However, when inferring
based on the certification hypothesis, it was concluded that the
companies supported by venture capital will have higher underpricing
rates during IPO. Because a lot of researches and analyses show that
when capital markets are not completely effective, the closing price of a
company on the first day of listing is about 10% higher than its actual
value; and a high closing price represents a high underpricing rate.
What went wrong? Chemmanur and Loulskina believed that the
underpricing rate should not be used as an indicator to measure the
role of venture capital. Therefore, in their empirical analysis,
Chemmanur and Loulskina proposed the concept of intrinsic value of a
company and regarded it as a perfect substitute for the indicator of
closing price on the first day of listing. The final result verified the
“market power hypothesis”. The research horizons of scholars are thus
broadened. Even so, the research of Chemmanur and Loulskina is not
perfect, and their empirical analysis has weaknesses. For example, the
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intrinsic value of a company includes subjective speculation that cannot
be measured objectively through data. In order to further elaborate the
credibility of the study, it is necessary to make a new empirical test of
the market power hypothesis.
In the investigation of Chinese scholars on the impact of venture capital
during IPOs by using data from GEM listed companies, Wang Wei
(2013), Li Yao, Wang Xiujun (2015) and other scholars all mentioned
the role of “market power” in venture capital. Wang Wei et al. (2013)
analyzed the data of GEM listed companies from October 2009 to
March 2012 and found that there is a positive correlation between the
participation of venture capital and the IPO discount rate of companies.
The higher of venture capital’s shareholding ratio in targeted
companies and the proportion in the board of directors, the higher the
discount rate during IPO.In other words, this study result confirms the
“market power hypothesis” of venture capital. At the same time, they
also believed that venture capital does not play a “certification role”
during IPOs, so the certification hypothesis of venture capital fails. After
investigating the situations of 355 companies successfully listed on
GEM, Li Yao and Wang Xiujun (2015) found that: The certification role
of venture capital during IPO and market power exist simultaneously,
but the degrees of the two roles are different. And they asserted that
the two roles are bound to be effective, but as the role of market power
is greater than the certification role, the companies supported by
venture capital will have a higher discount rate in the first day of IPO.
Certainly, some scholars believed that venture capital does not have a
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significant market power effect. In addition, scholars have designed
different research programs based on differences in the backgrounds of
venture capital to raise the awareness of the impact of venture capital
during IPOs.
(6) After investigating the data of 2887 companies in the twelve years
from 1983 to 1994, Hochberg (2003) found that due to the relatively
independent structure of the board of directors, the probability of
merging the positions of CEO and the chairman of the board of
directors is low, and companies maintain a lower level of earnings
management after IPOs due to venture capital. Wongsimwai (2007)
used the company data in the THOMAS financial database to confirm
that compared with those without venture capital funding, the boards of
directors of companies funded by venture capital are larger and have a
higher proportion of independent directors. Suchard (2009) constructed
a measurement model covering venture capital, independent directors
and business managers, and found that venture capital can help
improve the independence of enterprises in that the proportions of
independent directors and managers with relevant experience in these
enterprises are higher.
In short, many researches hold that the value-added services
(knowledge, technology, business know-how) provided to the target
companies make venture capital play a positive role in the internal
governance of the target companies to some extent. It can be seen that
supervision mechanism no longer examines the behaviors of venture
capital from the perspective of operating efficiency but integrates the
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internal governance of enterprises into the overall analysis framework
of venture capital from the perspective of operating efficiency. The
influence of the supervisory effect of venture capital can be specifically
verified in conjunction with the development of China’s venture capital
industry.
(7) Baker and Gompers (1999) employed data from 1553 listed
companies in the United States to explore the impact of venture capital
on corporate executive compensation. They pointed out that the
equities obtained by executives before and after IPOs are “from low to
high”. Only when the company is successfully listed, can executives
obtain equity incentives. This approach can reduce the reliance of
executives on the right of control of companies for earning profits and
encourage them to work hard. At the same time, by measuring the
flexibility of the monetary compensation of executives and corporate
performance, it was found that the participation of venture capital can
more or less reduce the monetary compensation of executives, and the
sensitivity of monetary compensation to corporate performance is
higher than that of companies without the support of venture capital.
Based on the real cases of venture capital, Kaplan and Stromberg
(2000) emphasized that salary compensation is closely related to
corporate performance, especially in case of the higher information
asymmetry between venture capital and companies. Based on data
from companies listed between 1993 and 1996, Campbell and Frye
(2009) confirmed that from participation to exit, venture capital has a
positive impact on improving internal governance capabilities of
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corporates both in terms of quantity to quality. They were particularly
concerned that in order to improve the internal governance of
corporates, venture capital often uses the method of equity incentives.
Among Chinese scholars, when analyzing the flexibility of executive
compensation performance, Wang Huijuan (2012) classified the
Chinese GEM listed companies from 2006 to 2010 into two categories
based on the participation of private equity funds. They believed that
the increased flexibility of executive compensation performance and
corporate governance can be explained by the participation of private
equity funds. Shen Weitao and Hu Liufen (2014) added an investigation
of the amount of venture capital in enterprises. After applying OLS
regression analysis to 374 companies listed on the Shenzhen SME
Board in China, they found that the funding of multiple venture capital is
more conducive to the improvement of internal governance and
management of enterprises than the participation of one venture capital.
The amount of introduced venture capital and the proportion of
professional directors in the board of directors is directly proportional to
the flexibility of executive compensation performance. Based on these
perspectives, the analysis of scholars on the incentive mechanism of
venture capital has formed an important reference for our research and
analysis.
2.3.2 Evaluation on relevant literature
After the trace analysis and review of the research literature at home
and abroad, it can be found that there are still some flaws in the
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relevant researches on the mutual impact between venture capital and
operating performance of startups in Chinese and foreign academic
communities, mainly as follows:
First, the literature paid too much attention to the creation or verification
of relevant theories and hypotheses and lacked research on the
mathematical associations between venture capital and operating
performance of startups. Generally speaking, there are many kinds of
associations, such as mathematical associations and causal
associations. It will be better if mathematical associations, causal
associations and other associations can be found at the same time. In
the existing literature, there are many inferences and deductions of
causal association which may have contradictions and most of which
have not yet been finalized. While the mathematical associations are
less studied, which seems to be insufficient to guide the practical
operation.
Second, some studies of mathematical associations may be flawed in
the methods, indicators, and data used. For example, China’s IPO
market has a price limit for a long time. For main board, SME, GEM
listed companies, the price limits are 44% on the first day of IPOs, and
resorted to 10% on the next day. As most stocks will have consecutive
days of limit-up, the IPO underpricing rate is difficult to be in line with
international standards, so the related research value is of little value.
What’s more, in the sample of listed companies in China, startups are
mainly concentrated in the GEM, while the main board and SME board
mainly consist of state-owned enterprises and traditional enterprises
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that have a long history, which is significantly different from
international startups. However, the sample analysis did not focus on
the GEM, plus the relatively poor time validity, the conclusions drawn
are questionable.
In this paper, the Chinese GEM listed companies are selected as a
sample database for startups, which emphasizes the time validity of the
samples in recent years. This study focuses on mathematical
associations supplemented by the verification of related theories in
order to deepen the understanding of the venture capital market and
strengthen the practical value of research, which will not only benefit
the author’s investment career but also help people improve the
effectiveness of related investment activities.
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Chapter 3 Development Process of Venture capital and
Research Problems in This Study
For a long time, the developed economies of the world have attached
great importance to the development of venture capital and have
obtained valuable successful experience. Since the reform and opening
up of China, venture capital has flourished and continued to develop.
Through the analysis of the development process of venture capital, the
problem directions of the mutual impact between venture capital and
operating performance of startups can be introduced, and relevant
research methods can be used to analyze the characteristics of
relevant statistical data and create the research design of this study.
3.1 Development process of Chinese and foreign venture
capital
American venture capital is undoubtedly the leader around the world,
and some other advanced economies have also achieved excellent
results, but with a process full of ups and downs. Chinese venture
capital started after the reform and opening up, and developed rapidly
in the process of learning from the developed economies such as the
United States.
3.1.1 Development of foreign venture capital and characteristics
by countries
(1) The United States
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The United States is the world’s most developed country in terms of
venture capital, and its venture capital development has roughly gone
through six stages.(Tian,2007)
The first is the beginning stage from the end of World War II to the early
1970s. In 1946, the United States founded the American Research and
Development Corporation (ARD), whose purpose is to raise funds to
support the numerous colleges and universities around Boston to
transform the scientific and technological achievements of the
laboratories into products that can be available to consumers as soon
as possible. In 1958, the United States Congress passed the Small
Business Investment Act and authorized the Federal Government to
establish the Small Business Administration (SBA). Small business
investment companies established under the approval of the SBA could
enjoy tax incentives and government preferential loans. For every dollar
invested, the small business investment company can obtain a
low-interest government loan of 4 dollars, thus the investment
enthusiasm was greatly stimulated. However, due to the long
investment recovery period, short-term repayment of government loan
interest and the single source of funds for small business investment
companies, it gradually got into trouble by the end of the 1960s. Due to
many problems in the development of small business investment
companies, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, limited partnership
venture capital companies that focused on absorbing individual capital
gradually emerged in the United States, and led the American venture
capital to be standardized and organized.
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The second is the adjustment stage of 1971-1980. In the 1970s, the US
economy entered a recession period due to the oil crisis, which resulted
in the slow development of venture capital during adjustment. In 1971,
the Nasdaq market was established, which provided a convenient exit
channel for venture capital. In 1973, the National Venture Capital
Association was established to promote the government to provide
great support for venture capital in legislation and taxation. In 1978, the
US Department of Labor revised the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act to pave the way for introducing pensions to venture capital.
In 1980, the US Congress passed the Small Business Investment
Incentive Act, which allowed venture capital funds to not have to control
investors within 14 people so as to raise more funds.
The third is the rapid growth stage of 1981-1989. In 1981, the United
States lowered the capital gains tax rate from 28% to 20%, causing the
scale of venture capital to expand rapidly. In 1982, the United States
began to implement the “Small Business Innovation Research
Program” to guide venture capital to lean toward high-tech SMEs and
promote the industrialization of scientific and technological
achievements. After this period of rapid development, the capital
sources and invested industries of American venture capital were
greatly improved.
The fourth is the mature stage of 1990-2000. In the 1990s, the U.S.
economy entered a period of rapid development, with the overwhelming
trend of the new economy. Venture capital played an important role in
the American information technology revolution, promoting the rapid
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development of high-tech industries such as the Internet, biotechnology,
new energy, and new materials.
Fifth is the downturn stage of 2001-2009. After entering the new
century, the US Internet bubble burst. The venture capital industry
gradually declined from the peak, and entered a downturn with the IT
industry. After 2004, venture capital began to recover, but by 2008,
American venture capital fell again under the influence of the subprime
mortgage crisis and the international financial crisis.
The sixth is the gradual recovery stage since 2010. The Internet bubble
and the subprime mortgage crisis have made American venture capital
pay more attention to diversified investment. With the recovery of the
U.S. economy and the global economy, venture capital has recovered
in 2010, with amount of funds raised, the number of investment projects
and the number of IPO exit projects increased in fluctuation. Especially
since then, the US stock market has entered a long bull market, which
has contributed to the rapid expansion of venture capital.
(2) The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom was the first European country to develop venture
capital and its venture capital market is the most fully developed in
Europe, dating back to the establishment of the Industrial and
Commercial Finance Corporation (ICFC) in 1945.(Wang,Xu,
Chen,2006) In the 1970s, a group of venture capital managers who
had gained rich experience in the US market came to the UK to bring
their investment experience to the UK. In the 1980s, during Mrs.
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Thatcher’s time in office, the British government introduced a series of
preferential policies such as tax incentives, loan guarantee plans and
enterprise expansion plans, which brought the British venture capital
industry into a booming period. In the mid-to-late 1990s, a group of
British successful entrepreneurs, scientists and financiers gradually
established a number of leading venture capital funds in London,
Cambridge and Scotland, and investment in high-tech fields began to
increase gradually. At present, British venture capital has exceeded 2
billion pounds among 1,200 companies.
As the early venture capital in the United Kingdom was mainly applied
to leveraged buyout business and less involved in startups, British
venture capital still tends to invest in established companies nowadays.
The support for venture funds in the United Kingdom mainly adopts the
method of participating in the establishment of guiding funds, in
combination with other measures such as capital guarantees or
subsidies for transaction costs at the same time. Instead of directly
investing in SMEs, the government supports the establishment of
commercial venture capital enterprises in various regions to promote
investment in SMEs.
(3) Japan
Japan was the first Asian country to develop venture capital.
(Xu,Xiao,Wu,2007) In 1951, Japan established the “Venture
Development Bank” to provide low-interest loans to startups. Since the
1960s, the Japanese government successively launched a series of
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policies and measures, and venture capital thus entered an accelerated
stage. In the 1970s, due to the impact of the Middle East oil crisis and
the lack of sound capital markets and venture capital experience, the
first round of venture capital of Japan began to fall from its peak. In
1982, Japan’s limited liability partnership fund opened up new channels
for venture capital to raise funds, triggering the second peak of venture
capital development. In 1986, with the sharp appreciation of Japanese
Yen, many startups went bankrupt due to excessive equipment
investment, finally ending the second climax of venture capital that
lasted for three years.
In the early 1990s, in addition to securities companies and commercial
banks, insurance companies, general manufacturing enterprises, and
even some government agencies and economic groups actively
supported the development of venture capital, which promoted a new
wave of venture capital. In 1997, the bankruptcy of Yamaichi Securities
and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and the outbreak of the Asian financial
crisis shocked the financial market in Japan, and the development of
venture capital slowed down. Even to this day, due to the influences of
bursting of IT bubble, the imperfect second-board market, the global
financial crisis and the economic recession, Japanese venture capital
institutions and total investment have not yet recovered to their peak.
(4) Germany
The German financial system is dominated by indirect financing, and
bank-oriented financing has a large share. However, for special groups
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such as high-tech and high-growth startup SMEs, traditional bank loan
methods cannot provide full financing due to risk control and other
factors.(Du & Tan,2004) In 1988, Germany established the Venture
Capital Association in Berlin. After the 1990s, the total investment
began to leap.
The sources of venture capital in Germany mainly consist of pensions,
banks, insurance companies, governments, etc. In terms of the stage
distribution, the startups in the seed and initial stages receive about
25% of capital, and startups at growth and expansion stages receive
about 75% of capital. Since the German capital market is not well
developed, exit of venture capitals by IPO is less, while liquidation
accounts for a larger proportion.
(5) Israel
The venture capital industry in Israel started in 1993-2000. During this
period, venture capital grew rapidly at an average rate of 85% per year.
The government set up the Yozma fund to implement a new set of
national preferential development strategies, aiming at complying with
domestic and foreign environmental changes which include the
immigration of a large number of scientists and engineers from the
former Soviet Union into Israel in the early 1990s, the ineffectiveness of
government research funding, and the lack of management and
commercialization capabilities in the country. (Wang & Liu,2003) The
scale of Israel’s venture capital industry in 1997 was USD 440 million,
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and it grew to USD 1.759 billion in 2007, mainly investing in high-tech
fields including ICT and biotechnology.
Israeli venture capital is mainly invested in the start-up period of
enterprises. Since the venture capital companies from the United
States also invested heavily in Israeli startups and high-tech, the
Nasdaq market has become a common exit channel for the venture
capital in both the United States and Israel.
3.1.2 Rise and development of Chinese venture capital
The high-tech enterprises and venture capital in China are outcomes of
reform and opening up. The development process of Chinese venture
capital since the 1980s can be roughly divided into six stages.
The first stage is the gestation and exploration stage from 1987 to 1997.
In 1985, the CPC Central Committee issued the Decision on the
Reform of Science and Technology Management System, clearly
proposing to allow the venture capital to support the development of
high-tech enterprises with higher risks, which kicked off development of
Chinese venture capital. In September 1985, China’s first venture
capital company - China Venturetect Investment Corporation (CVIC)
was established. Since the 1990s, venture capital has been highly
valued at the national level. In 1991, the State Council promulgated the
Interim Provisions on Certain Policies Concerning National High
Technology and New Technology Industry Development Zones,
permitting high-tech zones to independently establish venture capital
companies to support the development of high-tech industries; in 1995
65
and 1996, the State Council repeatedly emphasized the development
of science and technology venture capital funds in a series of
documents including the Decisions on Strengthening Scientific and
Technological Progress; in 1997, the State Council organized seven
ministries and commissions to set up the group of “National Venture
Capital Mechanism Research”, formally promoting the development of
venture capital as national strategy.
The second stage is the rapid development stage from 1998 to 2000. In
March 1998, the China National Democratic Association Central
Committee submitted the Proposal on Quickly Developing Chinese
Venture capital, which was listed as the No. 1 proposal of CPPCC that
year, clearly suggesting that promoting venture capital should be a
basic policy to boost the development of high-tech industries. Since
then, the development of venture capital has been pushed to a new
high. In March 1999, the Ministry of Science and Technology issue the
Several Opinions on the Establishment of Venture capital Mechanism
with seven ministries and commissions, allowing venture capital
institutions to support the development of high-tech enterprises by
establishing venture funds and financing guarantee funds. Since then,
Shenzhen, Beijing and other local governments have followed the
example of the Central Government and proposed a series of policies
and measures to promote the development of venture capital. During
this period, with the vigorous supports of the Central Government and
local governments, Chinese venture capital has witnessed an
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astonishing growth in terms of both the number of companies and the
total amount of venture capital.
The third stage is the industrial adjustment stage from 2001 to 2004
With the bursting of the Internet bubble in the United States in 2001,
China’s venture capital also reached a low point of development. The
GEM market, which was the best way for venture capital to exit, has
been delayed to launch again. A large number of venture capital
companies collapsed because of the failure to recover capitals. At the
same time, the government carried out some institutional innovations at
this stage. In 2004, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange launched the SME
board market, which opened up new channels for venture capital
companies to realize capital appreciation and exit, and promoted the
development of the Chinese venture capital.
The fourth stage is the rapid expansion stage from 2005 to 2010. 2005
was a divide in the development history of Chinese venture capital, and
also the first year for Chinese venture capital to enter a stage of rapid
expansion. It was mainly manifested in the effective support for the
development of Chinese venture capital provided by a series of system
constructions. In November 2005, the National Development and
Reform Commission and other nine ministries and commissions jointly
introduced the Interim Measures for the Administration of Startup
Investment Enterprises, which made clear provisions on the
establishment and investment operation of startup investment
companies for the first time, and simultaneously allowed the
government to set up startup investment guidance funds to formed a
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demonstration effect for the development of startup investment
companies. In February 2006, the State Council issued the Several
Supporting Policies for Implementing the National Medium- and
Long-Term Science and Technology Development Program Outline
(2006-2007), which incorporated “accelerating the development of
venture capital” and “establishing multi-level capital markets which
support independent innovation” into the national science and
technology development strategy, which provided policy guarantee for
the venture capital. In the same year, the China Securities Regulatory
Commission issued relevant documents that allowed the
Zhongguancun Science and Technology Park to pilot the “agency
transfer system of shares of non-listed companies”, which broadened
the channels for the transactions and exits of venture capital. In
October 2009, the GEM market that had been nurtured for ten years
was officially launched on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. It opened up
a new path for the development of startups and the exit and capital
appreciation of venture capital, which is of great significance for
encouraging the development of Chinese venture capital and startups.
The fifth stage is the deep adjustment stage from 2011 to 2015. Since
2011, due to the slowdown of domestic economic growth and the
downturn in the capital market, Chinese venture capital once again fell
into the deep adjustment stage. Especially from November 2012 to
December 2013, China actually suspended the issuance of new shares,
and the decrease of exit channels made the venture capital worse.
During this period, although Chinese venture capital was in trouble
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again, it maintained a relatively high growth in terms of overall scale. At
the same time, in order to regulate the development of venture capital,
China also issued a series of policy documents. For example, the
NDRC issued the Notice on Further Regulating the Development and
Filing Management of Equity Investment Enterprises and Notice on
Promoting the Standardized Development of Equity Investment
Enterprises respectively in January and November 2011, which played
an important role in regulating the market behavior of venture capital
companies.
After July 2014, Chinese stock market began to rise, and venture
capital began to recover gradually. During the period, there was a total
of 172 exits. The successful listing of companies such as Alibaba and
JD.com brought stunning exit rewards to the institutions including
Softbank China and Capital Today.
In 2015, Chinese stock market rose sharply in the first and second
quarters, and many venture capital projects were able to exit at a high
premium, with an obvious wealth effect. However, in the third quarter, a
well-known stock market crash broke out, wiping out a lot of wealth.
Especially from July to November, China once again suspended the
IPO market, and the stock market fell down with venture capital.
The sixth stage is the calm development stage from 2016 to the present.
Since 2016, the development of Chinese venture capital has been
relatively peaceful. Due to the slowdown in economic growth, the
switching of the new growth drivers of new economy is continuing, and
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there are many investment opportunities in the AI and other fields.
Since 2019, the China-US trade war has highlighted the hard core
technologies such as chips, and the role of government-led equity
investment capital has been strengthened. Meanwhile, the valuation
bubble in the field of venture capital has also attracted more attention,
including that the difficulty of Wework invested by Japan Software also
gave a warning to global venture capital①. In general, the performance
of venture capital is relatively stable and calm.
On June 13, 2019, China’s Science and Technology Innovation Board
was officially opened. On July 22, the first batch of companies was
listed on the Science and Technology Innovation Board. The
establishment of the Science and Technology Innovation Board has
created a new channel for the exit of venture capital, which benefits the
development of venture capital.
3.1.3 Reference from the development experience of Chinese and
foreign venture capital
Comparing the developments of venture capital in internationally
developed economies and China, some successful experiences can be
found, which are mainly reflected in four aspects.
First, the government guides the development of venture capital and
provides an important source of funds. In foreign countries, the United
States established the Small Business Administration (SBA) in 1958 to
① HuXiu.(2019,October 9).Softbank Reinvests in WeWork: Who is the Rescuer?.
https://m.huxiu.com/article/320888.html
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lead the Small Business Investment Corporation (SBIC) to provide
startup capital for small businesses, creating a precedent for the
guidance funds of government-supported venture capital; the Israeli
government allocated USD 100 million in 1993 to set up the wholly
state-owned YOZMA fund which was positioned as a “parent fund” to
attract private and overseas capital to initiate and set up equity
investment funds. In 1998, the United Kingdom founded a government
guidance fund for startup investment, investing 100 million pounds in
the first phase to support the establishment of government guidance
sub-funds in various regions, and employed capital guarantees,
transaction cost subsidies and other measures for complex operations.
After entering the new century, China has also actively set up
government guidance funds to attract social capital into venture capital.
In January 2002, Zhongguancun Startup Investment Guidance Fund,
the first real startup investment guidance fund in China, was formally
established. In July 2007, the Ministry of Science and Technology and
the Ministry of Finance jointly established the first national-level
guidance fund with an initial scale of 100 million yuan. In October 2008,
China issued the Guiding Opinions on the Standard Establishment and
Operation of Startup Investment Guidance Funds, which provided
several normative requirements for the establishment and operation of
the guidance funds and had a positive and far-reaching impact on the
development of Chinese startup investment. In October 2009, the
NDRC and the Ministry of Finance jointly launched the “Startup
Investment Plan for Emerging Industry”, with the first batch of pilots in
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seven provinces and cities including Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen,
Chongqing, Anhui, Hunan, and Jilin. In September 2014, the Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology and the Ministry of Finance
founded the National Integrated Circuit Fund (commonly known as the
“Big fund”), with the first phase of raised funds reaching 120 billion yuan.
Its purpose is to support the local chip industry of China to reduce the
reliance on foreign manufacturers. In October 2019, the fund raised
204.15 billion yuan in the second phase, which will further realize the
leap-forward development of China’s integrated circuit industry. Under
the active guidance of governments at all levels, Chinese venture
capital has developed rapidly, and many venture capital clustering
areas have emerged, such as Beijing, Shenzhen, Shanghai, and
Tianjin.
Second, the government introduces relevant laws, regulations, and
policies to strengthen the establishment of a venture capital system. In
foreign countries, the United States launched the Small Business
Investment Act to encourage innovation and industrial development,
and amended the Employee Retirement Income Security Act to pave
the way for pensions to enter startup investment funds; Japan has
innovated the limited partnership system to facilitate the rapid
development of partnership startup investment funds. China issued the
Interim Measures for the Administration of Startup Investment
Enterprises in 2005, and released the Guiding Opinions on the
Standard Establishment and Operation of Startup Investment Guidance
Funds was published in 2008 to regulate the establishment of startup
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investment funds and their guidance funds. Some local provinces and
cities, especially some provincial capital cities, have introduced
administrative measures for guidance funds of startup investment funds.
These laws, regulations, policies and measures have provided
important institutional guarantees for the healthy and rapid
development of startup investment.
Third, the capital market system is improved and the exit channels for
venture capital are enriched. In order to promote the financing of small
and medium-sized enterprises and help analyze the investment and
exit, the United States established the Nasdaq market in 1971, which
became the most successful global second board market; the United
Kingdom also created the second board market AIM (Alternative
Investment Market) in 1995 to aid the financing of British and overseas
start-up and high-growth companies. In addition to the main board
market, China launched the SME board market in 2004, the GEM board
in 2009, and expanded the original agency system of equity transfer of
Zhongguancun Science and Technology Park to the “New OTC Market”
for the whole country in 2013, and launched the Science and
Technology Innovation Board in 2019. Furthermore, various places
have launched regional equity trading centers. A multi-level capital
market system has been built, which provides rich mechanisms and
channels for venture capital exit and SME financing.
Fourth, a venture capital organization system is established to
introduce funds into startups. Due to its high risk, venture capital needs
government incentives, guidance and regulation. In foreign countries,
73
the United States allowed the establishment of small business
investment companies and provided financial support in 1958 to
promote the development of venture capital institutions. In 1973, the
National Venture Capital Association was set up to promote
government to provide support for venture capital in legislation and
taxation. Germany also established a similar venture capital association
in 1988. In China, local governments have actively propelled the
construction of organization system of venture capital, and established
a large number of state-owned venture capital companies, startup
investment promotion centers, etc., as well as industrial self-regulatory
startup investment associations and alliances, which have contributed
to the development of local venture capital.
3.2 Introduction to the research problems
3.2.1 Research problems in this study
Since the 1980s, Chinese venture capital has continued to develop and
thrive, and it is still in prosperity to this day. It has become a supporting
power for the switching of the new economy and new growth drivers,
and it has also become a booster for “Widespread Entrepreneurship
and Innovation”, with obvious positive externalities.
From a micro perspective, the capital and project parties are the two
main players in the venture capital market, and venture capital and
startups are interdependent and closely linked. Among them, the
relationship between venture capital and operating performance of
startups has become a focus of attention. Some views, such as
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regulatory mechanism effect and incentive mechanism effect, believe
that the introduction of venture capital may improve the operating
performance of startups, while some views, such as the adverse
selection hypothesis and the grandstanding hypothesis, argue that the
introduction of venture capital may not necessarily improve the
operating performance of startups, and may even damage the
operating performance of startups. On the other hand, the operating
performance of startups may also have an impact on the introduction of
venture capital. For example, the adverse selection hypothesis believes
that due to the preference and adverse selection of venture capital,
startups with poor performance may be more likely to earn the favor of
venture capital.
The Chinese venture capital market has many twists and turns in
development path, and is particularly easy to follow the ups and downs
of the stock market. It has different characteristics at different stages,
which is difficult to form a general conclusion on the mutual impact
between venture capital and operating performance of startups, and
some staged characteristics can be obtained only by combining new
changes and new data. The paper uses the GEM listed startups from
2016 to 2018 as samples, and the venture or venture-free investment
as a dummy variable to study the mutual impact between venture
capital and operating performance of startups. The main research
problems are:
(1) What is the impact of venture capital on the operating performance
of startups?
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(2) What are the causes for the impact of venture capital on the
operating performance of startups? How is the specific impact
manifested? What are the specific effects?
(3) How to deal with the impact of venture capital on the operating
performance of startups?
3.2.2 Reference of research methodology
By comparing previous studies, it can be found that the
regression-related methods are mainly employed in the studies of the
mutual impact between venture capital and the operating performance
of startups.
The first is the binary OLS regression. The ordinary least square (OLS)
is mainly applied to describing the relationship between the explained
variable and the explaining variable. For example, Shen Weitao and Hu
Liufen (2014) conducted an investigation on the number of venture
capital in enterprises. After applying OLS regression analysis to 374
companies listed on the Shenzhen SME Board in China, they found
that the funding of multiple venture capital is more conducive to the
improvement of internal governance and management of startups than
the participation of one venture capital. The amount of introduced
venture capital and the proportion of professional directors in the board
of directors is directly proportional to the flexibility of executive
compensation performance.
Xu Zhiwen (2018) took the GEM listed companies from 2014 to 2017 as
the research object, and used OLS regression analysis to empirically
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test the impact of PE on the operating performance of companies. The
operating performance of companies were measured from the four
aspects of profitability, solvency, operating capability, and growth ability,
with the presence or absence of PE, the joint investment amount of PE,
the shareholding proportion of PE, and the investment years of PE as
explaining variables, and the company scale, the asset-liability ratio,
the proportion of top ten shareholders, company background, macro
economic factors as control variables. Empirical research results
indicate that the operating performance of companies with PE
participation is better; the higher the shareholding ratio of PE, the better
the operating performance of companies; the investment years of PE
have a negative impact on the operating performance of companies;
the joint investment amount of PE has a less obvious impact on the
operating performance of companies.
The second is cross-sectional multiple linear regression. It is mainly
used when there are multiple explaining variables and the acquired
data is cross-sectional data. For example, Zhang Feng (2009) selected
256 listed companies on the SMEs board from June 25, 2004 to June
30, 2008 as the research object to establish a mean comparison and
multiple regression analysis model, and explain the mechanism by
which venture capital affects the IPO of startups. Chen Gongmeng, Yu
Xin and Kou Xianghe (2011) adopted multiple linear regression method
for investigating the “three places and four boards” (Shenzhen SME
Board, Hong Kong Main Board, New York and NASDAQ) to compare
the adjusted return in the first day of listed companies with or without
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venture capital support, and found that the grandstanding hypothesis of
venture capital exists objectively, especially among newly established
venture capital institutions whose supported companies obviously have
a shorter listing cycle.
Song Fangxiu and Li Chenchen (2014) conducted empirical research
by employing the cross-sectional multiple linear regression method
based on ROA, ROE and other financial indicators, believing that there
is an adverse selection of venture capital in the GEM. Zhang Xueyong
and Liao Li (2011) classified venture capital into three different types:
private sector background, foreign investment background and mixed
type according to the ownership status. By using cross-sectional
multiple linear regression measurement, it is found that the IPO
underpricing rate of companies invested by the venture capital with
foreign investment background and mixed type background is low, and
venture capital with private sector background has no significant impact
on the underpricing rate of companies during IPOs.
The third is other regression methods. Some improved regression
methods are mainly employed according to study needs. For example,
Chemmanur and Krishnan (2011) used the longitudinal research
database of the US Census Bureau and adopted the endogenous
switching regression model, regression discontinuity, PSM and other
research methods to carry out the empirical testing for the TFP of target
companies before, during, and after venture capital support.
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By referring to previous studies, this study mainly adopts the following
research methods in empirical analysis:
(1) In the study of the impact of venture capital on the operating
performance of startups, the cross-sectional multiple linear regression
method is mainly employed, and the multiple regression is performed
with the dummy variables and control variables of the relevant
indicators and constructs of profitability, operating capacity, and
solvency, in order to investigate the impact of venture capital on the
operating performance of startups in different dimensions.
(2) Control variables are introduced in the multiple regression which
includes the actual control variables, such as the “logarithm of total
assets” that represents the size of the companies, and the
“shareholding ratio of venture capital” that represents the participation
of venture capital, and also includes the sub-dummy variables that
represent the fixed annual effect and industrial effect for getting closer
to the actual situation in order to deepen the regression model.
3.2.3 Data sources
The data to be used in this study are all third-party public data. The
main data sources include:
(1) GTA “IPO Research Database for Listed Companies in China”. The
database collects data on prospectuses, listing particulars, issuance
results announcements, share change announcements, corporate
governance, share capital, finance and market performance on the first
day of listing released by A-share listed companies on the Shanghai
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Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, including information
on all aspects of the issuance process from issuance review, IPO,
subscription to listing. This study mainly uses the relevant data of GEM
companies from the public data of this database.
(2) Eastmoney.com Choice Database. Choice Database is a
professional financial data platform under Eastmoney.com, dedicated
to providing professional financial data services for users including
financial investment institutions, research institutions, academic
institutions, regulators and media, involving public financial data of
listed companies and pre-IPO statistical data etc.
(3) Wind Database. Information about the financial indicators of
companies, industry information and macro information can be
obtained through the industry database in this software and the
investment time of private equity investment institutions can be inquired
in “PEVC” library in the software, which are mainly used for verification
in this study.
(4) Chinaventure.com. It is mainly used to verify the investment time of
private equity investment institutions. In order to minimize the error of
investment time of private equity investment institutions, the companies,
venture capital institutions and investment time obtained from the
“PEVC” library of Wind are re-entered into Chinaventure.com. for
verification.
(5) Zdatabase. It is mainly used for inquiring and verifying related
information of venture capital institutions.
80
3.3 Research framework
This paper takes the impact between venture capital and operating
performance of startups as the theme. The overall research framework
is to use the public data of GEM listed companies to conduct empirical
research, conduct cause and effect analysis in combination with
empirical research results, and put forward relevant countermeasure
suggestions through qualitative comparison and summary.
3.3.1 About empirical analysis
The empirical analysis of the impact of venture capital on the operating
performance of startups is mainly carried out. The operating
performance of startups mainly includes profitability, solvency, and
operating capabilities. Two related indicators are adopted in each
dimension, which are used as the explained variables in the multiple
regression with the dummy variable being as explaining variable herein:
“venture or venture-free investment” (venture capital = 1, venture-free
investment = 0). In the meanwhile, in order to improve the regression
accuracy, the necessary control variables are introduced in the
regression. It is generally believed that introducing control variables will
improve the accuracy and saliency of the entire regression model, but
control variables cannot be introduced excessively. The author notes
that some literature introduces listing dates, stock codes, etc. as control
variables into the model, the economic significance is questionable.
In this paper, ROE and ROA are mainly used to represent the
profitability of the operating performance of startups; CR and QR
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represent the solvency of the operating performance of startups;
I_TURNOVER, TAT represent the operating capabilities of operating
performance of startup. By constructing the dummy variables “venture
or venture-free investment” and selecting control variables, regression
analysis is conducted respectively for the explained variables including
ROE, ROA, CR, QR, I_TURNOVER and TAT, so as to determine and
analyze the impact of “venture or venture-free investment” on the
operating performance of startups.
At the same time, among the control variables, the explaining variables
such as the shareholding ratio of venture capital and the logarithm of
total assets are introduced, and two sub-dummy variables that
represent relative years and 33 sub-dummy variables that represent
relative industries are also introduced, which finally form the regression
model combining dummy variables, control variables and multiple
sub-dummy variables. Although it is different from the previous
research on the setting of control variables, this research model has
been widely used in other fields and is relatively mature, which can be
regarded as a reference of other fields being applied in the field of
venture capital.
3.3.2 About cause and effect analysis of adverse selection
After empirical analysis, this study finds that venture capital and
operating performance of startups mainly is negatively correlated, and
the reason is that there is an adverse selection the process of venture
capital.
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The causes and effects of adverse selection are noteworthy. The
qualitative analysis on causes and effects of adverse selection will
enhance the understanding of the venture capital market characteristics,
such as the possibility of increasing venture capital for startups, lemon
market, valuation bubble, moral risks, and threshold issues. This is a
deductive analysis process that combines empirical analysis with real
practice.
3.3.3 About countermeasure suggestions
Based on the empirical analysis of the mutual impact between venture
capital and operating performance of startups, corresponding
countermeasure suggestions can be put forward through qualitative
analysis, comparative analysis, and summary analysis.
Venture capital and startups are important players in China’s venture
capital market. In addition, for GEM market, an important exit channel
for venture capital, other institutions, regulatory authorities and various
investors are also included. Based on the mutual impact between
venture capital and operating performance of startups, as well as the
mechanisms and causes of these impacts, relevant strategic
suggestions can be provided for venture capital, startups and other
participants in the capital market, which will output and deepen the
value of this study.
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Chapter 4 Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Venture
capital on the Operating Performance of Startups
This chapter will employ the relevant statistical data of Chinese GEM
listed companies to put forward research hypotheses, conduct an
empirical analysis of the impact of venture capital on the operating
performance of startups, and verify the relevant assumptions to draw
certain conclusions.
4.1 Indicator selection, data analysis, and research
hypotheses
There are many startups in Chinese GEM market, so it is of
representative significance to use the GEM listed companies as the
samples for studying the mutual impact between venture capital and
operating performance of startups
4.1.1 Indicator selection
Relevant data since the opening of the Chinese GEM market in
October 2009 can be inquired from GTA “IPO Research Database for
Listed Companies in China”, Eastmoney.com Choice Database and
other databases. But there is a large number of missing values on the
subdivision indicators of these data. After observation and calculation, it
is found that there are a lot of missing values in relevant indicators in
the data of the early stage and last year. Besides, July to November
2015 was the last time of IPO suspension due to the disaster of
Chinese stock market and 2016 to now is a relatively peaceful and
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mature stage of the development of China’s venture capital. Therefore,
only the GEM listed companies in 2016-2018 are used as samples.
This study makes some trade-offs in relevant indicators after
comprehensive consideration, which is explained as follows.
(1) About the indicators of the operating performance of startups
The operating performance of startups is a general concept, usually
including profitability, solvency, operating capabilities, etc. Due to the
extremely unstable growth capabilities of startups, the annual changes
of relevant indicators including operating income growth rate, total
asset growth rate, operating profit growth rate, net profit growth rate
and net asset growth rate are too large. So, this study excludes the
growth capability indicators covered in a few literature. In addition, the
multiple indicators used to represent a certain capability are mostly
derived from a certain conversion and have a certain degree of
homogeneity. In this study, two indicators are selected for each
capability.
There are many relevant indicators for profitability, mainly including
operating profit margin, net profit margin, gross profit margin, cost
expense profit margin, ROA, and weighted ROE according to
Tongdaxin stock software. Among the available data, weighted ROE
and ROA have fewer missing values, and are applied in relevant
analysis more often. This study mainly chooses weighted ROE and
ROA to represent the profitability of startups.
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Solvency mainly includes indicators such as CR, QR, asset-liability
ratio and equity ratio according to Tongdaxin stock software. Among
the available data, CR and QR have fewer missing values, and are
applied in relevant analysis more often. This study mainly chooses CR
and QR to represent the solvency of startups.
Operating capabilities mainly include indicators such as I_TURNOVER,
current asset turnover rate, fixed asset turnover rate, TAT and growth
rate of cash flow per share (%) according to Tongdaxin stock software.
Among the available data, I_TURNOVER and TAT have fewer missing
values, and are applied in relevant analysis more often. This study
mainly chooses I_TURNOVER and TAT to represent the operating
capabilities of startups.
(2) About dummy variables
Dummy variables, also known as pseudo variables, nominal variables,
or dummy argument, are artificial variables reflecting qualitative
attributes, and are quantified independent variables. Their values are
usually 0 or 1. The introduction of dummy variables can make the linear
regression model more complicated, but describe problems in a more
concise manner, which can achieve the function of two equations and is
close to reality.
For GEM listed companies, “venture capital” is distinguished from
“venture-free investment”. Venture capital is denoted as 1, venture-free
investment is denoted as 0, and a dummy variable is constructed,
which is introduced into the regression equation as explaining variables.
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Essentially two equations are constructed, one for the regression of
listed companies without venture capital, and the other for the
regression of the listed companies with venture capital. When they are
subtracted, the explained variables on the left side of the equation can
be characterized by the difference between venture capital and
venture-free investment, while some control variables can be added to
on the right (or not) to promote the goodness of fit of the regression
equation.
In this study, having venture capital means that a startup has accepted
venture capital (VC) or private equity (PE) before the IPO, while
venture-free investment means there’s neither VC nor PE. Both VC and
PE are equity capital. VC investment will occur in early stage, PE
investment will occur in late stage of startups, and there is no essential
difference between them. Many VCs play the same role with PE, so
does PE. It is called VC mainly because it has state subsidies. Both of
them are regarded as venture capital in this study (the dummy variable
of “venture or venture-free investment” is denoted as VC).
(3) About control variables
Relevant indicators such as profitability, solvency, and operating
capabilities of startups are used as explaining variables. To construct
regression equation by introducing control variables can improve the
goodness of fit of regression equation and better characterize impact of
“venture or venture-free investment” on these capabilities under
constrained conditions. However, it is not easy to find quantifiable
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control factors that characterize these capabilities. Because profitability,
solvency and operating capabilities are not only affected by the
companies themselves, but also by the meso-level and macro-level of
industry development, domestic and foreign economic trends, etc. They
are also affected by many external factors such as the leadership of the
startup team and government support. This paper attempts to introduce
indicators including the shareholding ratio of venture capital, company
size, industry growth, and national GDP growth as direct control
variables, but finds that the regression effect is not obvious and
insufficient to improve the goodness of fit, so a certain transformation is
required.
The shareholding ratio of venture capital is denoted as VCR in this
paper, which directly brings the shareholding ratio of venture capital (%).
And the shareholding ratio of venture-free investment is 0.
In terms of company size, the logarithm of total assets is taken as the
control variable, denoted as LNTA, which represents the conditional
factors of company size that affect regression changes and results.
At the macro level, the annual GDP growth rate (denoted as GDPR) is
directly brought into the regression calculation as a control variable, but
the goodness of fit of the overall regression is found to be poor.
Therefore, from the perspective of fixed effect of the control year, new
dummy variables are introduced again. 2015 is denoted as 1 and the
years other than 2015 (including 2016 and 2017) as 0, so as to obtain
the dummy variable of GDPRYEAR2015 (not for regression). Based on
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this, the dummy variables GDPRYEAR2016 and GDPRYEAR2017,
which are introduced into regression equation and express the annual
GDPR fixed effect, can be set.
At the meso level of the industry, the industry sales margin (denoted as
ISM) is used to represent the development of the industry. The 232
samples involve a total of 34 industries, and the largest part of samples
(47 in total) from “computer, communications and other electronic
equipment manufacturing industries” is taken as the basic group
denoted as industry0, which doesn’t participate the regression equation,
thereby constructing the remaining 33 dummy variables




Chinese GEM listed companies in 2016-2018 are adopted as samples,
which covers the financial data of 2015, 2016, and 2017 at the time of
the IPOs of all GEM listed companies, and a total of 232 samples of
GEM listed companies are obtained with missing values in weighted
ROE, ROA, CR, QR, I_TURNOVER and TAT excluded.
It should be noted that GEM listed companies in 2009-2018 and
2014-2018 have used as different segmented samples to establish a
regression model. But only the size of the parameters and the
significance level are changed, without changing the directions of the
symbols. Therefore, the economic meaning of regression is essentially
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the same and does not have a substantial impact on the conclusions of
this paper.
In addition, the cross-section of sample data is based on the time of
IPOs of GEM listed companies, dating back to the data of the most
recent year before the IPO. Therefore, as the control variable of
company size, the “total assets (TA)” does not take the time value of
capital into account. Fortunately, after the logarithm (LNTA) is adopted,
this difference is basically negligible. And other indicators are relative
numbers or dummy variables, which avoids the problem of the time
value of capital.
(2) Descriptive statistics
Firstly, a descriptive statistical analysis is carried out for the relevant
financial indicators of 232 sample of Chinese GEM listed companies
from 2016 to 2018 by EViews software. The results are shown in the
following table (Table 4-1).
Table 4-1 Descriptive statistics of 232 Chinese GEM listed companies from 2016
to 2018
VC VCR(%) LNTA ROE ROA
Mean 0.780172 10.83816 20.21308 22.19039 17.34515
Median 1.000000 6.520000 20.07497 19.48000 15.86347
Maximum 1.000000 81.73000 24.62852 69.35000 64.28745
Minimum 0.000000 0.000000 18.96903 4.740000 4.353586
Std. Dev. 0.415025 14.47167 0.731486 10.82130 8.812277
Observations 232 232 232 232 232
CR QR I_TURNOVER TAT
Mean 2.755644 2.222139 18.19666 0.876819
Median 2.115631 1.694903 3.204593 0.791147
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Maximum 18.02062 16.54461 1894.535 2.544212
Minimum 0.344898 0.156192 0.562870 0.193353
Std. Dev. 2.132317 1.973223 134.0703 0.365066
Observations 232 232 232 232
According to the results in Table 4-1, the relevant indicators of the 232
sample companies have the following features.
For the indicator VC for venture and venture-free investment, the mean
value is 0.78. There is a total of 232 samples, including 181 with
venture capital and 51 without venture capital.
In terms of VCR, the mean value is 10.84%, the median value is 6.52%,
the maximum value is 81.73%, the minimum value is 0, and the
standard deviation is 14.47%. Among them, the maximum value is a bit
of special. After checking, it is due to 300735 DBG, similar to 300660
Jiangsu Leili, 300722 Xinyu Guoke, 300689 Chengtian Weiye, 300727
Runhe Materials, 300669 Huning Shares, 300580 Best, 300739 SG
Circuits, whose shareholding ratios of venture capital all exceed 50%.
Considering that there may be multiple venture capitals, it is still
regarded as normal.
In terms of logarithm of total assets (LNTA), the indicator representing
the company size, the mean value is 20.21, the median value is 20.07,
the maximum value is 24.63, the minimum value is 18.97, and the
standard deviation is 0.76, which is at a normal level.
The weighted ROE has a mean value of 22.19, a median value of 19.48,
a maximum value of 69.35, a minimum value of 4.74, and a standard
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deviation of 10.82. Considering the features of different industries, it is
generally at a normal level.
The ROA has a mean value of 17.35, a median value of 15.86, a
maximum value of 64.29, a minimum value of 4.35, and a standard
deviation of 8.81. Based on the features of different industries, it is
generally at a normal level.
CR has a mean value of 2.76, a median value of 2.16, a maximum
value of 18.02, a minimum value of 0.34, and a standard deviation of
2.13. Considering the features of different industries, it is generally at a
normal level.
QR has a mean value of 2.22, a median value of 1.69, a maximum
value of 16.54, a minimum value of 0.16, and a standard deviation of
1.97, which is generally at a normal level.
I_TURNOVER has a mean value of 29.26, a median value of 3.23, a
maximum value of 3789.07, a minimum value is 0.56, and a standard
deviation of 262.97. Among them, the maximum value is quite special.
After checking, it is due to the stock 300758 Shengxunda, whose main
business is mobile game development and sales. Similar stocks with
high I_TURNOVER include 300746 Hanjia Design, 300675 IBR,
300598 ARCHERMIND, 300738 SG Circuits, mainly concentrating on
research, development and design companies. There are many R&D
companies among GEM listed companies. Such companies are
dominated by innovation and startup, generally with a very high
I_TURNOVER. After careful consideration, the value of this indicator is
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regarded as normal in this study in order to reflect the features of such
companies.
TAT has a mean value of 0.88, a median value of 0.79, a maximum
value of 2.54, a minimum value of 0.19, and a standard deviation of
0.37, which is generally at a normal level.
On the whole, the data used in this paper are public statistical data. It is
generally believed that non-questionnaire statistics that indicate real
occurrences may not process the extreme values unless their existence
is unreasonable.(Chang & Zhang,2008) In order to express the
objectivity of real practice, the extreme values of each data will not be
processed in this study.
Secondly, for the annual GDPR intended to be introduced into
regression, the GDP growth rates of China in 2015, 2016, and 2017
were 6.9%, 6.7%, and 6.8% respectively. It is specially noted that two
sub-dummy variables, GDPRYEAR2016 and GDPRYEAR2017, are set
up for 2015 when controlling the fixed year effect of GDPR in this study.
For the industry growth rate intended to be introduced into regression, a
total of 34 industries are involved. “Computer, communications and
other electronic equipment manufacturing industries” is used as the
basic group coded INDUSTRY0, and the remaining industries are set to
sub-dummy variables. The statistics of number of sample distributions
in industries and the number of samples with VC are as follows (Table
4-2):
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Animal husbandry INDUSTRY1 1 1
Electrical machinery and
equipment manufacturing industry INDUSTRY2 13 10
Textile industry INDUSTRY3 2 2
Non-metallic mineral products
industry INDUSTRY4 6 3
Radio, television, film and
recording operations INDUSTRY5 1 1
Chemical fiber manufacturing
industry INDUSTRY6 1 1




Motor vehicle, electronic product
and daily product repair industry INDUSTRY8 1 1
Furniture manufacturing industry INDUSTRY9 3 1
Building decoration and other
construction industries INDUSTRY10 1 1
Metal products industry INDUSTRY11 1 0
Retail INDUSTRY12 2 2
Agricultural and sideline product
processing industry INDUSTRY13 1 1
Agriculture INDUSTRY14 1 1
Wholesale trade INDUSTRY15 1 1
Leather, fur, feather and their
products and footwear industry INDUSTRY16 1 1
Other manufacturing industries INDUSTRY17 2 1
Automotive manufacturing
industry INDUSTRY18 10 10
Software and information
technology services INDUSTRY19 33 31
Ecological protection and
environmental governance INDUSTRY20 2 1





manufacturing industry INDUSTRY22 9 6
Civil engineering and construction INDUSTRY23 2 1
Culture and arts INDUSTRY24 2 2




Rubber and plastic products
industry INDUSTRY26 10 8
News and publishing industry INDUSTRY27 1 1
Research and experimental
development INDUSTRY28 1 1
Pharmaceutical manufacturing
industry INDUSTRY29 17 13
Instrumentation manufacturing
industry INDUSTRY30 8 5
Non-ferrous metal smelting and
rolling processing industry INDUSTRY31 2 1
Professional technical service
industry INDUSTRY32 4 4
Special equipment manufacturing
industry INDUSTRY33 18 13
Total 232 181
4.1.3 Research hypothesis
According to previous research results, the operating performance of
startups is mainly expressed in three dimensions of profitability,
solvency and operating capability. Combined with the research problem
hypothesis of Zhang Lingyu (2006), Zhang Feng (2009), Li Yao, et al.
(2011) and Song Fangxiu et al. (2014), the research hypothesis of the
impact between venture capital and operating performance of startups
is set as follows:
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(1) About the relationship between venture capital and the
profitability of the operating performance of startups
In order to ensure the objective neutrality of this study, the research
hypothesis of positive and negative aspects is proposed. Since the
weighted ROE and ROA indicators are examined for profitability, the
research hypothesis is:
H1a: There is a positive correlation between venture capital and the
weighted ROE of the operating performance of startups;
H1b: There is a negative correlation between venture capital and the
weighted ROE of the operating performance of startups.
The regression equation to verify the research hypothesis is
ROEi=β0+β1*VCi+β2*VCRi+β3*LNTAi+β4*GDPRYEAR2016i+β5
*GDPRYEAR2017i+β6*INDUSTRY1i+...+β38*INDUSTRY33i+εi  (Equation 4-1);
H2a: There is a positive correlation between venture capital and the
ROA of the operating performance of startups;
H2b: There is a negative correlation between venture capital and the
ROA of the operating performance of startups;
The regression equation to verify the research hypothesis is
ROAi=β0+β1*VCi+β2*VCRi+β3*LNTAi+β4*GDPRYEAR2016i+β5
*GDPRYEAR2017i+β6*INDUSTRY1i+...+β38*INDUSTRY33i+εi  (Equation 4-2).
(2) About the relationship between venture capital and the
solvency of the operating performance of startups
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Similarly, since CR and QR indicators are examined for solvency, the
research hypothesis is:
H3a: There is a positive correlation between venture capital and the CR
of the operating performance of startups;
H3b: There is a negative correlation between venture capital and the
CR of the operating performance of startups;
The regression equation to verify the research hypothesis is
CRi=β0+β1*VCi+β2*VCRi+β3*LNTAi+β4*GDPRYEAR2016i+β5
*GDPRYEAR2017i+β6*INDUSTRY1i+...+β38*INDUSTRY33i+εi  (Equation 4-3);
H4a: There is a positive correlation between venture capital and the QR
of the operating performance of startups;
H4b: There is a negative correlation between venture capital and the
QR of the operating performance of startups;
The regression equation to verify the research hypothesis is
QRi=β0+β1*VCi+β2*VCRi+β3*LNTAi+β4*GDPRYEAR2016i+β5
*GDPRYEAR2017i+β6*INDUSTRY1i+...+β38*INDUSTRY33i+εi  (Equation 4-4).
(3) About the relationship between venture capital and the
operating capabilities of the operating performance of startups
Similarly, since the operational capabilities examine the I_TURNOVER
and TAT indicators, the research hypothesis is:
H5a: There is a positive correlation between venture capital and the
I_TURNOVER of the operating performance of startups;
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H5b: There is a negative correlation between venture capital and the
I_TURNOVER of the operating performance of startups;
The regression equation to verify the research hypothesis is
I_TURNOVERi=β0+β1*VCi+β2*VCRi+β3*LNTAi+β4*GDPRYEAR2016i+β
5 *GDPRYEAR2017i+β6*INDUSTRY1i+...+β38*INDUSTRY33i+εi  (Equation 4-5);
H6a: There is a positive correlation between venture capital and the
TAT of the operating performance of startups;
H6b: There is a negative correlation between venture capital and the
TAT of the operating performance of startups;
The regression equation to verify the research hypothesis is
TATi=β0+β1*VCi+β2*VCRi+β3*LNTAi+β4*GDPRYEAR2016i+β5
*GDPRYEAR2017i+β6*INDUSTRY1i+...+β38*INDUSTRY33i+εi  (Equation 4-6).
4.2 Model analysis of the impact of venture capital on the
operating performance of startups
Based on the research hypotheses and regression equations presented
above, an empirical analysis of the impact of venture capital on the
profitability, solvency, and operating capabilities of startups is
respectively carried out as follows.
4.2.1 Impact of venture capital on profitability
4.2.1.1 Impact on weighted ROE
(1) Direct regression results
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In the EViews software, regression is directly conducted to the
weighted ROE of the sample companies and VC-free/VC. The results
are shown in the following table (Table 4-3):







Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
VC -6.324651 1.667913 -3.791956 0.0002
C 27.12471 1.473223 18.41181 0
R-squared 0.058839 Mean dependentvar 22.19039
Adjusted R-squared 0.054747 S.D. dependentvar 10.8213
S.E. of regression 10.52092 Akaike infocriterion 7.553192
Sum squared resid 25458.64 Schwarz criterion 7.582905
Log likelihood -874.1702 Hannan-Quinncriter. 7.565175
F-statistic 14.37893 Durbin-Watsonstat 1.882996
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000191
The results in Table 4-3 show that there is a negative correlation
between VC and ROE. The regression coefficient of VC is -6.32, and
the F statistics of VC, which refers to the T statistics, is 0.0002. This is
the direct regression result between VC and ROE.
(2) Multiple regression with control variables
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According to the regression equation of Equation 4-1, the data of 232
sample companies are input in the EViews software. The impact of
venture capital on the weighted ROE is shown in the following table
(Table 4-4).
Table 4-4 Multiple regression results of venture capital and weighted ROE
Dependent Variable: ROE
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/05/20 Time: 03:32
Sample: 1 232
Included observations: 232
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
VC -5.071287 1.932808 -2.623792 0.0094
VCR 0.029240 0.057012 0.512871 0.6086
LNTA -1.139844 1.150854 -0.990433 0.3232
GDPRYEAR2016 0.249051 0.234597 1.061612 0.2897
GDPRYEAR2017 0.907682 0.420961 2.156212 0.0323
INDUSTRY1 4.397364 10.67525 0.411921 0.6809
INDUSTRY10 1.067643 10.44366 0.102229 0.9187
INDUSTRY11 41.71251 10.52735 3.962298 0.0001
INDUSTRY12 -10.15292 7.545395 -1.345579 0.1800
INDUSTRY13 -3.664531 10.45298 -0.350573 0.7263
INDUSTRY14 -8.383231 10.42762 -0.803945 0.4224
INDUSTRY15 -2.990954 10.44018 -0.286485 0.7748
INDUSTRY16 -3.090755 10.44173 -0.296000 0.7675
INDUSTRY17 -4.034709 7.468480 -0.540232 0.5897
INDUSTRY18 -6.815118 3.633949 -1.875403 0.0622
INDUSTRY19 -3.287678 2.402403 -1.368495 0.1727
INDUSTRY2 -1.852695 3.312971 -0.559225 0.5767
INDUSTRY20 -7.607782 7.544462 -1.008393 0.3145
INDUSTRY21 -1.799685 5.377954 -0.334641 0.7383
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INDUSTRY22 -5.001453 3.796004 -1.317557 0.1892
INDUSTRY23 -9.649696 7.498010 -1.286968 0.1996
INDUSTRY24 5.199165 7.459786 0.696959 0.4867
INDUSTRY25 2.757243 6.156569 0.447854 0.6548
INDUSTRY26 -0.537970 3.595908 -0.149606 0.8812
INDUSTRY27 -15.36047 10.60575 -1.448315 0.1492
INDUSTRY28 -14.54995 10.70618 -1.359024 0.1757
INDUSTRY29 -6.566829 2.929685 -2.241479 0.0261
INDUSTRY3 6.507918 7.448084 0.873771 0.3833
INDUSTRY30 -2.988519 3.965478 -0.753634 0.4520
INDUSTRY31 -4.565140 7.516802 -0.607325 0.5443
INDUSTRY32 0.930009 5.457845 0.170399 0.8649
INDUSTRY33 1.187679 2.868128 0.414095 0.6793
INDUSTRY4 -2.854002 4.491526 -0.635419 0.5259
INDUSTRY5 -4.203917 10.44896 -0.402329 0.6879
INDUSTRY6 -6.162946 10.42963 -0.590907 0.5553
INDUSTRY7 -2.030774 2.857527 -0.710675 0.4781
INDUSTRY8 -15.11353 10.61961 -1.423171 0.1563
INDUSTRY9 3.246106 6.221283 0.521774 0.6024
C 49.47942 22.99562 2.151689 0.0327
R-squared 0.247535 Mean dependent var 22.19039
Adjusted R-squared 0.099381 S.D. dependent var 10.82130
S.E. of regression 10.26952 Akaike info criterion 7.648397
Sum squared resid 20354.36 Schwarz criterion 8.227806
Log likelihood -848.2141 Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.882067
F-statistic 1.670797 Durbin-Watson stat 2.089955
Prob(F-statistic) 0.013492
According to the regression results in Table 4-4, the R2 value of the
regression equation containing dummy variables and control variables
is 0.2475, the R value is about 0.5, which is believed in statistics that
the variables are moderately correlated when |R| is greater than or
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equal to 0.5 and less than 0.8, and the Prob value of F statistics is
0.0135, which is far lower than 5%, and the equation has a high fitness.
After the regression equations are generally tested and combined with
the coefficients of explaining variables, Equation 4-1 can be rewritten
as regression equation with coefficients. Because there are too many
dummy variables to express industrial fixed effects, which is omitted
here.
(3) The economic significance test of multiple regression
It can be seen from Table 4-4 that the coefficient β1 of the dummy
variable VC, “venture or venture-free investment”, is -5.0713, which
indicates that when other factors remain unchanged, the ROE of the
VC startups has decreased by 5.41 units. In other words, there is a
negative correlation between venture capital and ROE. Therefore, the
H1a “There is a positive correlation between venture capital and the
weighted ROE of the operating performance of startups” is denied, and
the H1b “There is a negative correlation between venture capital and
the weighted ROE of the operating performance of startups” is affirmed.
However, the regression equation only reveals the mathematical
relationship between venture capital and weighted ROE, and cannot
conclude that the ROE of startups will decline due to the introduction of
venture capital. According to the adverse selection hypothesis, if
venture capital tends to invest in startups with worse operating
performance, it will inevitably lead to a lower ROE of startups. Based on
a large number of practical observations, the adverse selection
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hypothesis is accepted in this study, and it is believed that venture
capital tends to invest in startups with worse operating performance,
which has caused the venture-invested startups to have a generally low
weighted ROE.
(4) The statistical significance test of multiple regression
For the regression equation in Table 4-4, The Prob value of the overall
F statistics is 0.0135, which is lower than 5%, and the regression
equation has statistical significance.
The T statistics of single variable is examined. The T statistics of the
dummy variable VC, “venture or venture-free investment”, is -2.6238,
and the Prob value is 0.0094, which is significantly lower than 5%.
Therefore, the multiple regression passes the T test.
For the control variable VCR, the T statistics is 0.5129, and the Prob.
value is 0.6086, which is significantly greater than 5%. Therefore, the
multiple regression fails the T test. That is to say, the explanation of
VCR on the weighted ROE is not significant.
For the control variable LNTA that represents the company size, the T
statistic is -0.9904, and the Prob. value is 0.3232, which significantly
greater than 5%. Therefore, the multiple regression fails the T test.
Among control sub-dumb variables GDPRYEAR2016 and
GDPRYEAR2017 that represent the annual GDP growth rate fails the T
test, GDPRYEAR2016 fails the T test and GDPRYEAR2017 passes the
T test.
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Among the control sub-dumb variables industry1 to industry33 that
represent the industry growth rate, only industry11 and industry29 pass
the T test, and the remaining fail the T test.
Some of the control variables participating in the regression and the
controlled sub-dummy variables can pass the test, while others cannot,
indicating that the impact of the control variable on the weighted ROE is
local and limited, not as significant as the dummy variable VC. On the
other hand, it also shows that there are other factors that affect the
weighted ROE. From practical observations, such factors are too many
to be processed in multiple regression equations. This is also the
reason for the moderate level of the goodness of fit of the multiple
regression equation.
The purpose of introducing control variables is to investigate the
explained variables by putting the explaining variables under certain
conditions. But the control variable is not the focus of this paper, it
doesn’t merit any additional discussion here.
(5) The econometric significance test of multiple regression
EViews software is applied to examine the multicollinearity of the
explaining variables for the multiple regression equations in Table 4-4.
The results are as follows (Table 4-5).
Table 4-5 Collinearity diagnosis of multiple regression equation
VC VCR LNTA ISM GDPR
VC 1.000000 0.398401 0.062127 0.005939 0.032346
VCR 0.398401 1.000000 0.078594 -0.008490 -0.103125
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LNTA 0.062127 0.078594 1.000000 0.124830 -0.023697
ISM 0.005939 -0.008490 0.124830 1.000000 -0.048382
GDPR 0.032346 -0.103125 -0.023697 -0.048382 1.000000
According to Table 4-5, the explaining variables of multiple regression
have a low correlation, and the correlation coefficient is lower than 0.4.
Therefore, there is no multiple collinearity problem, and the multiple
regression passes the econometric significance test. The multiple
regression equation effectively explains the correlation between VC
and ROE.
4.2.1.2 Impact on ROA
(1) Direct regression results
Regression is directly conducted to the ROA of the sample companies
and VC in EViews software. The results are shown in the following table
(Table 4-6):
Table 4-6 Regression results of ROA and VC
Dependent Variable: ROA
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/05/20 Time: 03:13
Sample: 1 232
Included observations: 232
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
VC -4.903461 1.362225 -3.599596 0.0004
C 21.17069 1.203218 17.59506 0.0000
R-squared 0.053331 Mean dependent var 17.34515
Adjusted R-squared 0.049215 S.D. dependent var 8.812277
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S.E. of regression 8.592694 Akaike info criterion 7.148285
Sum squared resid 16981.91 Schwarz criterion 7.177998
Log likelihood -827.2011 Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.160268
F-statistic 12.95709 Durbin-Watson stat 2.126774
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000390
The results in Table 4-6 indicate VC is a negative correlated with ROA.
The regression coefficient of VC is -4.90, and the F statistic value of VC,
that is, the T statistic value is 0.0004, which passes the test. That is,
without considering other control factors or conditions, the ROA of VC
startups is generally lower intuitively.
(2) Multiple regression with control variables
According to the regression equation of Equation 4-2, the impact of
venture capital on ROA is shown in the following table (Table 4-7).
Table 4-7 Multiple regression results of venture capital and ROA
Dependent Variable: ROA
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/05/20 Time: 03:34
Sample: 1 232
Included observations: 232
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
VC -3.005243 1.473002 -2.040217 0.0427
VCR -0.015433 0.043449 -0.355195 0.7228
LNTA -2.932429 0.877071 -3.343433 0.0010
GDPRYEAR2016 0.154522 0.178787 0.864278 0.3885
GDPRYEAR2017 0.417521 0.320817 1.301433 0.1947
INDUSTRY1 6.746788 8.135657 0.829286 0.4080
INDUSTRY10 5.769062 7.959163 0.724833 0.4694
INDUSTRY11 43.93288 8.022944 5.475905 0.0000
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INDUSTRY12 -6.661921 5.750379 -1.158519 0.2481
INDUSTRY13 -5.132185 7.966262 -0.644240 0.5202
INDUSTRY14 -7.835751 7.946936 -0.986009 0.3254
INDUSTRY15 -6.284090 7.956511 -0.789805 0.4306
INDUSTRY16 -1.481820 7.957690 -0.186212 0.8525
INDUSTRY17 -5.827370 5.691762 -1.023825 0.3072
INDUSTRY18 -5.948980 2.769449 -2.148074 0.0330
INDUSTRY19 -2.494427 1.830882 -1.362418 0.1747
INDUSTRY2 -0.183433 2.524830 -0.072651 0.9422
INDUSTRY20 -6.212247 5.749668 -1.080453 0.2813
INDUSTRY21 -1.116449 4.098563 -0.272400 0.7856
INDUSTRY22 -4.899405 2.892952 -1.693566 0.0920
INDUSTRY23 -9.638324 5.714267 -1.686712 0.0933
INDUSTRY24 7.842172 5.685136 1.379417 0.1694
INDUSTRY25 -2.532193 4.691948 -0.539689 0.5900
INDUSTRY26 -0.507217 2.740457 -0.185085 0.8534
INDUSTRY27 -10.84401 8.082690 -1.341633 0.1813
INDUSTRY28 -4.385467 8.159225 -0.537486 0.5916
INDUSTRY29 -6.074383 2.232726 -2.720613 0.0071
INDUSTRY3 2.246629 5.676218 0.395797 0.6927
INDUSTRY30 -2.156614 3.022108 -0.713612 0.4763
INDUSTRY31 -5.340899 5.728588 -0.932324 0.3523
INDUSTRY32 3.689343 4.159448 0.886979 0.3762
INDUSTRY33 -0.166107 2.185813 -0.075993 0.9395
INDUSTRY4 2.148467 3.423012 0.627654 0.5310
INDUSTRY5 -8.126799 7.963197 -1.020545 0.3087
INDUSTRY6 -1.911618 7.948470 -0.240501 0.8102
INDUSTRY7 -0.552038 2.177734 -0.253492 0.8002
INDUSTRY8 -10.18876 8.093255 -1.258920 0.2096
INDUSTRY9 5.284616 4.741267 1.114600 0.2664
C 79.80389 17.52506 4.553701 0.0000
R-squared 0.340981 Mean dependent var 17.34515
Adjusted R-squared 0.211226 S.D. dependent var 8.812277
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S.E. of regression 7.826446 Akaike info criterion 7.105054
Sum squared resid 11821.88 Schwarz criterion 7.684462
Log likelihood -785.1862 Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.338723
F-statistic 2.627878 Durbin-Watson stat 2.352788
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000009
According to the regression results in Table 4-7, the R2 value of the
regression equation containing dummy variables and control variables
is 0.3410, the R value is about 0.58, which is believed in statistics that
the variables are moderately correlated when |R| is greater than or
equal to 0.5 and less than 0.8, and the Prob value of F statistics is
0.0000, the significance is 0, and the equation has a high fitness.
After the regression equations are generally tested and combined with
the regression coefficients of explaining variables, Equation 4-2 can be
rewritten as regression equation with coefficients, which is omitted
here.
(3) The economic significance test of multiple regression
It can be seen from Table 4-7 that the regression coefficient β1 of the
dummy variable VC, “venture or venture-free investment”, is -3.0052,
which indicates that when other factors remain unchanged, the ROA of
the VC startups has decreased by 3.0052 units on the whole. In other
words, there is a negative correlation between venture capital and ROE.
Therefore, the H2a “There is a positive correlation between venture
capital and the ROA of the operating performance of startups” is denied,
and the H2b “There is a negative correlation between venture capital
and the ROA of the operating performance of startups” is affirmed.
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According to the adverse selection hypothesis, if venture capital tends
to invest in startups with worse operating performance, it will inevitably
lead to a lower ROA of startups.
(4) The statistical significance test of multiple regression
For the regression equation in Table 4-7, The Prob value of F statistics
is 0 significantly, and the regression equation has statistical
significance.
The T statistics of single variable is examined. The T statistics of the
dummy variable VC, “venture or venture-free investment”, is -2.0402,
and the Prob value is 0.0427, which is lower than 5%. Therefore, the
multiple regression passes the T test.
For the control variable VCR, the T statistics is -0.3552, and the Prob.
value is 0.7228, which is significantly greater than 5%. Therefore, the
multiple regression fails the T test. That is to say, the explanation of
VCR on the ROA is not significant.
For the control variable LNTA that represents the company size, the T
statistic is -3.3434, and the Prob. value is 0.0010, which is significantly
lower than 5%. Therefore, the multiple regression passes the T test,
indicating that the explanation of LNTA on RA is very significant.
The control sub-dumb variables GDPRYEAR2016 and
GDPRYEAR2017 that represent the annual GDP growth rate all fail the
T test.
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Among the control sub-dumb variables industry1 to industry33 that
represent the industry growth rate, only industry11 and industry29 pass
the T test, and the remaining fail the T test.
Some of the control variables participating in the regression and the
controlled sub-dummy variables can pass the test, while others cannot,
indicating that the impact of the control variable on the ROA is local and
limited, not as significant as the dummy variable VC. In general, there
are other unknown factors for the impact of ROA, which is also the
reason for the moderate level of goodness of fit of the multiple
regression equation. But the control variables are not the focus of this
paper, which is simply observed and discussed here.
(4) The econometric significance test of multiple regression
For the multiple regression equation in Table 4-7, the multicollinearity
result of explaining variables is the same as that in Table 4-5, and the
explaining variables of multiple regression have a low correlation.
Therefore, there is no multiple collinearity problem, and the multiple
regression passes the econometric significance test. The regression
equation effectively explains the correlation between VC and ROE.
4.2.2 Impact of venture capital on solvency
4.2.2.1 The impact on CR
(1) Direct regression results
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Regression is directly conducted to the CR of the sample companies
and VC in EViews software. The results are shown in the following table
(Table 4-8):
Table 4-8 Regression results of venture capital and CR
Dependent Variable: CR
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/05/20 Time: 03:14
Sample: 1 232
Included observations: 232
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
VC -0.449077 0.337480 -1.330678 0.1846
C 3.106001 0.298087 10.41977 0.0000
R-squared 0.007640 Mean dependent var 2.755644
Adjusted R-squared 0.003325 S.D. dependent var 2.132317
S.E. of regression 2.128769 Akaike info criterion 4.357548
Sum squared resid 1042.281 Schwarz criterion 4.387261
Log likelihood -503.4756 Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.369531
F-statistic 1.770705 Durbin-Watson stat 1.995191
Prob(F-statistic) 0.184613
The results in Table 4-8 show that VC and CR is not statistically
correlated. The F statistics of explaining variable VC of the regression
equation, which refers to the T statistics, is 0.1846, which fails the test.
If only VC coefficient is observed, its value is -0.4491. The CR of VC
startups is lower, but very slight.
That is, without considering other control factors or conditions, the CR
of VC startups is slightly lower intuitively, but is not statistically
significant.
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(2) Multiple regression with control variables
According to the regression equation of Equation 4-3, the impact of
venture capital on CR is shown in the following table (Table 4-9).
Table 4-9 Multiple regression results of venture capital and CR
Dependent Variable: CR
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/05/20 Time: 03:36
Sample: 1 232
Included observations: 232
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
VC 0.057314 0.387948 0.147736 0.8827
VCR -0.014936 0.011443 -1.305194 0.1934
LNTA -0.790065 0.230996 -3.420247 0.0008
GDPRYEAR2016 -0.005528 0.047088 -0.117403 0.9067
GDPRYEAR2017 0.047042 0.084494 0.556743 0.5783
INDUSTRY1 0.565542 2.142708 0.263938 0.7921
INDUSTRY10 2.991847 2.096225 1.427255 0.1551
INDUSTRY11 5.558284 2.113023 2.630489 0.0092
INDUSTRY12 0.006210 1.514492 0.004101 0.9967
INDUSTRY13 -1.192024 2.098094 -0.568146 0.5706
INDUSTRY14 -0.015477 2.093004 -0.007394 0.9941
INDUSTRY15 -0.579852 2.095526 -0.276709 0.7823
INDUSTRY16 -0.542897 2.095837 -0.259036 0.7959
INDUSTRY17 -0.250168 1.499054 -0.166884 0.8676
INDUSTRY18 -0.785468 0.729397 -1.076873 0.2829
INDUSTRY19 0.101434 0.482204 0.210355 0.8336
INDUSTRY2 0.495719 0.664971 0.745474 0.4569
INDUSTRY20 -0.376342 1.514305 -0.248525 0.8040
INDUSTRY21 1.217193 1.079449 1.127606 0.2609
INDUSTRY22 -0.002869 0.761924 -0.003765 0.9970
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INDUSTRY23 -1.243353 1.504981 -0.826159 0.4097
INDUSTRY24 2.230207 1.497309 1.489477 0.1380
INDUSTRY25 -1.224711 1.235730 -0.991083 0.3229
INDUSTRY26 -0.461628 0.721761 -0.639585 0.5232
INDUSTRY27 -0.310580 2.128758 -0.145897 0.8842
INDUSTRY28 -0.017975 2.148916 -0.008365 0.9933
INDUSTRY29 -0.585997 0.588039 -0.996528 0.3202
INDUSTRY3 -0.203888 1.494960 -0.136384 0.8917
INDUSTRY30 1.945655 0.795940 2.444474 0.0154
INDUSTRY31 -0.846700 1.508753 -0.561192 0.5753
INDUSTRY32 0.578722 1.095484 0.528280 0.5979
INDUSTRY33 1.174949 0.575683 2.040965 0.0426
INDUSTRY4 0.749159 0.901527 0.830989 0.4070
INDUSTRY5 -0.583215 2.097287 -0.278081 0.7812
INDUSTRY6 0.273511 2.093409 0.130653 0.8962
INDUSTRY7 0.355529 0.573555 0.619869 0.5361
INDUSTRY8 -1.082612 2.131541 -0.507901 0.6121
INDUSTRY9 0.171008 1.248719 0.136947 0.8912
C 18.63568 4.615620 4.037525 0.0001
R-squared 0.219250 Mean dependent var 2.755644
Adjusted R-squared 0.065528 S.D. dependent var 2.132317
S.E. of regression 2.061271 Akaike info criterion 4.436682
Sum squared resid 820.0255 Schwarz criterion 5.016090
Log likelihood -475.6551 Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.670351
F-statistic 1.426271 Durbin-Watson stat 2.149036
Prob(F-statistic) 0.063923
According to the regression results in Table 4-9, the F statistical
probability value of the regression equation containing dummy
variables and control variables is 0.0639, which is greater than 5%. The
overall regression equation fails the test, and the impact relationship
between VC and CR has no statistical significance.
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(3) The economic significance test of multiple regression
It can be found through examining Table 4-9 that the value of the
coefficient β1 of the dummy variable VC is 0.0573, which is different
from the direct regression for CR and VC. After adding the control
variable, the value of VC coefficient β1 changes from negative to
positive, but is very slight. Neither of them can pass the F test and T
test.
In view of this result, the H3a “There is a positive correlation between
venture capital and the CR of the operating performance of startups”
and the H3b “There is a negative correlation between venture capital
and the CR of the operating performance of startups” cannot be
verified.
(4) The statistical significance test of multiple regression
For the regression equation in Table 4-9, The Prob value of F statistics
is greater than 5%, and the regression equation has no statistical
significance.
The dummy variable VC, “venture or venture-free investment” is
examined. The T statistics is 0.1477, and the Prob value is 0.8827,
which is significantly greater than 5%. Therefore, the regression
equation fails the T test, which further indicates that it has no statistical
significance.
(4) The econometric significance test of multiple regression
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For the multiple regression equation in Table 4-9, the multicollinearity
result of the explaining variables is the same as that in Table 4-5, and
the explaining variables of multiple regression have a low correlation.
Therefore, there is no multiple collinearity problem, indicating that the
insufficient significance of the regression results of VC and CR is not
caused by the multicollinearity of the explaining variables.
4.2.2.2 The impact on QR
(1) Direct regression results
Regression is directly conducted to the QR of the sample companies
and VC in EViews software. The results are shown in the following table
(Table 4-10):
Table 4-10 Regression results of venture capital and QR
Dependent Variable: QR
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/10/20 Time: 04:00
Sample: 1 232
Included observations: 232
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
VC -0.419090 0.312280 -1.342032 0.1809
C 2.549101 0.275829 9.241611 0.0000
R-squared 0.007770 Mean dependent var 2.222139
Adjusted R-squared 0.003456 S.D. dependent var 1.973223
S.E. of regression 1.969810 Akaike info criterion 4.202335
Sum squared resid 892.4353 Schwarz criterion 4.232048
Log likelihood -485.4709 Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.214318
F-statistic 1.801050 Durbin-Watson stat 2.047446
Prob(F-statistic) 0.180909
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The results in Table 4-10 show that VC and QR is not statistically
correlated. The F statistics of explaining variable VC of the regression
equation, which refers to the T statistics, is 0.1809, which fails the test.
If only VC coefficient is observed, its value is -0.4190. The QR of VC
startups is lower, but very slight.
That is, without considering other control factors or conditions, the QR
of VC startups is slightly lower intuitively, but is not statistically
significant.
(2) Multiple regression with control variables
According to the regression equation of Equation 4-4, the impact of
venture capital on QR is shown in the following table (Table 4-11).
Table 4-11 Multiple regression results of venture capital and QR
Dependent Variable: QR
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/10/20 Time: 04:02
Sample: 1 232
Included observations: 232
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
VC 0.008632 0.365034 0.023646 0.9812
VCR -0.011848 0.010767 -1.100349 0.2726
LNTA -0.676964 0.217353 -3.114588 0.0021
GDPRYEAR2016 -0.001769 0.044306 -0.039924 0.9682
GDPRYEAR2017 0.033955 0.079504 0.427083 0.6698
INDUSTRY1 0.217794 2.016151 0.108025 0.9141
INDUSTRY10 2.730380 1.972413 1.384284 0.1679
INDUSTRY11 5.142066 1.988219 2.586268 0.0104
INDUSTRY12 -0.184897 1.425039 -0.129749 0.8969
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INDUSTRY13 -0.997508 1.974172 -0.505279 0.6139
INDUSTRY14 0.198344 1.969383 0.100714 0.9199
INDUSTRY15 -0.445627 1.971755 -0.226005 0.8214
INDUSTRY16 -0.757378 1.972048 -0.384057 0.7014
INDUSTRY17 -0.625382 1.410513 -0.443372 0.6580
INDUSTRY18 -0.594868 0.686315 -0.866756 0.3872
INDUSTRY19 0.068184 0.453723 0.150277 0.8807
INDUSTRY2 0.653903 0.625695 1.045083 0.2973
INDUSTRY20 -0.355606 1.424863 -0.249572 0.8032
INDUSTRY21 0.703490 1.015692 0.692622 0.4894
INDUSTRY22 -0.158745 0.716921 -0.221426 0.8250
INDUSTRY23 -0.971100 1.416090 -0.685761 0.4937
INDUSTRY24 1.520942 1.408871 1.079547 0.2817
INDUSTRY25 -1.015267 1.162743 -0.873165 0.3837
INDUSTRY26 -0.337450 0.679131 -0.496885 0.6198
INDUSTRY27 -0.142267 2.003025 -0.071026 0.9435
INDUSTRY28 0.247816 2.021992 0.122560 0.9026
INDUSTRY29 -0.425234 0.553307 -0.768532 0.4431
INDUSTRY3 -0.096026 1.406661 -0.068265 0.9456
INDUSTRY30 1.811901 0.748929 2.419324 0.0165
INDUSTRY31 -0.836876 1.419639 -0.589499 0.5562
INDUSTRY32 0.724570 1.030780 0.702933 0.4829
INDUSTRY33 1.033430 0.541681 1.907822 0.0579
INDUSTRY4 0.636394 0.848279 0.750217 0.4540
INDUSTRY5 -0.300092 1.973412 -0.152067 0.8793
INDUSTRY6 -0.216718 1.969763 -0.110022 0.9125
INDUSTRY7 0.302305 0.539679 0.560158 0.5760
INDUSTRY8 -0.863693 2.005643 -0.430631 0.6672
INDUSTRY9 0.376359 1.174965 0.320315 0.7491
C 15.82802 4.343002 3.644489 0.0003
R-squared 0.192797 Mean dependent var 2.222139
Adjusted R-squared 0.033865 S.D. dependent var 1.973223
S.E. of regression 1.939523 Akaike info criterion 4.314921
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Sum squared resid 726.0178 Schwarz criterion 4.894330
Log likelihood -461.5309 Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.548591
F-statistic 1.213082 Durbin-Watson stat 2.183938
Prob(F-statistic) 0.200406
According to the regression results in Table 4-9, the F statistical
probability value of the regression equation containing dummy
variables and control variables is 0.2004, which is greater than 5%. The
overall regression equation fails the test, and the impact relationship
between VC and QR has no statistical significance.
(3) The economic significance test of multiple regression
It can be found through examining Table 4-11 that the value of the
coefficient β1 of the dummy variable VC, “venture and venture-free
investment” is 0.0086, which is different from the direct regression for
CR and VC. After adding the control variable, the value of VC
coefficient β1 changes from negative to positive, but is very slight. And
neither of them can pass the F test and T test.
Therefore, the H4a “There is a positive correlation between venture
capital and the QR of the operating performance of startups” and the
H4b “There is a negative correlation between venture capital and the
QR of the operating performance of startups” cannot be verified.
(4) The statistical significance test of multiple regression
For the regression equation in Table 4-11, The Prob value of F statistics
is significantly greater than 5%, and the regression equation has no
statistical significance.
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The dummy variable VC, “venture or venture-free investment” is
examined. The T statistics is 0.0236, and the Prob value is 0.9812,
which is significantly greater than 5%. Therefore, the regression
equation fails the T test, which further indicates that the impact of
venture capital on QR has no statistical significance.
(4) The econometric significance test of multiple regression
For the multiple regression equation in Table 4-11, the multicollinearity
result of the explaining variables is the same as that in Table 4-5, and
the explaining variables of multiple regression have a low correlation.
Therefore, there is no multiple collinearity problem, indicating that the
insufficient significance of the regression results of VC and QR is not
caused by the multicollinearity of the explaining variables.
4.2.3 The impact of venture capital on operational capabilities
4.2.3.1 The impact on I_TURNOVER
(1) Direct regression results
Regression is directly conducted to the I_TURNOVER of the sample
companies and VC in EViews software. The results are shown in the
following table (Table 4-12):
Table 4-12 Regression results of venture capital and I_TURNOVER
Dependent Variable: I_TURNOVER
Method: Least Squares




Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
VC -30.00407 21.20864 -1.414710 0.1585
C 41.60502 18.73304 2.220943 0.0273
R-squared 0.008627 Mean dependent var 18.19666
Adjusted R-squared 0.004316 S.D. dependent var 134.0703
S.E. of regression 133.7806 Akaike info criterion 12.63886
Sum squared resid 4116370. Schwarz criterion 12.66858
Log likelihood -1464.108 Hannan-Quinn criter. 12.65085
F-statistic 2.001404 Durbin-Watson stat 2.005917
Prob(F-statistic) 0.158506
The results in Table 4-12 show that VC and I_TURNOVER is not
statistically correlated. The F statistics of explaining variable VC of the
regression equation, which refers to the T statistics, is 0.1585, which
fails the test. If only VC coefficient β1 is observed, its value is -30.0041.
The CR of VC startups is lower.
Therefore, without considering other control factors or conditions, the
I_TURNOVER of VC startups is slightly lower intuitively, but is not
statistically significant.
(2) Multiple regression with control variables
According to the regression equation of Equation 4-5, the impact of
venture capital on I_TURNOVER is shown in the following table (Table
4-13).




Date: 05/05/20 Time: 03:35
Sample: 1 232
Included observations: 232
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
VC -29.31738 25.67355 -1.141929 0.2549
VCR -0.056972 0.757293 -0.075231 0.9401
LNTA -5.661690 15.28683 -0.370364 0.7115
GDPRYEAR2016 -2.114063 3.116158 -0.678420 0.4983
GDPRYEAR2017 2.539607 5.591643 0.454179 0.6502
INDUSTRY1 -3.053613 141.7997 -0.021535 0.9828
INDUSTRY10 9.852437 138.7235 0.071022 0.9435
INDUSTRY11 -11.38805 139.8352 -0.081439 0.9352
INDUSTRY12 14.49540 100.2257 0.144628 0.8852
INDUSTRY13 23.64615 138.8472 0.170303 0.8649
INDUSTRY14 1.070416 138.5104 0.007728 0.9938
INDUSTRY15 2.561223 138.6773 0.018469 0.9853
INDUSTRY16 1.588413 138.6978 0.011452 0.9909
INDUSTRY17 -2.175934 99.20405 -0.021934 0.9825
INDUSTRY18 3.179180 48.26986 0.065863 0.9476
INDUSTRY19 17.89712 31.91119 0.560841 0.5756
INDUSTRY2 18.25408 44.00629 0.414806 0.6787
INDUSTRY20 0.362895 100.2133 0.003621 0.9971
INDUSTRY21 -3.904540 71.43553 -0.054658 0.9565
INDUSTRY22 -1.323549 50.42244 -0.026249 0.9791
INDUSTRY23 -13.28432 99.59629 -0.133382 0.8940
INDUSTRY24 5.981519 99.08857 0.060365 0.9519
INDUSTRY25 -4.248885 81.77789 -0.051956 0.9586
INDUSTRY26 7.343418 47.76455 0.153742 0.8780
INDUSTRY27 27.20948 140.8765 0.193144 0.8470
INDUSTRY28 8.707703 142.2105 0.061231 0.9512
INDUSTRY29 2.273603 38.91510 0.058425 0.9535
INDUSTRY3 10.92855 98.93313 0.110464 0.9122
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INDUSTRY30 230.8963 52.67356 4.383533 0.0000
INDUSTRY31 1.409575 99.84591 0.014118 0.9888
INDUSTRY32 167.8128 72.49671 2.314764 0.0217
INDUSTRY33 -7.783106 38.09743 -0.204295 0.8383
INDUSTRY4 -8.681676 59.66108 -0.145517 0.8845
INDUSTRY5 2.837011 138.7938 0.020440 0.9837
INDUSTRY6 11.79035 138.5371 0.085106 0.9323
INDUSTRY7 -0.248510 37.95662 -0.006547 0.9948
INDUSTRY8 -12.00814 141.0607 -0.085128 0.9322
INDUSTRY9 -4.625155 82.63749 -0.055969 0.9554
C 146.5242 305.4515 0.479697 0.6320
R-squared 0.135083 Mean dependent var 18.19666
Adjusted R-squared -0.035212 S.D. dependent var 134.0703
S.E. of regression 136.4103 Akaike info criterion 12.82137
Sum squared resid 3591301. Schwarz criterion 13.40078
Log likelihood -1448.279 Hannan-Quinn criter. 13.05504
F-statistic 0.793228 Durbin-Watson stat 2.023523
Prob(F-statistic) 0.799617
According to the regression results in Table 4-13, the F statistical
probability value of the regression equation containing dummy
variables and control variables is 0.7996, which is greater than 5%. The
overall regression equation fails the test, and the impact relationship
between VC and I_TURNOVER has no statistical significance.
(3) The economic significance test of multiple regression
It can be found through examining Table 4-13 that the value of the
coefficient β1 of the dummy variable VC, “venture and venture-free
investment” is -29.3174. I_TURNOVER of venture capital startups is
negatively correlated with dummy variable VC, but it cannot pass the F
test and T test.
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In view of this result, the H5a “There is a positive correlation between
venture capital and the I_TURNOVER of the operating performance of
startups” and the H5b “There is a negative correlation between venture
capital and the I_TURNOVER of the operating performance of startups”
cannot be verified.
(4) The statistical significance test of multiple regression
For the regression equation in Table 4-13, The Prob value of F statistics
is significantly greater than 5%, and the overall regression equation has
no statistical significance.
The dummy variable VC, “venture or venture-free investment” is
examined. The T statistics is -1.1419, and the Prob value is 0.2459,
which is significantly greater than 5%. Therefore, the regression
equation fails the T test, which further indicates that the regression
equation of venture capital and I_TURNOVER has no statistical
significance.
(4) The econometric significance test of multiple regression
For the multiple regression equation in Table 4-13, the multicollinearity
result of the explaining variables is the same as that in Table 4-5, and
the explaining variables of multiple regression have a low correlation.
Therefore, there is no multiple collinearity problem, indicating that the
insufficient significance of the regression results of venture capital and
I_TURNOVER is not caused by the multicollinearity of the explaining
variables.
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4.2.3.2 The impact on TAT
(1) Direct regression results
Regression is directly conducted to the TAT of the sample companies
and VC in EViews software. The results are shown in the following table
(Table 4-14):
Table 4-14 Regression results of venture capital and TAT
Dependent Variable: TAT
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/05/20 Time: 03:16
Sample: 1 232
Included observations: 232
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
VC -0.049393 0.057909 -0.852947 0.3946
C 0.915355 0.051150 17.89560 0.0000
R-squared 0.003153 Mean dependent var 0.876819
Adjusted R-squared -0.001181 S.D. dependent var 0.365066
S.E. of regression 0.365282 Akaike info criterion 0.832289
Sum squared resid 30.68912 Schwarz criterion 0.862002
Log likelihood -94.54554 Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.844272
F-statistic 0.727518 Durbin-Watson stat 1.923444
Prob(F-statistic) 0.394576
The results in Table 4-14 show that VC and TAT is not statistically
correlated. The F statistics of explaining variable VC of the regression
equation, which refers to the T statistics, is 0.3946, which fails the test.
If only VC coefficient β1 is observed, its value is -0.0494. The CR of VC
startups is lower but is slight.
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It can be seen that, without considering other control factors or
conditions, the TAT of VC startups is lower intuitively but slight, and is
not statistically significant.
(2) Multiple regression with control variables
According to the regression equation of Equation 4-6, the impact of
venture capital on TAT is shown in the following table (Table 4-15).
Table 4-15 Multiple regression results of venture capital and TAT
Dependent Variable: TAT
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/05/20 Time: 03:38
Sample: 1 232
Included observations: 232
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
VC -0.020248 0.066876 -0.302773 0.7624
VCR 0.000599 0.001973 0.303519 0.7618
LNTA -0.103880 0.039820 -2.608723 0.0098
GDPRYEAR2016 0.009418 0.008117 1.160295 0.2474
GDPRYEAR2017 0.021670 0.014565 1.487740 0.1385
INDUSTRY1 0.772448 0.369369 2.091265 0.0378
INDUSTRY10 -0.163912 0.361356 -0.453604 0.6506
INDUSTRY11 0.407387 0.364252 1.118421 0.2648
INDUSTRY12 0.216145 0.261074 0.827907 0.4087
INDUSTRY13 0.428724 0.361678 1.185373 0.2373
INDUSTRY14 0.019501 0.360801 0.054050 0.9570
INDUSTRY15 0.634709 0.361235 1.757052 0.0805
INDUSTRY16 0.156848 0.361289 0.434134 0.6647
INDUSTRY17 -0.131502 0.258413 -0.508883 0.6114
INDUSTRY18 -0.231689 0.125736 -1.842660 0.0669
INDUSTRY19 -0.113928 0.083124 -1.370579 0.1721
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INDUSTRY2 0.133430 0.114630 1.164005 0.2459
INDUSTRY20 -0.111232 0.261042 -0.426108 0.6705
INDUSTRY21 -0.148997 0.186080 -0.800718 0.4243
INDUSTRY22 0.037420 0.131344 0.284902 0.7760
INDUSTRY23 0.020947 0.259435 0.080741 0.9357
INDUSTRY24 -0.088016 0.258112 -0.341000 0.7335
INDUSTRY25 -0.110543 0.213020 -0.518930 0.6044
INDUSTRY26 0.029983 0.124420 0.240985 0.8098
INDUSTRY27 -0.079245 0.366964 -0.215949 0.8293
INDUSTRY28 -0.130345 0.370439 -0.351867 0.7253
INDUSTRY29 -0.122737 0.101369 -1.210797 0.2275
INDUSTRY3 0.128247 0.257707 0.497646 0.6193
INDUSTRY30 -0.013795 0.137207 -0.100545 0.9200
INDUSTRY31 -0.207955 0.260085 -0.799565 0.4249
INDUSTRY32 0.086381 0.188844 0.457420 0.6479
INDUSTRY33 -0.140816 0.099239 -1.418962 0.1575
INDUSTRY4 -0.281300 0.155409 -1.810064 0.0718
INDUSTRY5 -0.184400 0.361539 -0.510042 0.6106
INDUSTRY6 0.100416 0.360870 0.278261 0.7811
INDUSTRY7 0.053907 0.098872 0.545218 0.5862
INDUSTRY8 0.350920 0.367444 0.955031 0.3408
INDUSTRY9 0.610677 0.215259 2.836935 0.0050
C 2.964320 0.795660 3.725613 0.0003
R-squared 0.208472 Mean dependent var 0.876819
Adjusted R-squared 0.052628 S.D. dependent var 0.365066
S.E. of regression 0.355330 Akaike info criterion 0.920622
Sum squared resid 24.36812 Schwarz criterion 1.500031
Log likelihood -67.79219 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.154292
F-statistic 1.337692 Durbin-Watson stat 2.239825
Prob(F-statistic) 0.105722
According to the regression results in Table 4-15, the F statistical
probability value of the regression equation containing dummy
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variables and control variables is 0.1057, which is greater than 5%. The
overall regression equation fails the test, and the impact relationship
between VC and TAT has no statistical significance.
(3) The economic significance test of multiple regression
It can be found through examining Table 4-15 that the value of the
coefficient β1 of the dummy variable VC, “venture and venture-free
investment” is -0.0202. TAT of venture capital startups is negatively
correlated with dummy variable VC in a very slight manner, but it
cannot pass the F test and T test.
In view of this result, the H6a “There is a positive correlation between
venture capital and the TAT of the operating performance of startups”
and the H6b “There is a negative correlation between venture capital
and the TAT of the operating performance of startups” cannot be
verified.
(4) The statistical significance test of multiple regression
For the regression equation in Table 4-15, The Prob value of F statistics
is greater than 5%, and the overall regression equation has no
statistical significance.
The dummy variable VC, “venture or venture-free investment” is
examined. The T statistics is -0.3028, and the Prob value is 0.7624,
which is significantly greater than 5%. Therefore, the regression
equation fails the T test, which further indicates that the regression
equation of venture capital and TAT has no statistical significance.
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(4) The econometric significance test of multiple regression
For the multiple regression equation in Table 4-15, the multicollinearity
result of the explaining variables is the same as that in Table 4-5, and
the explaining variables of multiple regression have a low correlation.
Therefore, there is no multiple collinearity problem, indicating that the
insufficient significance of the regression results of venture capital and
TAT is not caused by the multicollinearity of the explaining variables.
4.3 Hypothesis verification and main conclusions
The above mainly uses the 232 sample companies of Chinese GEM
listed companies from 2016 to 2018 to conduct an empirical analysis of
the impact of venture capital on the operating performance of startups.
The verification of relevant research hypothesis and conclusions are
further discussed below.
4.3.1 About hypothesis verification
The research hypotheses in this chapter are mainly proposed from the
two perspectives that venture capital has a positive or negative impact
on the operating performance of startups. According to the previous
analysis, the verification results are shown in the following table (Table
4-16).
Table 4-16 Hypothesis verification of the impact of venture capital on the







H1a: There is a positive correlation between




equity (ROE) of operating performance of
startups.
H1b: There is a negative correlation between
the venture capital and the weighted return on
equity (ROE) of operating performance of
startups.
0.0135 0.0094 Y
H2a: There is a positive correlation between
the venture capital and the total return on
assets (ROA) of operating performance of
startups.
0.0000 0.0427 Contraryconclusion
H2b: There is a negative correlation between
the venture capital and the total return on
assets (ROA) of operating performance of
startups.
0.0000 0.0427 Y
H3a: There is a positive correlation between
the venture capital and the current ratio (CR)
of operating performance of startups.
0.0639 0.8827 N
H3b: There is a negative correlation between
the venture capital and the current ratio (CR)
of operating performance of startups.
0.0639 0.8827 N
H4a: There is a positive correlation between
the venture capital and the quick ratio (QR) of
operating performance of startups.
0.2004 0.9812 N
H4b: There is a negative correlation between
the venture capital and the quick ratio (QR) of
operating performance of startups.
0.2004 0.9812 N
H5a: There is a positive correlation between
the venture capital and the inventory turnover
rate (I_TURNOVER) of operating
performance of startups.
0.7996 0.2549 N
H5b: There is a negative correlation between
the venture capital and the inventory turnover
rate (I_TURNOVER) of operating
performance of startups.
0.7996 0.2549 N
H6a: There is a positive correlation between
the venture capital and the total asset turnover
(TAT) of operating performance of startups.
0.1057 0.7624 N
H6b: There is a negative correlation between
the venture capital and the total asset turnover
(TAT) of operating performance of startups.
0.1057 0.7624 N
4.3.2 Main conclusions
According to the summary results in Table 4-16, there is a negative
correlation between venture capital and the profitability of the operating
performance of startups, including the negative correlations of weighted
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ROE and ROA.; there is no statistically significant correlation between
venture capital and the solvency including CR and QR of the operating
performance of startups; there is no statistically significant correlation
between venture capital and the operating capabilities including
I_TURNOVER and TAT of the operating performance of startups.
(1) There is a negative correlation between venture capital and the
profitability of the operating performance of startups. Generally
speaking, after being introduced to a startup, the venture capital will
bring more resources to the startup. In addition to capital, it is likely to
render assistance in governance structure, capital operation, human
resources, strategic innovation, etc., which will further develop and
expand the startup. But why are the ROEs of venture capital startups in
the sample companies generally low? Based on the literature review
and a large amount of practical observations in this paper, it’s most
likely due to the adverse selection. Adverse selection is an important
phenomenon when venture capital is introduced to a startup. Venture
capital tends to choose startups with poor profitability for investment.
So even before the IPO, the profitability of these venture capital
startups is still generally lower than that of startups without venture
capital.
(2) There is no statistically significant correlation between venture
capital and the solvency of the operating performance of startups. It
may be believed that the startups will improve the solvency as the
invested startups incorporate the venture capital. But it can still be
considered in terms of adverse selection and purpose of capital: Firstly,
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if the current liabilities of the invested startups are already high, but
venture capital prefers such startups, then the current liabilities may be
eased after the introduction of venture capital, but the current ratio of
invested startups before the IPO is still generally lower than the
average level; secondly, the introduction of many venture capitals into
the invested startups has a clear purpose of capital, such as expanding
reproduction, technological upgrading, market expansion, etc., and the
invested startups may need to increase the debt ratio to complete these
operating activities, which cannot improve the solvency.
Therefore, it is of realistic logical rationality that there is no statistically
significant correlation between venture capital and the solvency of the
operating performance of startups, which is also proved by empirical
analysis.
(3) There is no statistically significant correlation between venture
capital and the operating capabilities of the operating performance of
startups. Venture capital can provide more capital and intellectual
support to the invested startups, but it may not be able to promote the
operating capabilities of the invested startups to exceed the average
level. There are also two possible reasons: Firstly, venture capital has a
preference for adverse selection and tends to invest in startups with
poor operating capabilities. In this case, even if venture capital
improves the operating capabilities of some invested companies, the
operating capabilities represented by I_TURNOVER of the invested
startups before the IPO are still generally below average; secondly,
relatively speaking, venture capitals are of little help in improving the
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business operations. They may be familiar with finance, capital,
governance, etc., but generally not very familiar with business
operations and mostly are “powerless”.
Therefore, it is of realistic logical rationality that there is no statistically
significant correlation between venture capital and the operating
capabilities of the operating performance of startups, which is in line
with the results of empirical analysis.
(4) In general, the conclusions of the empirical analysis can be
summarized as follows: Due to the prominent adverse selection effect,
the operating performance of startups with venture capital is generally
lower than that of startups without venture capital.
Why isn’t that the profitability of startups is reduced by the active entry
of venture capital? It needs to be analyzed in terms of motivation and
behavior: Firstly, the venture capital does not have the motivation to
reduce the profitability of startups. Because it does no good to startups,
venture capital and managers of venture capital, and it does not meet
the hypothesis of rational man. Secondly, in terms of behavior, venture
capital requires the invested startups to make some improvements
according to modern enterprise management system, standards and
methods, etc. These improvements are generally considered to have
positive value for startups. Certainly, they may increase some costs or
result in failures, but it is impossible for all invested sample companies
to fail after absorbing venture capital; there is also a possible
phenomenon that the entrepreneurs of the invested startups do not
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want to make progress after absorbing venture capital, resulting a
certain decline in performance, etc. But it is impossible for all invested
startups to make no attempt to make progress, causing the decline in
the profitability of invested startups.
Therefore, the most convincing explanation is that there is indeed an
adverse selection between venture capital and the operating
performance of startups. Venture capital prefers to invest in startups
with poor operating performance, so that the profitability of invested
startups before the IPO is still generally lower than startups without
venture capital. During the investment process, instead of being
reduced by the venture capital, the profitability of invested startups is
generally low. This idea can also be extended to solvency and
operating capabilities. From the perspective of direct regression
between VC and solvency indicators and operating capability indicators,
the regression coefficients of VC have negative correlations in different
degrees. Although there is no statistical significance, it is
evidence-based that venture capital tends to invest in startups with poor
profitability, solvency and operating capabilities.
4.3.3 Comparison with the conclusions of other related studies
Before empirical analysis, the author used to think that there was a
positive correlation between venture capital and operating performance
of startups, as too many startups are chasing venture capital, and too
much venture capital is rushing into startups. Intuitively, if there is a
negative correlation between venture capital and operating
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performance of startups, so what is venture capital needed? It is
precisely because of such doubts that the author conducted an overall
analysis of the relevant data of GEM listed companies and different
segmentation analysis, as well as referred to a large number of
previous studies to finally determine that due to the adverse selection,
there is a certain negative correlation between venture capital and the
operating performance of startups.
In related literatures, the relevant research conclusions on the impact of
venture capital on the operating performance of startups are mainly
divided into two groups:
One group insists that there is a negative correlation, which is the
conclusion of most studies. For example, the research of Li Yao and
Zhang Ziwei (2011) shows that the reason why private equity capital in
the GEM market causes the increase of the IPO underpricing rate of the
holding companies is that there is an “adverse selection” effect when
private equity capital is introduced to companies. The research of Song
Fangxiu and Li Chenchen (2014) shows that the income state profits of
companies with the participation of venture capital institutions before
IPO are worse than those of holding companies without venture capital,
and the participation of venture capital has aggravated the degree of
underpricing during IPO. The research results of Zhang Lingyu (2006)
support the theory of adverse selection, that is, relatively low-qualified
companies are more likely to seek the support of venture capital. Liu
Yang (2015) believes that the IPO underpricing rate of private equity
capital holding companies is generally higher, which is not due to the
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grandstanding effect, but because of the adverse selection of
companies during equity financing. The research of Xu Xinyang (2011)
shows that due to the adverse selection, the operating performance of
companies invested by private equity capital after listing is not as good
as that of companies without the support of private equity capital. Sun
Xiaoqin (2015) believes that there is no significant change in the
operating performances of companies with PE and companies without
PE in the first year of listing. Zhang Feng (2009) believes that China’s
startup investment has improved the capital structure of company, but
provided insufficient value-added services, and there may be “adverse
selection” in project selection. Tan Yi and Yang Ye (2011) concludes in
empirical research that there is a long-term problem of information
asymmetry during venture capital.
Another group insists that there is a positive correlation. Only a few
related studies support the similar conclusions. The research
conclusions of Zhan Zhenghua and Zhou Juanyan (2018) believe that
the existence of private equity investment is more conducive to improve
the operating performance of companies; from the perspective of
private equity investment, the number of joint investments,
shareholding ratio and reputation are all positively correlated with the
operating performance of the invested companies. The research of
Tang Zhixiang (2019) shows that in Chinese GEM market, private
equity investment plays a significant role in promoting the operating
performance. The reason may be that private equity investment meets
the capital needs of companies and thus promotes the performance.
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The more participation of private equity institutions, the better the
operating performance. The joint investment of multiple private equity
institutions will contribute to the scientific decision-making and improve
the market competitiveness of the companies; and the shareholding
ratio of private equity and whether the private equity investment has a
state-owned background do not significantly affect the operating
performance of companies. Zhang Yelin (2015) believes that private
equity investment benefits to the improvement of the operating
performance of SME.
Obviously, the research conclusions in this paper are highly consistent
with the idea of negative correlation, that is, venture capital has a
negative correlation with the operating performance due to the adverse
selection. However, as a fact study on the relationship between venture
capital and the operating performance of startups, why are completely
opposite conclusions drawn? The author has conducted in-depth
reflection and analysis on this problem (because the author used to be
a supporter of positive correlation theory), and believes that there may
be certain flaws in these studies that draw the conclusion of positive
correlation: The first is about the research methods. Some studies have
used factor analysis method and other methods to perform complex
processing on the data, which distorts the data and conclusions after
the extraction of principal components and orthogonal rotation, such as
the master thesis Research on the Impact of Private Equity Investment
on the Operating Performance of Sample. (Xu,2018) The second is that
the sample size is reduced largely to replace the whole with parts,
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which may distort the selective research conclusions. For example, in
the article Research on the Impact of Private Equity Investment on
Operating Performance of Enterprises, only 135 listed companies were
selected as samples from more than 600 GEM companies (as of the
time of writing), (Tang,2019) and conclusion of positive correlation was
drawn, with flaws existing in the representativeness of the samples to a
certain extent.
Through the empirical analysis in this chapter, this paper believes that
the venture capital has a negative correlation with the operating
performance of startups mainly due to the adverse selection.
4.4 The relationship between the venture capital and the valuation
and growth of startups
The above found that there is a negative correlation between venture
capital and the operating performance of startups. Next, he relationship
between venture capital and the valuation and growth of startups will be
further examined. In order to be consistent, the author still uses the 232
Chinese GEM-listed companies from 2016 to 2018 as a sample, and
conducts new regression calculation separately to the price-to-earnings
ratio (PE, market value/earnings) and price-to-book ratio (PB, market
value/net assets), price-to-sales ration (PS, market value/sales) of the
first day of listing (IPO cross-section data), and IPO annual growth rate
of total operating income (TOIR-IPO) by the same method in this
chapter to form a supplementary analysis of the adverse selection.
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics of new variables
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Descriptive statistics have been carried out for the variables involved in
the new calculation, including VC (whether there is venture capital),
VCR (VC’s shareholding ratio), LNTA (logarithm for total assets), PE
(price-to-earnings ratio, market value/earnings), PB (market-to-book
ratio, market value/net assets), PS (market-to-sales ratio, market
value/sales), TOIR_IPO (IPO annual growth rate of total operating
income), and the results are as follows:
Table 4-17 Descriptive statistical results of new variables
From the results in the table, all variables are at a normal level. In
addition, the sub-dummy variables such as GDP growth rate and
industry growth rate involved in the calculation are consistent with the
above, so the descriptive statistics are omitted.
4.4.2 Calculation results of new variables
(1) About PE. In the unary regression, there is no statistically linear
relationship between the price-to-earnings ratio (PE) and the presence
or absence of VC. Its F test and T test prob. values are all 0.7944,
which is much greater than 5% (Table 4-18).
VC VCR LNTA PE PB PS TOIR_IPO
Mean 0.780172 10.83816 20.21308 29.56739 6.260250 5.337065 18.63688
Median 1.000000 6.520000 20.07497 30.52773 5.695021 4.637326 14.84384
Maximum 1.000000 81.73000 24.62852 33.10646 18.33300 18.68675 95.34728
Minimum 0.000000 0.000000 18.96903 11.83322 1.524919 1.054339 -22.30648
Std. Dev. 0.415025 14.47167 0.731486 3.363969 2.609612 2.930583 20.22859
Observations 232 232 232 232 232 232 232
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Table 4-18 Unary regression results of PE and the presence or absence of VC
Dependent Variable: PE
Method: Least Squares
Date: 10/28/20 Time: 11:38
Sample: 1 232
Included observations: 232
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
VC -0.139440 0.534379 -0.260939 0.7944
C 29.67618 0.472003 62.87288 0.0000
R-squared 0.000296 Mean dependent var 29.56739
Adjusted R-squared -0.004051 S.D. dependent var 3.363969
S.E. of regression 3.370775 Akaike info criterion 5.276746
Sum squared resid 2613.289 Schwarz criterion 5.306459
Log likelihood -610.1025 Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.288729
F-statistic 0.068089 Durbin-Watson stat 1.861854
Prob(F-statistic) 0.794373
The multiple regression results after adding controls variables such as
VCR, LNTA, sub-dummy variables that characterize annual GDP
growth rates (GDPRYEAR2016, GDPRYEAR2017), and sub-dummy
variables that characterize industry sales profit rates
(INDUSTRY1-INDUSTRY33) cannot pass the F test and T test (Table
4-19):
Table 4-19 Multiple regression results of PE and the presence or absence of VC
Dependent Variable: PE
Method: Least Squares




Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
VC -0.142967 0.618745 -0.231059 0.8175
VCR 0.004345 0.018251 0.238085 0.8121
LNTA -0.419559 0.368420 -1.138807 0.2562
GDPRYEAR2016 0.085438 0.075101 1.137637 0.2567
GDPRYEAR2017 -0.162721 0.134761 -1.207475 0.2287
INDUSTRY1 -5.141564 3.417442 -1.504507 0.1341
INDUSTRY10 -0.378614 3.343304 -0.113245 0.9100
INDUSTRY11 -7.100030 3.370096 -2.106774 0.0364
INDUSTRY12 -0.489267 2.415489 -0.202554 0.8397
INDUSTRY13 4.107601 3.346286 1.227510 0.2211
INDUSTRY14 4.281334 3.338168 1.282540 0.2012
INDUSTRY15 2.815549 3.342190 0.842426 0.4006
INDUSTRY16 -2.172547 3.342685 -0.649941 0.5165
INDUSTRY17 3.319707 2.390866 1.388496 0.1666
INDUSTRY18 -0.574951 1.163327 -0.494229 0.6217
INDUSTRY19 0.528974 0.769075 0.687805 0.4924
INDUSTRY2 -0.683438 1.060573 -0.644405 0.5201
INDUSTRY20 2.889749 2.415190 1.196489 0.2330
INDUSTRY21 3.023156 1.721631 1.755984 0.0807
INDUSTRY22 0.162632 1.215205 0.133831 0.8937
INDUSTRY23 1.899123 2.400319 0.791196 0.4298
INDUSTRY24 3.359266 2.388083 1.406679 0.1611
INDUSTRY25 2.644292 1.970887 1.341676 0.1813
INDUSTRY26 1.096410 1.151149 0.952448 0.3421
INDUSTRY27 -3.316403 3.395193 -0.976794 0.3299
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INDUSTRY28 4.524189 3.427342 1.320029 0.1884
INDUSTRY29 0.496885 0.937873 0.529800 0.5969
INDUSTRY3 2.119761 2.384337 0.889036 0.3751
INDUSTRY30 1.119940 1.269459 0.882219 0.3788
INDUSTRY31 2.880455 2.406335 1.197030 0.2328
INDUSTRY32 2.775086 1.747206 1.588299 0.1139
INDUSTRY33 2.013807 0.918167 2.193291 0.0295
INDUSTRY4 1.067527 1.437861 0.742441 0.4587
INDUSTRY5 3.171875 3.344999 0.948244 0.3442
INDUSTRY6 2.761040 3.338813 0.826953 0.4093
INDUSTRY7 1.032866 0.914773 1.129095 0.2603
INDUSTRY8 2.032391 3.399631 0.597827 0.5507
INDUSTRY9 1.300666 1.991604 0.653075 0.5145
C 37.23411 7.361530 5.057931 0.0000
R-squared 0.202028 Mean dependent var 29.56739
Adjusted R-squared 0.044915 S.D. dependent var 3.363969
S.E. of regression 3.287555 Akaike info criterion 5.370325
Sum squared resid 2085.948 Schwarz criterion 5.949734
Log likelihood -583.9577 Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.603995
F-statistic 1.285873 Durbin-Watson stat 1.941474
Prob(F-statistic) 0.139368
(2) About PB. In the unary regression, there is a negative correlation
between PB and the presence or absence of VC. The coefficient of VC
is -1.3177, and the prob. values of F test and T test are all 0.0013,
which is much lower than 5% (Table 4-20).




Date: 10/28/20 Time: 11:59
Sample: 1 232
Included observations: 232
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
VC -1.317721 0.405401 -3.250412 0.0013
C 7.288300 0.358080 20.35381 0.0000
R-squared 0.043918 Mean dependent var 6.260250
Adjusted R-squared 0.039761 S.D. dependent var 2.609612
S.E. of regression 2.557205 Akaike info criterion 4.724290
Sum squared resid 1504.038 Schwarz criterion 4.754003
Log likelihood -546.0176 Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.736273
F-statistic 10.56518 Durbin-Watson stat 2.003729
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001325
After adding the control variables, the prob. value of the F test is 0.2456,
so the overall equation cannot pass the test; the prob. value of the T
test is 0.0305, which is less than 5%, so it can pass the test (Table
4-21). In other words, by adjusting the explanatory variables and other
processing methods, it can be verified that there is a negative
correlation between PB and VC:
Table 4-21 Multiple regression results of PB and the presence or absence of VC
Dependent Variable: PB
Method: Least Squares




Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
VC -1.055934 0.484453 -2.179643 0.0305
VCR 0.005928 0.014290 0.414810 0.6787
LNTA -0.351642 0.288458 -1.219038 0.2243
GDPRYEAR2016 0.072919 0.058801 1.240100 0.2164
GDPRYEAR2017 0.179280 0.105513 1.699128 0.0909
INDUSTRY1 -0.597357 2.675721 -0.223251 0.8236
INDUSTRY10 0.487016 2.617674 0.186049 0.8526
INDUSTRY11 4.453525 2.638651 1.687803 0.0931
INDUSTRY12 -2.197011 1.891232 -1.161683 0.2468
INDUSTRY13 -0.670372 2.620009 -0.255866 0.7983
INDUSTRY14 -1.946997 2.613653 -0.744933 0.4572
INDUSTRY15 -0.431975 2.616802 -0.165077 0.8691
INDUSTRY16 -1.362520 2.617190 -0.520604 0.6032
INDUSTRY17 -0.843197 1.871953 -0.450437 0.6529
INDUSTRY18 -1.541830 0.910839 -1.692758 0.0921
INDUSTRY19 -0.812085 0.602155 -1.348630 0.1790
INDUSTRY2 -0.150155 0.830387 -0.180826 0.8567
INDUSTRY20 -1.743264 1.890998 -0.921875 0.3577
INDUSTRY21 -0.825806 1.347969 -0.612630 0.5408
INDUSTRY22 -1.122993 0.951458 -1.180287 0.2393
INDUSTRY23 -2.135109 1.879355 -1.136087 0.2573
INDUSTRY24 1.547468 1.869774 0.827623 0.4089
INDUSTRY25 0.860180 1.543126 0.557427 0.5779
INDUSTRY26 -0.016124 0.901304 -0.017889 0.9857
INDUSTRY27 -3.928182 2.658301 -1.477704 0.1411
INDUSTRY28 -3.091203 2.683473 -1.151941 0.2508
INDUSTRY29 -1.452791 0.734317 -1.978425 0.0493
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INDUSTRY3 2.218813 1.866841 1.188539 0.2361
INDUSTRY30 -0.392009 0.993936 -0.394401 0.6937
INDUSTRY31 -0.697540 1.884065 -0.370231 0.7116
INDUSTRY32 0.498354 1.367993 0.364296 0.7160
INDUSTRY33 0.669641 0.718888 0.931496 0.3528
INDUSTRY4 -0.311053 1.125788 -0.276298 0.7826
INDUSTRY5 -0.549329 2.619001 -0.209747 0.8341
INDUSTRY6 -1.230283 2.614158 -0.470623 0.6384
INDUSTRY7 -0.307176 0.716231 -0.428879 0.6685
INDUSTRY8 -3.234939 2.661776 -1.215331 0.2257
INDUSTRY9 1.252574 1.559347 0.803269 0.4228
C 14.16150 5.763786 2.456978 0.0149
R-squared 0.187134 Mean dependent var 6.260250
Adjusted R-squared 0.027087 S.D. dependent var 2.609612
S.E. of regression 2.574025 Akaike info criterion 4.880979
Sum squared resid 1278.742 Schwarz criterion 5.460387
Log likelihood -527.1935 Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.114648
F-statistic 1.169248 Durbin-Watson stat 1.921501
Prob(F-statistic) 0.245646
(3) About PS. In the unary regression, there is a negative correlation
between PS and the presence or absence of VC. The coefficient of VC
is -1.3658, and the prob. values of F test and T test are all 0.0031,
which is much lower than 5% (Table 4-22).
Table 4-22 Unary regression results of PS and the presence or absence of VC
Dependent Variable: PS
Method: Least Squares




Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
VC -1.365782 0.456811 -2.989821 0.0031
C 6.402610 0.403489 15.86813 0.0000
R-squared 0.037411 Mean dependent var 5.337065
Adjusted R-squared 0.033226 S.D. dependent var 2.930583
S.E. of regression 2.881486 Akaike info criterion 4.963073
Sum squared resid 1909.681 Schwarz criterion 4.992786
Log likelihood -573.7164 Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.975056
F-statistic 8.939031 Durbin-Watson stat 2.110398
Prob(F-statistic) 0.003095
After adding the control variables, the F test and T test cannot be
passed (Table 4-23):
Table 4-23 Multiple regression results of PS and the presence or absence of VC
Dependent Variable: PS
Method: Least Squares
Date: 10/28/20 Time: 11:53
Sample: 1 232
Included observations: 232
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
VC -0.746638 0.532192 -1.402949 0.1622
VCR -0.018887 0.015698 -1.203151 0.2304
LNTA -0.457533 0.316884 -1.443851 0.1504
GDPRYEAR2016 0.031256 0.064595 0.483869 0.6290
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GDPRYEAR2017 0.029601 0.115910 0.255379 0.7987
INDUSTRY1 -1.360005 2.939393 -0.462682 0.6441
INDUSTRY10 2.687214 2.875626 0.934479 0.3512
INDUSTRY11 4.472821 2.898670 1.543060 0.1245
INDUSTRY12 -2.953108 2.077598 -1.421405 0.1568
INDUSTRY13 -2.358755 2.878191 -0.819527 0.4135
INDUSTRY14 -1.876719 2.871209 -0.653634 0.5141
INDUSTRY15 -3.158041 2.874668 -1.098576 0.2733
INDUSTRY16 -1.501249 2.875094 -0.522157 0.6022
INDUSTRY17 -0.325676 2.056420 -0.158370 0.8743
INDUSTRY18 -0.644336 1.000595 -0.643953 0.5204
INDUSTRY19 0.345114 0.661493 0.521720 0.6025
INDUSTRY2 0.144310 0.912215 0.158197 0.8745
INDUSTRY20 -0.466695 2.077341 -0.224660 0.8225
INDUSTRY21 0.966342 1.480801 0.652581 0.5148
INDUSTRY22 -1.121430 1.045217 -1.072916 0.2846
INDUSTRY23 -2.652286 2.064551 -1.284680 0.2004
INDUSTRY24 3.935817 2.054026 1.916148 0.0568
INDUSTRY25 -0.068210 1.695190 -0.040238 0.9679
INDUSTRY26 -0.357901 0.990121 -0.361472 0.7181
INDUSTRY27 -2.986415 2.920257 -1.022655 0.3078
INDUSTRY28 -0.766140 2.947909 -0.259893 0.7952
INDUSTRY29 -0.887847 0.806679 -1.100620 0.2724
INDUSTRY3 0.682582 2.050804 0.332836 0.7396
INDUSTRY30 1.424201 1.091880 1.304356 0.1937
INDUSTRY31 0.021989 2.069725 0.010624 0.9915
INDUSTRY32 0.893356 1.502798 0.594461 0.5529
INDUSTRY33 1.290051 0.789729 1.633536 0.1040
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INDUSTRY4 3.874152 1.236726 3.132587 0.0020
INDUSTRY5 -0.969603 2.877084 -0.337009 0.7365
INDUSTRY6 -0.777185 2.871763 -0.270630 0.7870
INDUSTRY7 0.708424 0.786810 0.900375 0.3690
INDUSTRY8 -3.348491 2.924074 -1.145146 0.2536
INDUSTRY9 -0.675999 1.713009 -0.394627 0.6936
C 15.07582 6.331763 2.380983 0.0182
R-squared 0.222149 Mean dependent var 5.337065
Adjusted R-squared 0.068997 S.D. dependent var 2.930583
S.E. of regression 2.827676 Akaike info criterion 5.068947
Sum squared resid 1543.180 Schwarz criterion 5.648356
Log likelihood -548.9979 Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.302617
F-statistic 1.450511 Durbin-Watson stat 2.110157
Prob(F-statistic) 0.055355
(4) About TOIR-IPO. In the unary regression, there is no statistically
significant linear relationship between the TOIR_IPO and the presence
or absence of VC, and it cannot pass the F test and T test (Table 4-24).




Date: 10/28/20 Time: 12:01
Sample: 1 232
Included observations: 232
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
VC 1.823871 3.211611 0.567899 0.5707
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C 17.21395 2.836732 6.068231 0.0000
R-squared 0.001400 Mean dependent var 18.63688
Adjusted R-squared -0.002941 S.D. dependent var 20.22859
S.E. of regression 20.25832 Akaike info criterion 8.863591
Sum squared resid 94391.87 Schwarz criterion 8.893305
Log likelihood -1026.177 Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.875574
F-statistic 0.322509 Durbin-Watson stat 2.042257
Prob(F-statistic) 0.570658
After adding the control variables, it still fails to pass the F test and T
test (Table 4-25):




Date: 10/28/20 Time: 11:54
Sample: 1 232
Included observations: 232
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
VC 2.927918 3.919523 0.747009 0.4560
VCR -0.087893 0.115614 -0.760223 0.4480
LNTA 2.926904 2.333806 1.254133 0.2113
GDPRYEAR2016 1.150478 0.475737 2.418308 0.0165
GDPRYEAR2017 1.347594 0.853664 1.578600 0.1161
INDUSTRY1 -15.53095 21.64824 -0.717423 0.4740
INDUSTRY10 8.403266 21.17860 0.396781 0.6920
INDUSTRY11 17.91074 21.34832 0.838977 0.4025
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INDUSTRY12 -11.22317 15.30123 -0.733481 0.4642
INDUSTRY13 -5.429907 21.19749 -0.256158 0.7981
INDUSTRY14 2.483310 21.14607 0.117436 0.9066
INDUSTRY15 -17.13446 21.17155 -0.809316 0.4193
INDUSTRY16 9.507167 21.17468 0.448987 0.6539
INDUSTRY17 -4.687594 15.14526 -0.309509 0.7573
INDUSTRY18 -3.471610 7.369250 -0.471094 0.6381
INDUSTRY19 4.410360 4.871810 0.905282 0.3664
INDUSTRY2 -3.290410 6.718341 -0.489765 0.6249
INDUSTRY20 -4.602292 15.29934 -0.300816 0.7639
INDUSTRY21 8.699969 10.90590 0.797730 0.4260
INDUSTRY22 -6.873593 7.697880 -0.892920 0.3730
INDUSTRY23 -8.017702 15.20514 -0.527302 0.5986
INDUSTRY24 8.764827 15.12763 0.579392 0.5630
INDUSTRY25 -4.150953 12.48485 -0.332479 0.7399
INDUSTRY26 6.432473 7.292106 0.882115 0.3788
INDUSTRY27 -10.71707 21.50730 -0.498299 0.6188
INDUSTRY28 12.40529 21.71095 0.571384 0.5684
INDUSTRY29 -6.001891 5.941080 -1.010236 0.3136
INDUSTRY3 -1.959231 15.10390 -0.129717 0.8969
INDUSTRY30 -1.156982 8.041553 -0.143875 0.8857
INDUSTRY31 1.148942 15.24325 0.075374 0.9400
INDUSTRY32 11.23301 11.06791 1.014917 0.3114
INDUSTRY33 -0.010767 5.816248 -0.001851 0.9985
INDUSTRY4 1.037996 9.108322 0.113961 0.9094
INDUSTRY5 -12.95300 21.18934 -0.611298 0.5417
INDUSTRY6 7.643152 21.15015 0.361376 0.7182
INDUSTRY7 -1.503967 5.794752 -0.259540 0.7955
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INDUSTRY8 -11.65244 21.53541 -0.541083 0.5891
INDUSTRY9 10.30532 12.61608 0.816840 0.4150
C -46.43332 46.63259 -0.995727 0.3206
R-squared 0.114470 Mean dependent var 18.63688
Adjusted R-squared -0.059883 S.D. dependent var 20.22859
S.E. of regression 20.82546 Akaike info criterion 9.062389
Sum squared resid 83704.03 Schwarz criterion 9.641797
Log likelihood -1012.237 Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.296058
F-statistic 0.656542 Durbin-Watson stat 2.132983
Prob(F-statistic) 0.937909
4.4.3 The verification on adverse selection
Different from the operating performance of startups, PE, PB and PS
mainly characterize the valuation of startups, while TOIR-IPO mainly
characterizes the growth of startups. The above analysis on the
valuation, growth of startups and the presence or absence of venture
capital can form a supplementary verification of the adverse selection in
the venture capital.
Although the results of the unary regression show that the PS and PB
of startups with VC are generally lower, the multiple regression results
of adding control variables indicate that there is no statistically
correlation between PE, PB, PS, TOIR-IPO and the presence or
absence of VC. By adjusting the explanatory variables and other
processing methods, the negative correlation between PB and the
presence or absence of VC can be verified. From the perspective of PE
and TOIR-OPO, the conclusion cannot be drawn, and there is no
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statistically significant correlation. Generally speaking, the presence or
absence of VC does not have a significant influence on the valuation
and growth of startups. The phenomenon of adverse selection between
venture capital and startups is mainly reflected in operating
performance.
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Chapter 5 Cause and Effect Analysis of Adverse
Selection in Venture capital
The empirical analysis in Chapter 4 points out that there is a negative
correlation between venture capital and the operating performance of
startups. In 5.1 of this chapter, the author will analyze the main causes
that lead to the negative correlation between venture capital and the
operating performance of startups. In chapter 5.2 of this chapter, the
author will discuss the long-term and far-reaching effects of this
negative correlation on venture capital and startups.
5.1 Cause of adverse selection for negative correlation
between venture capital and operating performance of
startups
Two aspects will be analyzed in this paper. Firstly, in the process of
selecting invested companies and projects, venture capital is more
inclined to startups with poor operating performance in some cases.
Secondly, startups with poor operating performance may be more
willing to attract venture capital investment.
5.1.1 Causes for venture capital to select the startups with poor
operating performance
The process of venture capital is essentially the process of operating
risk. For different invested projects: The lower the risk, the lower the
return on investment, but the higher the probability of successful
investment; on the contrary, the higher the risk, the higher the return on
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investment, but the lower the probability of successful investment. If the
invested projects are compared in terms of maturity, degree of risk,
industry distribution, return on investment, and probability of successful
investment, a list can be roughly formed as follows:




















projects High Low Traditional industries Low High
The high-risk, medium-risk, and low-risk projects listed in Table 5-1 are
not absolute. There may also be TMT and pharmaceutical industry
projects with high maturity and low risk, as well as traditional industry
projects with low maturity and high risks. However, such projects are
generally not normal reserve investment projects for ordinary venture
capital. Either they are difficult to invest, or they are not worth investing.
Due to the existence of reserve projects with different risk degrees in
the market, different venture capitals will show different risk appetites
based on their own risk tolerance, thus forming a variety of different
types of venture capital, such as AI funds and biomedicine funds which
contend for high risks and high returns, and real estate funds and
Pre-IPO funds which contend for low risks and stable returns. These
are all normal phenomena caused by different market positioning,
which will help form a multi-level and diversified venture capital market.
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In the analysis in Chapter 4, the fixed effects of the industry are
controlled, so the results are not caused by the different risks of
different industries.
In terms of time period, different venture capitals focus on the initial,
early, middle and pre-IPO stages of startups, and also reflect their risk
appetites. In general, the earlier the investment focus of venture capital
is put, the worse the operating performance of startups for reserve
investment, the greater the risk faced by venture capital and the higher
the required return on investment; while those focus on the mid-to-late
periods, the operating performance of startups for reserve investment is
better, the risk faced by venture capital is lower, and the obtained return
on investment is lower.
From the perspective of venture capital, startups with poor operating
performance generally have low valuations, and they can obtain more
equities at a lower capital cost. Once the IPOs of invested startups are
successful, the wealth effect will be more considerable than investing in
companies with good operating performance and high valuations.
According to the analysis in Section 4.4 of this thesis, venture capital is
generally more inclined to invest in startups with lower valuations. Once
the project’s IPO is successful, venture capital will play the role of
“touching a stone and turning it into gold". For example, in 2010,
Hillhouse invested in Jingdong which was unprofitable and had low
valuation. At first, Liu Qiangdong only wanted USD 75 million, but
Zhang Lei insisted on investing USD 300 million and raised the
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valuation by several time, becoming a much-told story in the investment
community①.
Due to different investment fields, risk levels, and investment stages,
some venture capitals have adversely selected startups with high
probability of failure, high risk levels, and poor operating performance,
which is entirely the result of market-based selection. It reflects that
during IPO, the operating performance of invested companies does not
reach the average operating performance of all IPO companies. This is
a normal phenomenon, although there is also the effect of adverse
selection.
In addition to the causes discussed above, information asymmetry
refers to the fact that the information held by the transaction parties is
not exactly the same, which may cause adverse selection. Generally
speaking, in venture capital activities, risk fund managers cannot fully
grasp the information of the invested companies, including financial
information related to the operating performance, as well as the
concealed information such as contingent debts, judicial cases, and the
will of senior executives. Startups may also excessively publicize some
information that is beneficial to themselves, and deliberately conceal or
understate the information that is harmful to themselves. While venture
capital may be deceived to some extent, making a wrong judgment,
① WWW.JFQ.COM.(2018，October 9)The Capital behind JD which Holds a Fund of $60 Billion
and Invests 300 Million Despite that Only 75 Million is Needed by Liu
Qiangdong .https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1613818126683493556&wfr=spider&for=pc
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and selecting the startups that have proved to be poorly operating
afterward.
There are mainly two measures for venture capital to prevent passive
adverse selection caused by information asymmetry: One is to
strengthen the collection of information and increase the symmetry of
information, such as strengthening due diligence, especially the
collection and analysis on financial information, legal information,
market information, industrial chain upstream and downstream
suppliers and customers, competitors, industry development, etc., to
form information judgments closer to the real situations, in order to
reduce information asymmetry. The second is to use the valuation
adjustment mechanism to reduce the harm of information asymmetry.
Assuming that the startups do not provide completely true information,
including performance prediction and commitment, exaggerating the
development potential, hiding important information, etc., venture
capital can take some kind of punishments based on valuation
adjustment mechanism to form constraints and deterrents on the
invested startups to reduce the risk of adverse selection caused by
information asymmetry.
5.1.2 Selection of startups
The market-oriented adverse selection of Chinese venture capital
market is two-way. From the practical observation, in addition to the
adverse selection of venture capital, i.e., venture capital deliberately
selects the startups with poor operating performance as investment
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targets, the adverse selection of startups also exists, i.e., startups with
bad operating performance are more willing to accept venture capital
investment.
The startups with better operating performance have more smooth
financing channels and do not necessarily select venture capital after
comparing the financing costs. However, startups with poorer operating
performance do not have smooth financing channels. They have higher
desire for funds and more welcome venture capital. This reason will
also cause the negative correlation between venture capital and the
performance of invested companies in reality.
It should be noted here that when the startups with poor operating
performance attract venture capital, they may form an interest transfer
to the management team of venture capital, which means to use the
principal-agent relationship between venture capital and venture capital
managers to make a profit for the venture capital managers which in
turn facilitates adverse selection of venture capital. For startups with
better operating performance, the possibility of benefit transfer will be
lower as they have more smooth financing channels. In other words,
startups with band operating performance are more likely to choose
venture capital, but startups with good operating performance may not
necessarily choose venture capital. This is relatively common in the
Chinese market. For example, Huawei and Laoganma reject venture
capital, and they tend to adopt indirect financing.
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Due to the principal-agent relationship between the venture capital fund
and the fund management team, on the one hand, since the fund
management team invests in a startup with relatively poor operating
performance, they may ask the startup to transfer certain benefits so
that the management team will generate such motivation; on the other
hand, the financing channels of startups with poor operating
performance are more limited, and financing is more difficult. In order to
obtain venture capital, startups also have the willingness to transfer
benefits. In this way, the moral risks of benefit transfer sometimes exist.
For venture capital, since it tends to invest in startups with poor
operating performance, it should be aware of the huge risks involved in
investment activities. This study uses Chinese GEM listed companies
as a sample, but there are many invested startups actually cannot go
public. The investment exit channel is not smooth, and the risks are
self-evident. Although the venture capital community has long
recognized the law of “seven projects will lose, two will break even, and
one will gain profit”. The investment of project is allowed to fail, but it
should also be noted that due to the adverse selection, and the
principal-agent relationship between venture capital and its managers,
the failure risk and moral risk faced by venture capital are becoming
increasingly serious. In the context where the current trend of China’s
economic growth is difficult to reverse, if the GPs of venture capital
have a hard time, then those who purely serve as LPs can only face a
huge risk.
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Under the condition of market economy, adverse selection caused by
the principal-agent mechanism is unethical and should be avoided.
Certainly, it is unethical or even illegal for startups to obtain venture
capital through profit transfer. Although such phenomenon exists, it is
not the main reason causing the adverse selection of venture capital.
5.2 Adverse selection effect in venture capital
The empirical analysis in Chapter 4 of this paper demonstrates the
adverse selection phenomenon in the process of venture capital. The
preceding content of this chapter has analyzed the possible causes of
adverse selection. Next, the effects and impacts on China’s venture
capital market under the adverse selection will be discussed.
5.2.1 Improve the possibility for startups to obtain venture capital
through adverse selection
Since venture capital more favors the startups with poor operating
performance in the process of selecting invested companies and
projects, startups can structurally reduce certain operating performance
indicators according to their own actual conditions, thereby increasing
the chance and probability of obtaining venture capital.
Structural adjustment of the profitability, solvency, and operating
capabilities of the operating performance of startups will help improve
the possibility of attracting venture capital. The research in Chapter 4
shows that, while keeping other explaining variables unchanged, the
lower the profitability, the more conducive to attracting venture capital
and improving the possibility of attracting venture capital. This can be
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derived after testing the research hypothesis “There is a negative
correlation between venture capital and the weighted ROE and ROA of
operating performance of startups”. In terms of the solvency and
operating capabilities, there is also a certain negative correlation.
Although it’s not statistically significant, it also means that lower
solvency and operating capabilities may help improve the possibility to
obtain venture capital.
Therefore, in order to increase the possibility of obtaining venture
capital, startups can intentionally make certain adjustments to business
strategies, financial plans, strategic planning, etc., so as to finally obtain
the venture capital.
Firstly, increase investment in research and development, technology,
etc., and increase forward-looking investment sub-projects, so that the
ROE and ROA will be reduced. Although the profitability will decline,
the future development prospects are bright. Telling a good story can
increase the probability of obtaining venture capital.
Secondly, increase the intensity of debt management to a certain extent,
increase fixed assets, reduce the CR, QR, etc. to reduce the solvency,
which may also increase the probability of obtaining venture capital.
Thirdly, increase inventory and total assets and do not rush to collect
payments for market orders and reduce I_TURNOVER and TAT. But
with the promising market prospects, it may also increase the
probability of obtaining venture capital.
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Certainly, startups mainly optimize the structure under stock conditions,
make some minor adjustments to operation, finance, strategy, R&D,
and market, and respond to the concerns and preferences of venture
capital, rather than create a poor operating performance divorced from
the actual situation. If that is the case, it is possible that the companies
will burn their own fingers before absorbing the venture capital, which is
contrary to the original good intention of the author.
5.2.2 Lemon market under the adverse selection effect
The lemon market effect refers to that in the case of adverse selection,
good products are often eliminated, and inferior products will gradually
occupy the market to replace good products, resulting in a market filled
with inferior products. In terms of startups, since startups with poor
operating performance are eager to absorb venture capital, they are
willing to lower their valuations, and even do not hesitate to transfer
profits to the venture capital managers. Therefore, the “lemon market”
effect has been formed in the invested companies: Companies with
good operating performance are treated as bad companies, so that
good companies are increasingly staying far away from venture capital,
and most of the companies in the market are startups with poor
operating performance.
The phenomenon of the lemon market has already emerged in China’s
venture capital market. The remaining market participants are mainly
bad startups and bad capital. Good startups are reluctant to accept
venture capital while good capital is not willing to engage in the venture
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capital industry, which should be noted. This is also related to the
adverse selection of the venture capital market. The essence of
adverse selection is to reward poor students. Instead, the poor quality
startups have been invested by venture capital, and the poor
management teams in venture funds have achieved success. It is
because of the possible benefit transfer and moral risks in the adverse
selection. If a company is excellent, it may not easily transfer the equity
at a lower valuation, and the fund manager will not accept the benefit
transfer if it invests with its own funds. Despite that the information
asymmetry may trigger the lemon market, the principal-agent
mechanism in the venture capital market is the most important source
of the lemon market of venture capital.
In theory, venture capital is an important means of optimizing the
allocation of precious resources such as capital, and good companies
and excellent fund management teams can get more benefits. However,
due to the principal-agent mechanism, the lemon market has already
emerged. A powerful way to break the lemon market is to break the
principal-agent mechanism. For example, increase the investment ratio
of the fund management team or the main responsible person in
venture capital, so that a large proportion of venture capital belongs to
the management team, and the desire of management team to accept
the benefit transfer and invest in startups with poor performance will be
reduced. Or change the management mechanism of venture capital. A
venture capital fund can set up two independent management teams to
be responsible for investing and auditing and post-investment
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management respectively. Once mutually restricted, two teams may
perform better in project screening and preventing benefit transfer.
Certainly, what is more important is that all participants in the Chinese
venture capital market must cherish this market and don’t do things that
violate the law and discipline, violate the spirit of the contract, and
violate professional ethics. In this way, the venture capital market will
become better and better.
5.2.3 Valuation bubble under the adverse selection effect
The valuation bubble in the venture capital market is also related to
adverse selection. Due to the poor operating performance, the invested
startups must rely on the valuation bubble to attract new venture capital.
From the perspective of startups, higher valuations will easily attract
new capitals to provide new capitals and resources for companies with
poor operating performance. For venture capital that has already been
invested, high valuation can put the investors who do not participate in
the management of venture funds more at ease. The achievements
seem good, and it may even be possible to transfer the shares with the
help of high valuation. Therefore, both the invested companies and
venture capital have the incentive to brag about the “valuation bubble”.
And it is often stipulated in the investment agreement that the company
valuation should not be lower than the previous round when new
investors enter.
Due to the poor operating performance of the invested startups, they
have great difficulties in listing, and can only conduct venture capital
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financing round after round. The valuation bubble is getting bigger and
bigger, and the risks are getting higher and higher. It doesn’t matter that
a good project has high valuation, what matters is the valuation bubble
of bad projects. This has become a consensus in the field of venture
capital. The main way to prevent valuation bubble is to adhere to the
investment principles and adhere to value investment. Never blindly
follow the trend of investment due to the beautiful appearance and the
gathering of venture capitals.
Venture capital generally requires that the capital entered in the next
round is not lower than the valuation of the previous round, which is an
important cause for the “valuation bubble” of startups. After rounds of
venture capital financing, the valuation of startups is rising while the
date of listing is far from expected, which is an abnormal phenomenon.
The valuation bubble exacerbates the risk of the project. Once the
bubble bursts, the venture capital will be wiped out and the startups will
fall through in a flash, which goes against for the sustainable
development of venture capital and startups
It has been observed that venture capital prefers startups with lower
valuations in Section 4.4 of this thesis, which does not conflict with
valuation bubbles caused by adverse selection. Because the IPO
cross-section is adopted at this observation timing, the valuation of
startups may show a changing curve, representing in different forms
such as low→lower→high→lower, which is difficult to observe in IPO
cross-sectional data. For example, on October 30, 2020, the IPO of
LU.com, China's financial technology "unicorn", succeeded on the New
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York Stock Exchange, but the stock price fell below the IPO price on
that day. Its opening price was $11.6, which was 14.1% lower than the
previous issuing price of $13.5. As of the close, it fell 4.81% and closed
at US$12.85, corresponding to a market value of US$31.35 billion.
Compared with the valuation of US$39.4 billion in Series C financing in
2019, the valuation was 20% off. It can be considered that there was a
certain valuation bubble in Series C financing①.
In recent years, the most obvious valuation bubble of the venture
capital market appears in the field of artificial intelligence (AI)②. From
2016 to 2017, China’s VC/PE market was well funded, and there were
not many investment trends. A large amount of capital flowed into the
AI industry. At that time, the investment in AI was almost crazy.
Financing seemed to become a competition for the top AI companies,
and the financing record of the industry was refreshed again and again.
For example, SenseTime, established in 2014, has seen its valuation
soar to 2 billion dollars in just three years. In July 2017, SenseTime
announced that it had completed the 410 million dollars in Series B
financing, setting a global record for a single round of financing in the
field of artificial intelligence at the time. In April 2018, SenseTime
① Yu Yao. (2020,November 1). The Former P2P Giant Ran in front of Ant Group, But Fell
below the IPO Price after "20% off" Listing.https://new.qq.com/rain/a/20201101A0AKDT00












completed the 600 million dollars in Series C financing led by Alibaba
Group, again setting a global financing record in the field of artificial
intelligence; a month later, it received another 620 million dollars in
Series C+ financing; more than three months later, it once again
received 1 billion dollars of financing from Softbank, and its valuation
soared to 6 billion dollars. From April to September 2018, SenseTime
obtained three rounds of financing in succession in 5 months, and the
amount of these three rounds of financing alone exceeded 2.2 billion
dollars. Looking at the history of global venture capital, it is hard to find
another startup that can intensively obtain such a large amount of
financing. While CloudWalk and YITU, which were treated as the “Four
Tigers” in the field of computer vision together with SenseTime, also
continuously conducted financing during this period. In June 2018,
CloudWalk announced that it had received 1 billion yuan in Series B+
financing; Yitu also announced that it had won 300 million US dollars
two successive rounds of financing in June and July. This was really
rare in the history of China’s venture capital. The multibillion dollars of
capital were invested wave after wave. For these AI unicorns, the year
of 2018 was a fantastic year.
But it was also in 2018 that the difficulty of raising funds in the primary
market broke out in an all-round way, and the cold winter of capital
began to spread to the AI industry. The direct manifestation was that
the financing of some AI companies got difficult, and the survival
problems of a large number of AI startups gradually emerged. Starting
in 2019, the sequelae appeared. Huge amount of financing was a
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double-edged sword, which directly pushed the valuation of AI
companies to a level prohibitive to most VC/PE. The Chinese
investment in AI field and the number of investments fell sharply. In
2020, investors began to re-examine the liquidity and expansion space
of AI companies. After estimation of input and output, the capital fever
gradually subsided. Without the capital, AI companies trapped in capital
pressure either quietly closed down, or they began to seek the road to
listing. Megvii submitted a prospectus to the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange in August 2019, but this IPO was not smooth. Six months
after submitting the listing application, the status of IPO process of
Megvii on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange was shown as “invalid”.
SenseTime, another AI star company, was recently reported by foreign
media to postpone its first IPO plan of 750 million dollars in Hong Kong
this year, and turn to the private equity market to seek 500 million to 1
billion dollars of financing. According to industry sources, the listing of
these two AI unicorns in Hong Kong has been frustrated because their
valuation may have not been recognized. It is foreseeable that 2020 will
be a watershed for Chinese AI companies - some players will suffer a
dismal failure, while others will join in the secondary market to accept a
greater test. Bankruptcy may have just begun in the group of AI
companies.①






The valuation bubble in the AI field is a vivid manifestation of venture
capital in pursing high risk and high yield and a true portrayal of the
market-based adverse selection effect. However, when the valuation
bubble bursts, no matter whether it is an AI company or venture capital,
“every snowflake in an avalanche ever should be responsible.”
5.2.4 Moral risk under the adverse selection effect
Due to the principal-agent relationship between the venture capital fund
and the fund management team, under the adverse selection effect, on
the one hand, since the fund management team invests in a startup
with relatively poor operating performance, they may ask the startup to
transfer certain benefits so that the management team will generate
such motivation; on the other hand, the financing channels of startups
with poor operating performance are more limited, and financing is
more difficult. In order to obtain venture capital, startups also have the
willingness to transfer benefits. In this way, the moral risks of benefit
transfer sometimes exist.
At present, the measures of the venture capital market to prevent moral
risk are mainly the restrictions of systems. Since the early days of the
venture fund, the investment targets and management teams should
reach agreements, such as the types of fields, industries and
companies that cannot be invested, as well as the dos and don’ts of
general managers of management teas and the due diligence
personnel, the authorities of investment decision committees and the
veto power agreed by the sponsors of some major project funds. These
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system constraints are mainly used to prevent moral risks and prevent
the management team from accepting benefits. At the same time, the
author also believes that the moral risk cannot be completely eliminated
by relying solely on system constraints. In-depth investigations should
be conducted on the initial selection of management team, including the
professional competence, professional ethics, and professionalism of
the management team. After pre-screening, the participation of those
who fail to meet the requirements of fund sponsors should be rejected,
after all, people matter most in the investment field.
5.2.5 About the threshold problem of the operating performance of
startups and the entry of venture capital
The paper mainly discusses the relationship between venture capital
and the operating performance of startups. It is worth noting that the
samples of empirical analysis are all GEM listed companies. The ability
to list on Chinese stocks is enough to prove that these companies are
relatively high-quality. It just reveals that among the group of listed
companies, the operating performance of these listed companies with
risk investment is generally worse, and even the worse the operating
performance, the more likely they are to attract venture capital.
More broadly, although the startups with poorer operating performance
have a greater probability of attracting venture capital, it does not
indicate that startups with nearly zero operating performance have an
infinite probability of obtaining venture capital. There must be a lower
limit for the scale, technology content, and development prospects of
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the startups. Below this lower limit-the threshold, the startups will
basically receive no attention from venture capital. For example, if a
dormant company has no business activities and no possibility of
backing from the brink, and its operating performance is 0, it will
definitely not be favored by venture capital.
Therefore, there should be a threshold for poor operating performance
of startups. Below this threshold, the negative correlation between the
probability of the entry of venture capital and the operating performance
of startups no longer exists. Due to the paper selects GEM listed
companies with good quality as samples, this threshold has not been
further discussed. But according to the common sense of investment,
such threshold does exist and is a basic threshold in the field of venture
capital that cannot be ignored.
From another perspective, although there are certain moral risks,
valuation bubble, lemon market and other phenomena in the Chinese
venture capital market, a bottom line threshold still exists. Below this
threshold, no venture capital activities will be carried out. The field of
venture capital generally has a bright appearance and high-end content.
Although the situation is complex and changeable and the way is
arduous and long, the Chinese venture capital market should be
cautiously optimistic, and practitioners should not be frustrated.
Cognition of the threshold of operating performance of startups and
entry of venture capital has certain guiding significance for investment
practice activities. In practice, some companies that are far below this
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threshold are also seeking venture capital. But in fact, it can be
regarded that there will never be any venture capital interested in them.
As a venture capital practitioner, the author has been closer to such
phenomenon a lot. It is mentioned here to remind those startups that do
not have the basic conditions to avoid seeking venture capital, lest a lot
of labor costs, time costs and other costs are wasted without any
valuable returns.
5.2.6 Relationship between adverse selection effect and other
hypotheses
In Chapter 2 Fundamental Theories and Literature Review, the relevant
theories of venture capital including grandstanding hypothesis,
supervision hypothesis, certification hypothesis, market power
hypothesis, supervisory mechanism effect, and incentive mechanism
effect have been elaborated. The empirical analysis is conducted to the
pre-IPO data of Chinese GEM listed companies, mainly demonstrating
the adverse selection hypothesis. But it is difficult to form a verification
for other hypotheses, and overall, no more supports or denials are
formed for these theories.
Because there is a negative correlation between venture capital and
operating performance of startups and mainly due to the theory of
adverse selection, the operating performance of startups with venture
capital is generally lower than that of startups without venture capital.
Therefore, the adverse selection effect is not very supportive of the
certification hypothesis, market power hypothesis, supervisory
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mechanism effect, incentive mechanism effect and other theories
holding that venture capital brings positive effects. The grandstanding
hypothesis and the supervision hypothesis believe that venture capital
has more negative impact on startups. But the adverse selection effect
believes that the operating performance of startups is low mainly
because it’s generally low for its kind. The specific effects after the entry
of venture capital have not been explained, which makes it difficult to
verify the grandstanding hypothesis and supervision hypothesis.
In general, the entry of venture capital into startups is very complicated.
Practice is far more varied than theory. The empirical analysis in this
chapter shows that there mainly is a negative correlation between
venture capital and the operating performance of startups, which
verifies the adverse selection theory, but fails to get other theories
involved. To put it another way, most of the theories proposed
previously are called “hypotheses”, which also shows that they are
difficult to be fully verified by facts and data in practice. And these
theories both have supporters and opponents, which presents how
complicated the connection between venture capital and the operating
performance of startups is.
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Chapter 6 Countermeasure Analysis of the Impact of
Venture capital on the Operating Performance of
Startups
Mainly due to the adverse selection effect, it can be considered that
there is a certain negative correlation between China’s venture capital
and the operating performance of startups. Therefore, all of venture
capital, startups and third-party participants in the capital market must
face up to this phenomenon, strengthen strategic response, and
promote the healthy and sustainable development of China’s venture
capital market and capital market. Based on the results of previous
empirical analysis and qualitative analysis, this chapter analyzes the
relevant countermeasures of the impact of venture capital on the
operating performance of startups.
6.1 Countermeasures for venture capital
There is mainly a negative correlation between venture capital and the
operating performance of startups, which is caused by the adverse
selection effect. If reverse investment is only caused by investment
preference, risk appetite, etc., it is the result of freedom of choice in the
market, and it cannot be simply judged as good or bad, but attention
must be paid to avoiding the risks contained in low operating
performance. If reverse investment is due to principal-agent
mechanism, information asymmetry, etc., such adverse selection
should be avoided in that it mainly shows the lack of professional ethics
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and professional skills of the venture capital management team, which
is an unethical and unhealthy adverse selection with huge risks.
6.1.1 Correctly understand the adverse selection market behaviors
and avoid the risks of low operating performance
Different venture capitals have different risk appetites, corresponding to
the initial, early, middle and pre-IPO stages of startups in terms of
different stages focused by venture capital. Usually, the earlier the
investment focus of venture capital is put, the worse the operating
performance of startups for reserve investment, the greater the risk
faced by venture capital and the higher the required return on
investment. Due to different investment fields, different risk appetites
and different investment stages, there are various types of venture
capitals in the market. This is a normal phenomenon caused by
different market positioning, which is of great significance to form a
multi-level and diversified venture capital market and deserves
encouragement.
Therefore, based on different market positioning, venture capital
intentionally selects some startups with low operating performance,
which is a complete market behavior. Such adverse selection is
acceptable, but we must still be aware of and avoid the risks. Venture
capital should understand that: The earlier the startup, the worse the
operating performance, the lower the valuation and the greater the risk
of unsuccessful investment. Certainly, the risk is accompanied by the
profit. If successful, the excess investment return obtained is also
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greater. With this correct understanding, venture capital should
combine its own characteristics to calmly respond to the risks resulted
from the adverse selection of market-based behaviors caused by
focusing on different development stages:
The first is to pay more attention to the match-ability of fund terms.
There are many reasons accounting for the low operating performance
of startups, which may be staying at a lower stage of the life cycle, due
to the industry, or due to the knowledge and technology contents,
market competitiveness, etc. of the companies. If the industry is weak
and the company is not competent, the project investment is very likely
to fail and venture capital should strive to avoid it. If the company is at a
lower stage of the life cycle, the venture capital may extent the time to
hold the project until the company grows up before exiting. However,
there is also a problem that some funds do not have a long duration.
Some funds only have a life span of about 5 years. In case of projects
that require long-term cultivation with a growth period of more than 10
years, they have to earn profits and exit before listing of the companies.
There is a risk of mismatch of fund terms, which needs attention and
solution. For example, some reserve investment projects for R&D of
drugs and medical devices have a long clinical trial cycle, so they
shouldn’t be participated by those funds with insufficient duration.
From another perspective, in order to avoid the risk of insufficient
investment duration, venture capital managers should strive to make
the duration longer and more flexible upon establishment, such as “7+3
years” or “10+2 years. The exit of project should not be influenced by
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the duration as far as possible, for fear of affecting the investment
returns. From the perspective of development history of venture capital,
the investment returns of funds with long duration will be better. By
observing successful venture capital examples, such as Softbank and
KKR., it can be found that they have basically maintained a long-term
duration, which is worth learning by Chinese venture capital.
The second is to pay more attention to the diversified investment. Since
the risks and returns contained in low operating performance are equal,
in order to reduce risks, diversified investment should be performed
instead of not investing in early-stage companies with low operating
performance. That is, don’t put the eggs in the same basket. After
reaching a large quantity of investment projects, the probability of
success will be closer to the expected probability, thereby reducing
investment risk. For example, the probability of successful investment
in an IPO project is 10%, and the return rate after a successful project
investment is 20 times. Despite that the investment return expectation
is 2, for investing only one project and investing 100 projects, the
latter’s risk of finally achieving 2 times of returns is much smaller than
the former.
The third is to pay more attention to the match-ability of fund size. In
order to avoid investment risks, it is necessary to expand the quantity of
investment projects to strengthen diversified investment. Although the
operating performance of startups is low and the corresponding
valuation is low, the number of projects for the fund to invest can be
relatively higher. However, venture capital still needs to pay attention to
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the match-ability of adverse selection and fund size. If the fund size is
small, it is best to invest in relatively mature startups with better
operating performance. The IPOs of such startups have a higher
probability of success, and certainly the return on investment will be
smaller. The project quantity of diversified investment can be small,
which is conducive to ensure that the expected return on investment is
achieved. Venture capital with a large fund size is more suitable for
investing in early-stage projects. The project quantity can be larger and
the investment period can be longer. Although the risk of failure of a
single project is higher, the return rate will be higher once the
investment is successful. Thus, the quantity of investment projects will
ensure that the expected returns of the fund are achieved. Therefore,
under the adverse selection effect, the fund positioning and the fund
size must be matched.
6.1.2 Strengthen the building of the professional capabilities and
avoid the risks of information asymmetry
The information asymmetry between venture capital and startups is one
of the important reasons for adverse selection, which may cause the
generally low operating performance of startups with venture capital.
Besides, this reverse selection is passively accepted by venture capital
and should be overcome. As the saying goes, “the buyer is not as
astute as the seller”. As a party that sells shares, startups have a
natural information advantage in the activities of attracting venture
capital. But the risk fund management team can also minimize the risk
of information asymmetry through professional capability building.
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The first is to strengthen the training of the professional capabilities of
the fund management team. Improve the analysis and judgment
capabilities of due diligence personnel in industry development, market
competition, financial audit, legal disputes, business models and so on,
strengthen the screening and review of all information provided by
startup companies for reservation investment, do more thinking and ask
more questions. For the documents, forms and materials that are
generally required for the due diligence of venture capital, ask the
invested startups to try their best to provide. If not provided, the reason
must be explained, and the inquiry must be strengthened in case of any
doubts. At the same time, archive the due diligence documents and
backup files, write a clear and brief due diligence report to make the
detailed, accurate and authentic decision-making information available
to people pontificating the investment decision-making of project, in
order to minimize the information asymmetry risk between the venture
capital and startups.
Generally speaking, the information fraud in the venture capital process
is mainly caused by the incomprehension of risk fund management
team for the industry, market, upstream and downstream of the industry
chain, etc., so a single venture capital fund often only pays attention to
a few related industries. Having a thorough grasp of these related
industries and forming a profound understanding of industry
development, business models, industry leading companies, and
upstream and downstream of the industry chain can generally reduce
information asymmetry. It is not easy to achieve this state and takes a
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long time for accumulation. The development of professional
capabilities depends on the introduction of industry talents and
long-term precipitation. Many high-end talents in the industry switch to
venture capital. Since they are industry experts, they have a deeper
understanding and grasp of the industry and perform better at investing.
This is what the venture capital management team needs to pay
attention to.
The second is to use legal constraints, such as valuation adjustment
mechanisms, miscellaneous provisions, and performance
commitments, to reduce the risks of information asymmetry. For the
possible situations where reserve investment startups exaggerate
performance, are overconfident and have wrong judgments, the
venture capital management team should utilize the professional
capabilities and combine with actual conditions to design legal
constraints, such as valuation adjustment mechanisms, miscellaneous
provisions, in order to prevent the situation that may be unfavorable to
the capital side caused by information asymmetry. In reality, it is difficult
to exhaust all information and check the authenticity of various
information. Not only the cost is very high, but it even arouses the
antipathy of startups for reservation investment. At this time, the
investment management team can assume that the other party is
trustworthy and the relevant information provided is true. But if it is
confirmed that there are acts of dishonesty, untruthfulness and
deliberate exaggeration afterwards, the other party is required to bear
corresponding responsibilities in accordance with the legal constrains
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and provide some forms of compensation for the loss caused. In this
way, the costs for verifying the information can be reduced and the risk
of information asymmetry can be avoided to a large extent.
The third is to introduce necessary temporary external experts to
strengthen the professional capabilities of the team. It is difficult for the
venture capital fund management team to be highly professional in the
industries and projects involved. In order to consolidate the
professional capabilities of the management team, external experts can
be duly introduced during the voting meeting of investment decision
committee, external consultation, industry analysis, etc. For example,
experts, professors and executives in scientific research institutes,
industry associations and leading companies can be consulted for their
opinions and solving the problems of reserve investment projects, in
order to strengthen the recognition on the reserve investment
companies and projects, eliminate information asymmetry and avoid
relevant risks.
6.1.3 Strengthen the institutional constraints of the principal-agent
mechanism to prevent moral risks
Upon the establishment of the venture capital fund, there is seldom
investment based solely on the management team’s own funds.
Generally, funding is raised externally, forming the link of the persons
who contribute the capital for investment - limited partner (LP) and the
person who contributes a small amount of capital and manages the
fund - the general partner (GP). The LP and GP constitute the
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principal-agent mechanism. LP is the principal, and the capitals are
entrusted to the venture capital fund manager for investment and
management. GP participates in the venture fund contribution with a
small amount of capital, acting as a manager of venture capital fund to
invest externally and conduct post-investment management,
investment exit and other business activities on behalf of venture
capital fund.
Due to the principal-agent relationship, the interests between LP and
GP are not always consistent. LP seeks to maximize the interests of
venture capital funds, and GP seeks to maximize its own interests -
mainly including the annual management fees and excessive profit
sharing after exit, etc., But it does not rule out accepting the benefits
from invested startups during the investment management process. At
this time, adverse selection is easy to occur - that is, tending to invest in
startups with poor operating performance that transfer benefits to GP,
which in turn triggers moral risks.
In terms of invested startups, companies with poor operating
performance are harder in financing and have more limited channels
due to lower profitability and CR, so they are more eager to attract
venture capital, and even transfer some benefits to the venture capital
fund management team. Under the influence of both the venture capital
fund management team and the invested startups, the adverse
selection and moral risks are difficult to avoid completely.
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The moral risks in venture capital activities is unethical, which may
cause losses to venture capital, or partially reduce the return of venture
capital, mainly damaging the interests of LP. Once things are brought to
light, the entire venture capital fund will suffer the credit loss. The moral
risks must be strictly prevented and eliminated.
In order to prevent moral risks, regulations are often specified in the
prospectus (which may also directly be the fund charter) of the venture
capital fund to explain and stipulate the investment field, industry
distribution and project standards after the fund is established, agree in
advance on the responsibilities scope, code of conduct and fund
management of fund managers, and introduce the office resume,
investment performance and academic background of the team, which
is like an endorsement of professional ethics and professional skills. It
can be considered that the prospectus is the constitution of a venture
capital fund, to formulate strict system regulations on the investment
management team. In case of violations, LPs can hold the investment
management team accountable in accordance with the prospectus and
the fund charter, fund agreement, and relevant violation clauses formed
in accordance with the prospectus.
Since the prospectus, fund charter and agreement related to fund
establishment of the venture capital fund are generally prepared by the
investment management team, which is relatively beneficial to the GP,
but for the investor LP, this is not fair as these documents are a bit
similar to the format contract. From the perspective of protecting itself,
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LP should boldly propose its own amendments to the relevant clauses
to form more powerful binding regulations.
Therefore, the professional ethics and self-cultivation of management
team have to be mentioned. Institutional constraints are fundamental
for preventing moral risks. A good system encourages people to have
motivation for being moral and doing good, but the professional ethics
and self-cultivation of management tea are the foundation. Without this
foundation, the best system will be manipulated and broken. As the
institutions cannot predict all the situations in advance and make
corresponding arrangements, more often, the moral risks are reduced
relying on the management team’s consciousness. In the meanwhile,
the occurrence of moral risks is minimized due to the deterrence of the
relevant institutional constraints, the influence of the career reputation,
and the pursuit of career achievements.
In brief, strengthening the institutional constraints on the principal-agent
relationship during fundraising, investment, management and exit of
venture capital funds will be beneficial to prevent the occurrence of
moral risk events.
6.2 Countermeasures for startups
The poor operating performance is more conducive to absorbing
venture capital, so some countermeasures can be made accordingly by
startups.
6.2.1 Structurally improve the operating performance indicators
and increase the probability of obtaining venture capital
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The empirical analysis in Chapter 4 shows that there is a negative
correlation between the profitability, solvency, operating capabilities of
the operating performance of startups and venture capital. By
structurally improving certain performance indicators, the probability of
obtaining venture capital can be improved.
The first is to reduce the profitability indicator of operating performance.
The profitability indicator is mainly positively correlated to profit and
negatively correlated to assets. Both reducing profits and increasing
assets can reduce profitability, which will help attract venture capital
and increase the entry probability of venture capital. Generally, it is
mainly considered to increase investment with profits to form new
assets. For example, make significant investment in the future
development, increase investment in R&D and technology, and
increase investment in forward-looking sub-projects, which will reduce
the ROE and profitability of companies and increase the probability of
obtaining venture capital.
The second is to reduce the solvency indicator to a certain extent.
Solvency is positively correlated to current assets and negatively
correlated to liabilities. Solvency indicator can be reduced by increasing
the intensity of leverage, increasing fixed assets, and reducing the
current assets of company. In practice, the appropriate liability ratio can
make the operating efficiency reach the best state. For a startup, the
opportunity to increase leverage can make the company develop faster
and possibly increase the probability of obtaining venture capital.
Certainly, it is difficult for a startup to increase its leverage, mainly due
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to the lack of collateral and pledged assets required by bank loans. But
at least if there is an opportunity, it should not be missed.
The third is to reduce the operating capabilities indicator to a certain
extent. Operating capabilities are mainly positively correlated to cash
inflows and negatively correlated to assets. By reducing cash inflows
and increasing assets, the operating capabilities indicator can be
reduced. For example, increasing inventory and not rushing to collect
payments for market orders will reduce the operating capabilities
indicator, and may increase the probability of obtaining venture capital.
It should be emphasized that the above indicator adjustment is
structural, and the profitability indicator is the most sensitive and should
be prioritized. Instead of intentionally obstructing the development of
startups, according to the preference of venture capital, startups make
adjustments to technology improvement, market development, and
long-term planning and development. After these adjustments, the
recent operating performance indicators are reduced, which, however,
is very helpful for future growth. In this way, startups may attract more
venture capital. This paper is not intended to provide countermeasures
that are unethical and inconsistent with market rules, but only to point
out that through structural optimization, startups can better meet the
requirements and preferences of venture capital.
6.2.2 Jointly build a good reserve investment party and prevent
the lemon market
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The startups generally constitute all the reserve investment targets of
venture capital. In order to gain the favor of venture capital, they display
their respective abilities and fight their own battles. However, on the
other hand, they unite to form an overall reserve investment market of
venture capital. Therefore, they are also obliged to maintain a good
order and reputation in this market. Because once this market becomes
a lemon market, both investors and reserve investment party are
inferior entities. When good companies and capital are not willing to
participate in venture capital activities, a single startup will also suffer
losses of being difficult to finance with venture capital.
Firstly, startups should set high standards for themselves. This includes
no fraud, no benefit transfer, and maintaining a healthy cooperative
relationship with venture capital, etc., in order to facilitate the
constituents of the reserve investment party market of venture capital to
maintain a high moral level.
Secondly, for the sake of safeguarding the industry’s interests and the
clean and maintain a pure market of the reserve investment party, they
should speak out on and together resist the unethical behaviors in the
reserve investment market. For example, if a venture capital consults
the technical level or market prospect of certain startup, the truth should
be told instead of doing things contrary to the will out of some needs. A
well-known example is Dong Mingzhu’s investment in Zhuhai Yinlong.
The lithium titanate battery technology of Zhuhai Yinlong was actually a
technology that had been obsolete in the United States. However, it is
still unknown whether any industry players or enterprises warned Mrs.
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Dong some. The overall failure of this project investment has damaged
the enthusiasm of venture capital in the field of lithium batteries and
new energy vehicles, causing a far-reaching negative impact. But it
could actually be avoided if any warning can be given①.
6.2.3 Correctly regard the threshold of venture capital and avoid
the excessive pursuit of venture capital
The empirical analysis in this paper does not involve the threshold of
venture capital, but as described above, it does not indicate that
startups with nearly zero operating performance have an infinite
probability of obtaining venture capital. There must be a lower limit for
the scale, technology content, and development prospects of the
startups. Below this lower limit, the startups will basically receive no
attention from venture capital. Therefore, startups should also avoid
excessive pursuit of venture capital, resulting in waste of manpower,
material resources, financial resources and time.
Venture capital has its own focuses, requirements and thresholds.
Before introducing venture capital, startups should conduct an objective
comprehensive assessment. If they believe that they are still far from
the threshold of venture capital, they do not need to start the matters
related to the introduction of venture capital, which benefits both
startups and venture capital in terms of reducing cost waste and
improving business efficiency.
① Sohu Finance.(2018,August 10).Yinlong IPO was Terminated! Is Dong Mingzhu’s
“Car-making Dream” Going to Be Shattered?. https://www.sohu.com/a/246126096_100224431
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Generally speaking, traditional small and micro enterprises, low
knowledge and technology content, insufficient growth, outdated
business models, the small scale and low quality level of startup teams
are all taboos for venture capital. If three or more conditions are met, it
is basically unnecessary to consider attracting venture capital, so as to
avoid wasting communication costs. The threshold of venture capital is
proposed mainly based on the perspective of improving the efficiency of
the whole society and for reference of all parties.
6.3 Countermeasures for other capital market participants
The venture capital market is closely linked to the capital market, and
the IPO is always the most important channel for the exit of venture
capital. In recent years, the influence of venture capital on the capital
market has been increasing. Based on the impact between venture
capital and the operating performance of startups, some
countermeasure suggestions for other capital market participants are
put forward.
6.3.1 Countermeasure suggestions for the regulatory authorities
Venture capital plays an important role in the switching of new economy
and new growth drivers of China, innovation and startup, and high-tech
development, while the startups are the main carriers of these
economic activities. Therefore, regulatory authorities, including the
China Securities Regulatory Commission, stock exchanges and units
related to market supervision, should not only encourage the
continuous and rapid development of venture capital and startups, but
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also should notice the adverse selection between venture capital and
the operating performance of startups, strengthen the supervision, and
regulate the behavior of venture capital and startups.
(1) Promote the development of venture capital and encourage
startups to engage in direct financing
In order to promote the development of venture capital, the main
measures adopted by relevant government departments in China
include the establishment of guidance funds to participate in venture
capital raising and the establishment of state-owned venture capital
funds for direct investment.
In order to encourage and guide the development of venture capital,
Chinese governments at all levels have set up guidance funds to
participate in capital contribution as investors upon the establishment of
venture capital funds, and encourage various types of capital to enter
the field of venture capital through the methods of shareholding,
subsidies, incentives, profit tax preference, etc. With reference to
international experience, the intensity of input in guidance funds can be
increased in the future.
For a long time, the relevant departments of the Chinese government
have been an important pillar of economic development, industrial
support and enterprise subsidies. In order to promote the development
of venture capital, in recent years, the relevant departments have
coordinated the use of funds through cooperation to further promote the
“transfer from allocation to investment” of financial funds, established
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state-owned venture capital funds, and given play to the leverage and
demonstration effects of financial funds to lead the state-owned and
social capital into the field of venture capital. At present, China’s
venture capital market has formed a trend of co-existence of
international venture capital, state-owned venture capital and private
venture capital. The growth of state-owned venture capital is conducive
to increasing the total supply of venture capital, and the intensity of
input can be increased in the future.
In order to encourage direct financing for startups, the Chinese
government has launched a series of related policies, including
subsidies and incentives, combination of investment and loan, and
green channels for IPOs in western enterprises, to support startups in
obtaining venture capital as well as the listing and financing in the
capital market, alleviate the difficulty and reduce the cost of financing
for startups. Certain results have been achieved at present, and
support can be further increased in the future.
(2) Promote the innovative development of startups and create
favorable conditions for IPOs
In order to promote the innovation and development of startups, the
Chinese government has issued multiple measures such as identifying
high-tech enterprises, encouraging investment in emerging industries,
and supporting the development of SMEs, and focused on supporting
innovation and startups activities in seven major areas including energy
conservation and environmental protection, emerging information
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industry, biological industry, new energy, new energy vehicles,
high-end equipment manufacturing and new materials, which have also
caused controversy over excessive subsidies and market distortions. In
the future, in accordance with the requirements of the market economy,
the support for startups will be enhanced to promote the transformation
and upgrading of traditional industries and encourage the development
of emerging industries, which will help booster the realization of the
switching of new and old growth drivers and innovative development of
national economy.
In the context of the development of the new economy and new growth
drivers and the booming of high-tech industries, venture capital will be
bound to accomplish great deeds. With the continuous emergence of
investment targets, the scale of venture capital continues to expand.
Regulatory authorities can guide the situation in the light of its general
trend and create conditions for venture capital and startups to realize
IPO, mainly including:
Firstly, accelerate the IPO review and completely solve the problem of
“stagnancy” for pending companies for IPO.
Secondly, accelerate the reform of the registration system and lower
the IPO threshold. The high IPO threshold does not meet the
requirements of marketization, and is easy to cause the artificially high
value of new shares, which harms the secondary market investors,
makes the stock market sluggish for a long time, and damages the
investment and financing functions of the stock market. Therefore,
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lowering the IPO threshold is beneficial to restoring the original function
of stock market.
Thirdly, accelerate the integration of the capital market and
international standards, and encourage startups to conduct overseas
IPOs. At present, the premiums for listing of startups are excessive in
China’s stock market, which not only damages the secondary investors
in the market, but also causes many startups to bunch up in the
domestic capital market and lack the motivation to seek IPOs in
overseas markets. Only by accelerating the integration with
international standards, restoring the basic functions and original status
of the capital market, enabling good companies to receive high
premiums, and bad companies to receive low premiums or even be
punished, can a healthy capital market system be formed, which is also
beneficial to boosting the overseas expansion and sustainable and
healthy development of venture capital and startups.
(3) Improve the regulatory measures for venture capital and
improve the exit channels for venture capital
Necessary supervision needs to be strengthened on venture capital.
The current supervisory measures mainly include product filing,
penetrative supervision of capital sources, and new regulations on
asset management products, specifically: Firstly, venture capital must
be filed with the Asset Management Association of China to report the
registration information, fund size, fund charter, fund shareholders,
duration, management team, annual audit report, etc.; secondly,
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change the old way of supervising the shareholders of investors only,
conduct penetrative supervision on investors to trace the source to the
end to prevent non-compliant investment; thirdly, with the new
regulations on asset management, prohibit product nesting and the
promise of fixed income to investors, reveal the normal risks of venture
capital and prevent risk events.
Generally, the current regulatory measures have both advantages and
disadvantages. The advantages lie in regulating some behaviors of
venture capital, while the disadvantages include that there are
non-market-based behaviors. For example, the filing system is contrary
to market principles. In theory, capital investment is completely
market-based and doesn’t need reporting, just like buying and selling
commodities in a mall. The cause of the filing system is that some
criminals carry out illegal fund-raising activities in the name of venture
capital. In order to prevent illegal activities and supervise legal activities,
it seems to be suspected as over-regulation or improper supervision,
and may not necessarily play a role in the fight against illegal
fund-raising. A certain balance between regulation and the free market
is thus required, which exactly is the direction of improving the
regulatory measures for venture capital. At present, the requirements
for filing should be reduced at least. The current filing system makes
some enterprises and groups that really want to engage in venture
capital face hard times and violate the laws of market development.
In terms of improving the exit channel for venture capital, the most ideal
exit way for venture capital is IPO, but IPO has great difficulties and
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high threshold. The introduction of the Science and Technology
Innovation Board has relatively lowered some thresholds. In the future,
the threshold should be further lowered, and support should be
increased for exit channels such as equity transfers, mergers and
acquisitions and reorganization to smooth the exit channel for venture
capital.
6.3.2 Countermeasure suggestions for the agencies
Agencies in the capital market consist of securities firms, securities
sponsors, accounting firms, and law firms. Their main role is to help
regulate the development of non-listed companies, and promote
qualified startups to conduct IPOs and issue bonds.
(1) Pay close attention to the adverse selection of venture capital
and promote the compliance development of startups
Compared with startups, venture capital is more closely connected with
agencies such as securities firms, securities sponsors, accounting firms
and law firms. With the help of agencies, vigorously promoting the rapid
IPO of invested startups is also one of value-added services often
provided by venture capital.
In the process of carrying out listing counseling and compliance review
for startups with venture capital, agencies tend to be influenced by
venture capital, ignore the adverse selection of venture capital, and
make mistakes such as dressing up the performance and falsification to
speed up the IPOs of startups and help venture capital exit quickly and
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smoothly. This practice has caused severe damage to the capital
market and should be vigorously held down.
As China implements the guidance system and sponsorship system in
capital market, it requires non-listed startups to engage securities firms
for guidance, and can only apply for listing after the guidance period
expires. During the listing application process, the guidance securities
firm automatically becomes a sponsor broker, and the startup will be
recommended by the sponsor (individual qualified for recommendation)
of sponsor broker. After the listing of startup is approved, the sponsor
broker must become an underwriter or one of joint underwriters and
continue to act as a sponsor broker after the IPO, in order to ensure
that the listed company continues to receive professional compliance
guidance and achieve long-term healthy development. This system is
designed to be in line with international standards, and has achieved
good results in practice, but there are also problems that counseling
and sponsorship become a mere formality.
Therefore, in the process of listing guidance and sponsorship for
startups with venture capital, agencies including securities firms,
accounting firms and law firms must set the correct goal, that is, to help
startups meet the requirements of listing, and rectify the problems to
achieve the compliance development and growth of startups, rather
than using the professional capabilities of the agencies to cover up the
problems and spoil things by excessive enthusiasm, and push the
unqualified startups to the capital market. It may not be beneficial to the
startups, but also irresponsible for the majority of capital market
195
investors. In recent years, there have been a lot of punishments on the
guidance and sponsoring brokers by regulatory authorities, indicating
that there’s still a lot of room for agencies to make improvements in
promoting the compliance development of startups.
(2) Shape the friendly multi-party cooperation and promote the
rapid growth of startups
Venture capital, startups and agencies should set a common goal, that
is, to make startups stronger and bigger. In this way, venture capital will
obtain investment returns, startups will obtain development returns, and
agencies will obtain commission. If these returns are not gained from
the growth of startups, then the returns obtained by all parties contain
unethical elements.
In order to achieve this goal, venture capital, startups and agencies
must work together to form a friendly relationship through multi-party
cooperation. By respectively exerting their professional capabilities,
resource integration and sharing can be achieved to form a “1+1+1>3”
effect in order to promote the rapid growth of startups. Finally, all
parties will obtain their own returns, and also add high-quality assets,
wealth and welfare to society.
6.3.3 Countermeasure suggestions for investors in primary and
secondary markets
Due to the adverse selection effect, there is a certain negative
correlation between venture capital and the operating performance of
startups. In this way, startups still have an impact on the capital market
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after IPO, and investors in the primary and secondary markets of the
capital market should also respond appropriately.
(1) Correctly regard the possible valuation bubble of venture
capital
Startups with venture capital generally have lower operating
performance. This does not mean that these companies cannot go
public, but that they cannot be given an excessive premium. Only when
the price and value are basically consistent is the normal investment
target.
In China’s capital market, due to the certain halo effect of venture
capital and due to the adverse selection of venture capital, the startups
with low operating performance are likely to go through several rounds
of financing, and the valuation will get higher round after round. So, it is
easy to form the valuation bubble of startups, which may gradually
burst after the IPOs of startups and damages investors in the primary
and secondary stock markets.
The investors in the primary and secondary stock market must
recognize the negative correlation between venture capital and the
operating performance of startups, recognize the fact that listed
companies that contain venture capital may have valuation bubbles,
and carefully study the investment targets to have an objective
understanding of their investment value instead of being fooled by the
gorgeous appearances of venture capital. They must adhere to value
orientation and invest cautiously.
197
(2) Use the relevant effects included in venture capital to increase
investment income
The empirical analysis in this paper mainly demonstrates the adverse
selection between venture capital and the operating performance of
startups. And hypotheses and theories put forward in previous
researches related to venture capital such as the grandstanding
hypothesis, supervision hypothesis, certification hypothesis, market
power hypothesis, supervisory mechanism effect and incentive
mechanism effect have not been verified here.
On the whole, these theories make sense to a certain extent, and are
verified and applied a lot in practice. Investors in the stock market can
use these theories including adverse selection effects to increase
investment returns. For example, according to the grandstanding
hypothesis, venture capitalists try to improve their reputation, so when
the venture capitalists announce that they are about to sell their stocks
and exit, it is likely to conduct a certain market support transaction. At
this time, the secondary investors in the stock market can buy stocks
and exit after gaining the spread return.
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Chapter 7 Conclusions and Prospects
Now, this paper has completed the analysis of problem introduction,
empirical model, causes and effects of adverse selection, and
countermeasure suggestions. It is necessary to review the previous
research work, summarize some of the research conclusions, and
probe into the existing problems and point out the direction of future
research. After that, this paper reaches its end.
7.1 Main tasks and conclusions
7.1.1 Review of main work
This paper investigates the impact of venture capital on the operating
performance of startups and conducts an in-depth discussion on the
problem formulation, empirical analysis, cause and effect analysis, and
countermeasure suggestions. The main research work includes:
The first part is the introduction, mainly explaining the research
backgrounds, reasons, purposes and significance, research content,
research methodology, technical routes and possible novelties of the
paper.
The second part is fundamental theories and literature review. It mainly
includes concepts related to venture capital and startups, relevant
theories of the impact of venture capital on the operating performance
of startups, and Chinese and foreign literature reviews and evaluations.
The third part is development process of venture capital and research
problems in this study. It mainly includes the development history of
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Chinese and foreign venture capital, as well as the introduction to the
research problems, relevant research framework and research design.
The fourth part is empirical analysis of the impact of venture capital on
the operating performance of startups. It mainly includes the
characterization dimension of the operating performance of startups,
regression analysis of the impact of venture capital on operating
performance of startups, hypothesis verification and conclusion
discussion of the impact of venture capital on operating performance of
startups.
The fifth part is cause and effect analysis of adverse selection in
venture capital The causes for adverse selection mainly include
market-based selection of risk appetite, information asymmetry, and
principal-agent mechanism. Adverse selection effects mainly elaborate
the possibility of increasing venture capital for startups by making use
of adverse selection, lemon market, and valuation bubble, moral risks
and threshold issues.
The sixth part is countermeasure analysis of the impact of venture
capital on the operating performance of startups. It puts forward
countermeasures and recommendations for venture capital, startups,
and other participants in the capital market mainly based on the
empirical analysis on mutual impact between venture capital and
operating performance of startups in order to deepen the value of this
paper.
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The seventh part is the conclusions and prospects. It consists of the
main work and conclusions of the paper are reviewed, and the
problems and directions which require further study are pointed out for
the paper.
7.1.2 Main conclusions and analysis
In the research process of this paper, some important conclusions have
been formed, and they will be summarized and analyzed for their
applications as follows.
(1) There is a negative correlation between venture capital and
operating performance of startups, which mainly results from the
adverse selection effect.
Adverse selection is an important phenomenon when venture capital
enters a startup, and is the result of two-way selection. Venture capital
tends to choose startups with poor operating performance for
investment, and startups with poor operating performance also tends to
seek the venture capital. So even before the IPO, the operating
performance of these venture capital startups is still generally lower
than that of startups without venture capital.
From the perspective of venture capital, startups with poor operating
performance generally have low valuations, and they can obtain more
equities at a lower capital cost. Once the IPOs of invested startups are
successful, the wealth effect will be more considerable than investing in
companies with good operating performance and high valuations.
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Therefore, the occurrence of adverse selection is a normal market
behavior.
From the perspective of startups, startups with poorer operating
performance have higher desire for funds while have limited financing
channels, so they more welcome venture capital. Under this driving
force, more startups with poor operating performance choose to attract
venture capital for financing, and even reduces valuations to some
extent. As a result, the operating performance of startups with venture
capital is generally lower than that of startups without venture capital.
Such adverse selection is normal market behavior.
However, the startups with poor operating performance may form an
interest transfer to the management team of venture capital in order to
successfully attract venture capital, which means to use the
principal-agent relationship between venture capital and venture capital
managers to make a profit for the venture capital managers which in
turn facilitates adverse selection of venture capital. This is immoral. Or
in order to successfully attract venture capital, the startups with low
operating performance takes advantage of the information asymmetry
between the venture capital and the reserve investment companies,
causing venture capital to be hoodwinked to make wrong judgments
and choose the startups proved to have poor operating performance
afterwards, then, this is a passive adverse selection, which seriously
violates the basic principles of the market economy.
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(2) The causes for adverse selection in venture capital mainly
include the market selection of risk appetite, information
asymmetry, and principal-agent mechanism. The adverse
selection effect can increase the possibility for startups to obtain
venture capital. In the meanwhile, we need to avoid the adverse
selection and moral risks arising from information asymmetry and
principal-agent mechanism.
Different venture capitals have different risk appetites, forming venture
capitals that focus on the initial stage, early-stage, medium-stage and
pre-IPO stage in the market. Due to different investment fields, different
risk preferences and different investment stages, there are various
types of venture capitals in the market. This is a normal behavior
caused by different market positioning. Out of financing needs, startups
seek venture capital to achieve success according to their own
operating performance, asset characteristics, development stage,
growth, etc. This is also normal market behavior.
In order to attract the attention of venture capital and successfully
obtain venture capital, the startups can structurally lower the profitability,
solvency, and operating capabilities of the operating performance to
improve the possibility of attracting venture capital. However, startups
must optimize the structure under stock conditions, make some minor
adjustments to operation, finance, strategy, R&D, and market, and
respond to the concerns and preferences of venture capital, rather than
create a poor operating performance divorced from the actual situation,
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otherwise it is likely to harm the venture capital and the startups their
own.
For the adverse selection of the investment of venture capital in
startups with low operating performance caused by the use of
principal-agent relationship and information asymmetry, it should be
prevented by venture capital and startups with all their strengths.
Because it is unethical and does not conform to the principles of
marketization, which contains obvious risks. In order to avoid the
adverse selection and moral risks caused by the use of the
principal-agent relationship, venture capital funds should strengthen
institutional constraints and enhance the construction and cultivation of
professional ethics. In order to avoid the adverse selection caused by
information asymmetry, the venture capital fund management team
must improve the professional competences. If necessary, external
experts can be introduced and valuation adjustment mechanism can be
utilized to reduce possible risks.
In general, this paper has also made some important conclusions in the
valuation bubble, lemon market and threshold in the field of venture
capital. There are also many conclusions in the countermeasures for
other participants in the capital market, which will not be elaborated one
by one.
7.2 Insufficiencies and future research
7.2.1 Insufficiencies
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There are still some insufficiencies in the research and discussion of
this study, mainly in the following two aspects:
First, there are certain research limitations. In the empirical analysis of
this study, the public cross-sectional data before the IPO is mainly
employed to obtain samples of venture capital and venture-free
investment, and form two control groups, in order to study the impact
between venture capital and the operating performance of startups. It is
also the mainstream research method on this issue at home and
abroad. However, such research still has certain limitations. Because
for specific startups, each startup differs greatly, and it is easy to ignore
the individual characteristics of startups through the research method of
the control group. If going deep into a single startup and tracking
enough sample cases for a sufficient amount of time, the impact
between venture capital and the operating performance of startups can
be observed more profoundly, and the conclusions drawn can be more
convincing.
In 1938, Harvard University conducted an adult development study,
planning to use 75 years to track the life of 724 males, record their work,
family, state of health, and observe their life trends. Now the study has
finished, and the results show that it is the good interpersonal
relationship that determines one’s happiness in life, rather than money,
fame, fortune, and work. Such long-term continuous tracking makes the
conclusion very convincing①. The author believes that the venture
① Dr. Hai Lan.（2018,February 4）A 75 Years of Research of Harvard University Proves: What
Kind of Person is the Happiest? . http://dy.163.com/v2/article/detail/D9Q6SILQ0514DG98.html
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capital will also have a life-long impact on the operating performance of
startups. From follow-up research and the acquisition of time series
data and individual characteristics of the control group samples of
startups with and without venture capital, the research on mutual
impact between venture capital and the operating performance of
startups can be significantly deepened. Certainly, such condition is not
available to many researchers, including the author.
In general, this study has certain research limitations, and this
understanding is of positive significant to improve the subsequent
research.
Second, this study fails to perform more verifications on many
hypotheses and theories. In terms of the impact between venture
capital and the operating performance of startups, many hypotheses
and theories have been put forward in the previous research. During
the early stage, this study considered that verification might be made
on many hypotheses and theories through the empirical analysis of
pre-IPO cross-sectional data of Chinese GEM listed companies, but
finally found that only the adverse selection hypothesis can be verified
and logically deducted mainly based on empirical analysis. As the
author’s professional experience is mainly engaged in the practical
activities of venture capital, the author has a strong interest in these
hypotheses and theories, and hopes to form support or denial of these
hypotheses and theories through research to guide the investment
practice in future. But this study fails to achieve this goal. This is also a
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shortcoming of this study, and related issues deserve continuous
attention and in-depth research.
7.2.2 Future research
In the author’s view, the research on the impact of venture capital on
the operating performance of startups has great practical significance.
The shortcomings mentioned above can be further improved in the
future, and the related research directions mainly include the following
two aspects:
First, the follow-up study of venture capital cases can be improved.
Setting venture capital or venture-free investment as a control group for
group comparison and research certainly has prominent academic
value and significance, but if venture capital or venture-free investment
cases are selected to conduct long-term case tracking to conclude an
impact relationship based on time series and individual characteristics,
the conclusion will obviously deepen the value and significance of the
research. The author has easy access to a large number of real-life
cases due to the work. Therefore, even after this study is ended, the
follow-up research on venture capital cases will be strengthened, and
thereby consolidate his academic experience and ability.
Second, verification research on hypotheses and theories related to
venture capital can be strengthened. Previous studies have formed
many hypotheses and theories on the relationship between venture
capital and the operating performance of startups, but these
hypotheses and theories are mainly based on sample analysis and
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practice comparison of foreign markets such as the United States. But
China’s venture capital market has certain particularities. First, the
development time of venture capital market is relatively short. Second,
the state-owned economy has a dominant position. Whether these
hypotheses and theories are applicable to the China’s venture capital
market, whether they can be verified, and how the practical activities of
venture capital will be impacted, all of which are worthy of in-depth
study. In the future, the author will continue to pay close attention to
and explore the verification of hypothesis and theories related to
venture capital.
In short, as a senior practitioner in the field of venture capital, the author
hopes to combine investment practice and academic exploration.
Therefore, despite that the way of academic research is arduous and
long, the author will forge ahead.
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